Institute for Communication, Journalism and Computer Science, University of Roskilde

Media and Communication in Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building
Exploring strategies for International and UN-led Conflict Transformation

Bent Nørby Bonde

Submitted on 15 August 2005

Word count: 96.625

Abstract

The dissertation provides an integrated model for the analysis and design of media interventions in peace-building, conflict transformation and prevention. It offers a model to adapt media interventions to the phases of conflict and another for using content and various genres to move from conflict through reconciliation to conflict transformation. It identifies different areas of intervention as part of international efforts to prevent conflicts and build peace, such as content, media structure, capacity-building and ethics of journalism. The UN Secretariat but also national donors, governments, and international non-governmental organisations are analysed to identify their capacity to use media and communication to support peace. The dissertation shows how media and communication strategies must be based on thorough analysis to target both root and dynamic causes of conflict, and encompass short- and long-term perspectives. Methodologically, the functional approach of this dissertation combines the practical management of conflict with the theoretical understanding of the phenomena of conflict, media and psychological perceptions within the population, combining dynamic and structural conflict prevention.

Chapter 2 draws on conflict resolution, communication and social psychological research to develop a theoretical framework for understanding media and communication as part of peace-building efforts. Chapter 3 analyses the Yugoslav conflict and the Rwandan genocide and shows how public and private media played significant roles in inciting hatred and creating moral panic.

Chapter 4 identifies the possible areas of intervention as media structure, legislation, content, journalists' capacity and ethical standards; the chapter further identifies the possible phases for

media intervention as ranging from the distant pre-conflict to the post-conflict transformation of society, as well as different media defined according to their de-escalating values of diversity and impartiality. Chapter 5 develops a model for supporting and designing media content, which is tested through focus group interviews across the countries of former Yugoslavia; the chapter further discusses the role of journalists in conflict reporting. Chapter 6 identifies the fields of structural media intervention, relates them to types of conflicts and prioritises the post-conflict targets as the regulation of content, licensing mechanisms and public service broadcasting. Chapter 7 analyses the UN as a key actor for using media in conflict prevention and peace-building. The chapter concludes that in order to react rapidly with a long-term strategy, the organisation should involve other UN organisations, international donors and media NGOs.

The author argues that the strategies developed for internal conflicts are useful in designing answers also to international conflicts, the fostering of terrorists and use of media and communication in social change.

Resume

(Danish)

Afhandlingen giver en integreret model til at analysere og designe medieinterventioner i fredsskabelse, konflikttransformering og forebyggelse, baseret på psykosociale, konflikt-, kommunikations- og medieteorier. Den tilbyder en model, der tilpasser medieinterventioner til konfliktens faser og en anden til at bruge indhold og forskellige journalistiske genrer i processen fra konflikt, gennem forsoning og til konflikttransformering. Afhandlingen identificerer forskellige områder for intervention som led i internationale bestræbelser på at forebygge konflikter og bygge fred – såsom indhold, mediestruktur, kapacitetsopbygning og etik i journalistik. FN, men også nationale donorer, regeringer, og internationale NGO'er, bliver analyseret for at identificere deres kapacitet til at bruge medier og kommunikation til at støtte fred. Afhandlingen viser, hvordan medie- og kommunikationsstrategier må basere sig på grundige analyser for at ramme både grundlæggende og dynamiske årsager til konflikt, såvel som kort- og langtrækkende perspektiver. Metodisk kombinerer den funktionelle tilgang i denne afhandling den praktiske konfliktstyring med en teoretisk forståelse af fænomenet konflikt, medier og psykosocial perception i befolkningen, ligesom den retter sig både mod dynamisk og strukturel konfliktforebyggelse.

Kapitel 2 trækker på konfliktløsnings-, kommunikations- og socialpsykologisk forskning for at udvikle en teoretisk ramme for forståelsen af medier og kommunikation som led i bestræbelser på at opbygge fred. Kapitel 3 analyserer den Jugoslaviske konflikt og folkemordet i Rwanda og viser hvordan offentlige og private medier spillede væsentlige roller i at opbygge had og skabe moralsk panik. Kapitel 4 identificerer de mulige interventionsfelter som mediestruktur, lovgivning, indhold, journalistisk kapacitet og etiske

standarder. Kapitlet identificerer endvidere de mulige faser for medieintervention fra den fjerne prækonflikt til transformeringen af samfundet post-konflikt, ligesom forskellige medier defineres i forhold til deres deeskalerende værdier som diversitet og upartiskhed. Kapitel 5 udvikler en model til at støtte og udvikle medieindhold. Modellen er testet gennem fokusgruppeinterviews på tværs af landene i det tidligere Jugoslavien. Kapitlet diskuterer endvidere journalisters rolle i konfliktrapportering. Kapitel 6 identificerer strukturelle interventionsfelter og relaterer dem til forskellige konflikttyper, ligesom det post-konflikt prioriterer indsatserne som regulering for indhold, udstedelse af licenser og public service medier. Kapitel 7 analyserer FN som en nøgleaktør for brugen af medier i konfliktforebyggelse og fredsopbygning. Kapitlet konkluderer, at for at kunne handle hurtigt med en langsigtet strategi bør organisationen involvere andre FN-organisationer, internationale donorer og medie-NGO'er.

De strategier, der er udviklet til interne konflikter, vurderer forfatteren også vil kunne anvendes til at udforme svar på internationale konflikter, tilgangen af terrorister og brugen af medier og kommunikation som led i social forandring.

List of Abbreviations

9/11	Attacks on World Trade Center, 11 September 2001
ABC	American Broadcasting Corporation
ALER	Asociación Latinoamericana de Educación Radiofónica
AMARCC	La Asociación Mundial de Radios Comunitarias
ANEM	Network of independent electronic Media in Serbia
AU	African Union
BiH	Bosnia-i-Herzegovina
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BMC	Baltic Media Centre
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
CERD	United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
CIA	United States Central Intelligence Agency
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNN	Central News Network
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DfID	UK Department for International Development
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNDPI	United Nations Department of Public Information
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations
EBU	European Broadcasting Union
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERNO	European Regional News Exchange for South East Europe
EU	European Union
FOJO	Swedish School of Journalism
FRESTA	Danish Programme for Peace and Stability
HDZ	Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union)
HTV	Croatian Television
ICCPR	UN International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IFJ	International Federation of Journalists
IFOR	NATO-led Implementation Force in Yugoslavia
IMC	International Media Commission
IMS	International Media Support
IMPACS	Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society
JNA	Yugoslav National Army
MAI	Media Action International
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

MRND	Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	National Broadcasting Corporation
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NTA	Nigerian Federal Television
NWICO	New World Information and Communication Order
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHR	Office of the High Representative
ORINFOR	L'Office Rwandais d'Information
OAS	Organization of American States
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBS	Public Broadcasting System
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy
RFE	Radio Free Europe
RL	Radio Liberation
RPA	Rwanda Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTK	Radio & Television Kosovo
RTVBiH	Radio & Television Bosnia-i-Herzegovina
RTLM	Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
RTVBiH	Radio & Television Bosnia-i-Herzegovina
RTS	Radio & Television Serbia
SFOR	Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-i-Herzegovina
TELESEE	Network of Public Broadcasters of South East Europe
TMC	Temporary Media Commissioner
UK	United Kingdom
UNAMET	United Nations Mission to East Timor
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNMIL	United Nations Mission to Liberia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Security General
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VOA	Voice of America

WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements:

When I decided to leave my position as Managing Director of the Baltic Media Centre on the small Danish island of Bornholm after ten years my responsibilities included programme development for practical media support in peace-building and democracy and I was eager to explore and systematize the various approaches from a scholarly and scientific perspective.

My friend and collaborator, **Robin Cheesman**, MA, Associate Professor at the Institute for Communication, Journalism & Computer Science (ICJD) at the University of Roskilde (RUC), who guided me through my MA at the RUC twenty-three years earlier, immediately supported the idea and has been supportive ever since. Robin introduced me to **Cees J. Hamelink**, PhD and Professor in International Communication at the University of Amsterdam, to whom I am indebted for his unwavering encouragement, inspiration and fruitful discussions about media freedom, freedom of information and communication. My supervisor **Thomas Tufte**, PhD, Professor at ICJD at RUC, has contributed significantly to the writing process through his consistently precise, constructive and supportive critique based on his extensive knowledge and experience on communication for change.

A number of people have given significant scholarly input to my PhD thesis. I am grateful to **Andrea Bartoli**, PhD, Director of the Center for International Conflict Resolution, SIPA, Columbia University, for his generous assistance in putting my conflict resolution and media approaches in order. Many thanks to **Karsten Fledelius**, MA, Associate Professor at Institute for Film and Media Science at University of Copenhagen, for having supported the project from its early phases and having been so helpful in letting me draw on his extensive knowledge and experience on the media's role in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. **William J. Durch**, PhD and Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Centre was a well of knowledge about the United Nations' conflict management operations. I am grateful for his help as well as the valuable and new approaches to virtual diplomacy and use of the Web in conflict prevention outlined by **Sheryl Brown**, PhD, Director of the Virtual Diplomacy Initiative, the United States Institute of Peace. This is certainly worth exploring further, as is the advocacy approach to conflict prevention, so kindly presented by **Thomas R. Lansner**, MA, Associate Professor, SIPA, Columbia University. **Barnett Rubin**, PhD, Director of Studies, Center on International Cooperation at New York University, with his extensive experience, gave a comprehensive down-to-earth evaluation of actors and strategies for the media and NGOs in conflict areas.

Throughout this process, my driving force has been the memory of numerous **people in conflict situations** across the world, many of whom I have worked with and been inspired by. I hope that this PhD will provide useful insights in return and improve the work for sustainable peace.

Finally – for more than two years, I have drawn on my family's patience while working on this thesis as well as doing consultancy work. Every time I decided to go writing in our summerhouse, I would see the quietly reproachful looks in the eyes of my children **Astrid** and **Aske** and my wife **Ingeline**. This project is now done and I thank you all for your understanding and support throughout.

Bent Nørby Bonde

1.   Introduction

Background:

During the Cold War, most violent conflicts occurred within rather than between countries and can be set in the ideological context between East and West (Lederach, 1997, p. 3-17). These internal conflicts were intensified by support from the two superpowers, the Soviet Union (USSR) and United States of America (USA), and the transformation from open war to non-violent conflict implied negotiations between them or was the result of military defeat.

Since 1989, with the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, internal conflicts have appeared more diverse in nature with regard to the elements characterizing the group cohesion and mobilization. Often conflicts have been rooted in resource or land disputes, but fought with strong references to ethnic, cultural, and religious identities. Conflicts during the Cold War were primarily driven by rational motives and were consequently settled rationally, from a national security perspective. In the post Cold War era, open conflicts as well as external attempts to manage them were met with a much more irrational and localised battleground of identities and historically protracted conflicts (Lederach, 1997, p. 3-17). At the same time, many of the internal conflicts were regional or transnational by nature, implying strong links with external and global interests. The number of armed conflicts peaked in 1999 with 51 and has since then declined to 20 in 2004 (Easterbrook, 2005). In the same period we have seen a growth of investments in peacekeeping and international conflict prevention guided by the

UN, a spread of democracy and with one exception of USA a decline in military spending.

There is no doubt that the post 9/11 period will see the establishment of a new international relations scenario. From recent developments, it can be observed that the terror attack on the USA led to the government's declaration of war on terrorism. Attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq marked a new doctrine based on pre-emptive attacks on states with presumed capability to produce weapons of mass destruction or relations to terrorists. Islamic fundamentalists, who were behind the 9/11 attacks have gained ground in a number of countries with significant Muslim populations since then and have sought to hurt the political and economic interests of the USA in particular, through armed attacks at civilian and military targets and American allies, which include a number of European and totalitarian Arab regimes.

In parallel with technological and societal development, mass media has gained a still stronger influence in building national and group identities. The internal wars, which are fought on divisions between these identities, have consequently left the mass media playing one of the key roles in instigating the violence (Seaton, 1999, p. 46). As disseminators of symbols, canvassing stereotypes and prejudices against the 'others', it is well documented that the mass media has been of great importance in the wars leading to the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, the genocides in Rwanda as well as in many other internal conflicts (Thompson, 1999, p.1 and Chretien, 1995, Chapter 2).

Already evident during World War Two and throughout the Cold War era, media has been used as a tool for propaganda to promote the

strength and values of one party or to weaken popular support for another. Radio, television and films were all been instruments for the Nazi Germans to create well known symbols to embody the superiority of the German nation, the Aryan race, and Germany's 'legitimate' right to attack neighbouring countries (Bytwerk, 1997), the USSR exercised strict political control of its media, which provided its citizens with the information needed to build an image of the superior communist system taking care of everybody, its heroic working class and a nation suited to lead the world revolution. In the name of democracy and liberty, the USA encouraged popular resistance to totalitarian communist regimes as well as to democratically-elected socialist governments through widespread radio operations, which in turn were jammed by many of the target countries. Even today, international surrogate broadcasters (Price, 2002, p. 175) are an instrument, and psychological operations (PSYOPS) are used to

> convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviour favourable to the originator's objectives (*The Information Warfare Site*, 2004).

The mass media played an important role in psychological warfare during the Cold War because both East and West believed that conveying the right messages to target groups would influence their opinions, attitudes, and behaviour in a favourable direction. Time and research has shown that to change opinions, attitudes or

behaviour is not as simple as that, though this tradition still exists. Today the mass media is still seen as one of the most important institutions influencing our level of socialisation, on par with the family, school etc. and is viewed as being able to set the agenda for contemporary issues of concern.

It is a proven fact that the media in this way has played an important role in strengthening popular support for conflicts and wars. However, it would be logical to look at ways of diminishing this role and to look into ways of letting the media participate actively in reconciliation and peace-building. Over the past decade, this has in fact become part of the scope of work for international donors, non-governmental and multilateral organisations. The methods and models for these efforts are still being developed through the learning by doing approach, with almost no interaction with scholarly research.

There has been substantial research on the role of media in conflict escalation. Almost all of it is related to specific cases like the Rwandan genocide, the Balkan Wars, or international wars such as the Gulf War, the conflict in Kashmir and a number of others. Most of the scholarly literature in this field has dealt with the nature and quality of reporting on distant wars and internal conflicts in the American and European media. Among the publications in this field are *The Media of Conflict – War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence*, edited by Tim Allen and Jean Seaton (1999)*,* British experts in development and communication studies respectively. Another author working specifically on international communication is the UK-based Indian Communication and International Relations oriented researcher, Daya Kishan Thussu. His book *War and the Media – Reporting Conflict 24/7* deals with information warfare and

the streamlining imposed on the media agendas and journalists working for the international media during wars (Thussu, 2003).

The wars involving the USA and European countries have resulted in numerous books written about Western media coverage. As an example, the 1991 Gulf War resulted in many new books, which were edited by Bennett W. Lance, David L. Paletz, John R. MacArthur, Hamid Mowlana, George Gerbner, Herbert I. Schiller, Hedrick Smith, Philip M. Taylor, Douglas Kellner and Robert E. Denton J., amongst others. Similarly, Western reporting on the wars of former Yugoslavia, the genocides in Rwanda and other violent internal and international conflicts have been analysed by several authors. Besides issues of domestic concern in the West, the international reporting about even very distant conflicts seems important for the political decisions about possible international interventions. Though the international reporting consequently might have significant impact on the outcome of violent conflicts it will not be the focus for this thesis.

Less literature deals with the roles of domestic or neighbouring media reaching the populations engulfed by war, however this area is of more interest to my thesis. The authors who have contributed to this field have made their analyses primarily from journalistic, anthropological or sociological perspectives.

Yugoslavia and Rwanda in particular, have brought about a huge body of knowledge about the media's role in these specific conflicts. On the Yugoslav conflict, the British journalist and media analyst Mark Thompson has in his book *Forging War – The media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina* (1999) given a very comprehensive and detailed insight into the media's role before and during the

internal conflicts (p.1). Most literature focuses on the media content, while it in Thompson's case also puts it into the context of media landscape and media legislation. From a sociological and anthropological perspective, the Yugoslavian political sociologist Spyros A. Sofos (1999) provides a convincing analysis of the media's role in the dissolution of former Yugoslavia in the article *Culture, Media and the Politics of Disintegration and Ethnic Division in Former Yugoslavia (*p. 162). A sociological and anthropological perspective is also used by the French historian Jean-Pierre Chrétien's book *Rwanda, Les Médias du Génocide,* like in Edouard Bizumuremyi's (2001) thesis *Genése d'un genocide. "Racialisation", "ethnisation" et Communication au Rwanda*.

There are clearly a number of inspiring sources about the function that media carries before or during conflicts. One interesting approach is given by the Israeli Professor in Communications, Dov Shinar, who in his article *Peace process in cultural conflict: The role of the media* discusses the Israeli-Palestinian process since the Oslo accords (2003). Based on a definition of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a cultural and identity based conflict and following the enhanced function of media as an agenda setter for policy matters and parties in diplomatic discussions, Shinar discusses the different approaches taken by the media in the peace building phase. In particular, the restraints of the publicly established discourse of reconciliation, which was internalised by the Israeli media is often held up against a discourse of conflict transformation and its complex and long term vision making it less attractive to the mainstream media. Shinar (2004) takes as his starting point the normative premises that the media – considering their power in society – should be active participants, catalysts, mediators and messengers in promoting peace (2004). Consequently, he finds the

missing academic tool to be research on peace journalism and peace discourse. The perspective for Shinar is from within the media of the conflicting parties and not from any outside interventions and support to media in conflict situations.

What is striking, however, is that very little scholarly research actually focuses on the potential of media to prevent conflicts or contribute to a sustainable peace. Besides the discussions which took place in the 1970s in the wake of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), some research since the mid-1990s has dealt with peace journalism and the change of news from a discourse of war to a discourse of peace. Among the researchers in this field are the Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung, the British journalist Jake Lynch, the Danish journalist and PhD in peace Journalism Kirsten Schwarz Sparre, the German sociological/psychological PhD student Burkhard Bläsi and the German psychologist and peace researcher Wilhelm Kempf. What they generally have in common is an insight into the social-psychological impact of the media's discourses on a war-torn population. Furthermore, most they appear to share the premise that it is possible and desirable for individual journalists and media based on ethical choice to change the discourse of the media content from war to peace before, during and after conflict. Missing in this approach is evidently the understanding of the dynamics, power struggles and the leadership pressure on media and journalists leading up to and during violent conflicts. Even in well-established democracies, the development of full-scale peace journalism might come across as an impossible mission. Absent in the list of aforementioned experts and their research is the uncompromised commitment to standards linking the freedom of speech with media's editorial independence.

This thesis focuses on external multilateral and international interventions and support to media in conflict situations. While the above discussion about the role of journalism in relation to violent conflicts helps in setting goals and standards for one aspect of the possible media interventions, it hardly takes into account either the dynamics of conflict or conflict management. Links to well established and developed conflict management theories and models are rarely made in the literature on media in conflict prevention and peace-building.

An approach focusing on possible interventions from outside international actors is taken in *Forging Peace – Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space* (Price and Thompson [eds.], 2002). The book looks at the international legislative norms for humanitarian intervention, discusses options of *information interventions,* closing or jamming local media as well as provides a critical analysis of a module for media legislation and regulatory systems, which has been developed for United Nations (UN) led post-conflict interventions. However, the book does not focus on possibilities for the international community to support local media in playing a role in conflict prevention or peace-building. Nor does it establish a strong link to the numerous other tools within conflict management. From a communications theory perspective, the book lacks any analysis of the potential impact on popular attitudes or conflict dynamics by interventions supporting local, national or international media.

As I have reiterated, it is necessary to put media interventions into a perspective of conflict management theories and models to obtain the optimal outcome in terms of conflict prevention or peace-

building. The bridge between communication theories on one end and conflict or conflict management theories and models on the other has hardly been established. This is not only due to the communication researchers but equally due to lack of concern from the different schools of international relations.

The American scholars in Political Science, Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi (1993) distinguish between three principal understandings of international relations – realism, pluralism and globalism – which of course are simplified models subject to different nuances from researchers working in the field.

- The **Realism school,** which dominated before and during the Cold War, focuses on nation states and is characterised by having a unitary state as the key actor. The Realism school usually sees the state as a rational actor and assumes that national security has top priority among all other international issues. The international hierarchy is established depending on the military strength of each country.

- The **Pluralism school** existed during the Cold War but is much stronger today. It sees non state actors as important entities and the state as disaggregated into components some of which operate trans-nationally. The pluralists question the state as a rational actor and see foreign policymaking and trans-national processes as involving conflicts, bargaining, coalition and compromise, which not necessarily result in optimal outcomes. They believe that international socioeconomic or welfare issues are equally or more important than national security questions and see

UN an international organisations as having a strong role in regulating relations between states.

- The **Globalist School** sees international relations from a historical perspective and the development of the world capitalism with its classes, states, and non state actors as the decisive context. Globalists recognize the importance of states-as-actors, international organizations, and trans-national actors and coalitions, but the particular focus of their analysis is on mechanisms of domination by which some states, classes, or elites manage to benefit from this capitalist system at the expense of others. The economic factors are the most important.

Though the Globalist school adds to the understanding of causes behind internal conflicts as well, it does not include other important aspects, such as the relations between ethnic, geographical or religious identities. It is clear that the pure Realism school with its mechanical understanding of conflicts hardly provides a sufficient answer to the internal conflicts that we know today, but was more relevant during the Cold War, when internal conflicts were part of a larger international pattern. The Pluralism School, however, does accept it and is open for several dimensions to understand and develop management tools for internal conflicts.

The British Doctor in Gender and Conflict Transformation, Cordula Reimann (2004), sums up the third-party strategies in conflict transformation as follows (p.5):

- **Track I** activities range from 'good offices', fact-finding missions, facilitation, negotiation/mediation and

peacekeeping, to power-mediation, sanctions, peace-
enforcement and arbitration. The actors involved are
Political and military leaders as mediators and/or
representatives of conflict parties.

- **Track II** activities are all non-official and non-coercive
  activities often focusing on facilitation, consultation in the
  form of problem-solving work shops, and roundtable
  discussions. The actors range from private individuals,
  academics, professionals, 'citizens diplomacy' to
  international and local non-governmental organisations
  involved in conflict resolution.

- **Track III** is the most recent conceptual development. The
  activities are all process- and structure-oriented initiatives
  in grassroots training, capacity building and empowerment,
  trauma work, human rights, development work and
  humanitarian assistance. The actors range from local
  grassroots organisations to local and international
  development agencies, human rights, and humanitarian
  organisations.

Media interventions range from *Information Intervention* (Metzl,
2002, p. 1) as part of Track I to a wider scope of activities within
Tracks II and III.

When designing the strategic goals and scope of media interventions
it is necessary to clarify the desired outcome after a conflict. If we
strive for *Conflict Settlement,* the conflict is understood as a
problem to the political order and status quo. By settling the
conflict, order is restored and if possible a zero-sum situation is

changed to a positive-sum outcome. Conflict Settlement is linked to the Realism school and works at the Track I level (Reimann, 2004, p. 8-9).

If we seek *Conflict Resolution* the conflict is philosophically seen as a result of underlying causes of direct, cultural and structural violence. The conflicts are not based on negotiable interests but on needs and fears. Consequently conflict solution is process and relationship oriented, non-coercive and unofficial. While accepting Track 1 activities, it also stresses the need for Track II activities and actors like civil society. The Pluralism school will typically take a conflict resolution or conflict transformation approach (Reimann, 2004, p.9-10).

Also the *Conflict Transformation* approach sees conflict as a result of underlying causes but aims through process and structure oriented long-term peace-building efforts to overcome these forms of violence. It understands the conflict from conflict theory, human needs and non-violent action perspectives and effectively combines Tracks I, II and III activities along the continuum of short, middle and long-term involvement (Reimann, 2004, p. 10-13).

Balancing these three conceptions of conflict, it is clear that the conflict settlement approach alone does not add to the prevention of re-occurring conflicts, but nevertheless seeks to minimize violence. My entry point will be the conflict transformation approach, which both includes aspects of conflict resolution and also stresses the need for short-, middle-, and long-term involvement to bring about structural changes transforming the social, economic, cultural, or political causes of conflict. I will also link up to the efforts of conflict

prevention and conflict settlement as part of UN's operational conflict management.

The American International Security academic, Michael E. Brown (1996), distinguishes between pre-disposing and proximate causes or triggers of conflict (p. 571-602). This is similar to Michael Lund's distinction between structural and dynamic factors (2004, SAIS-jku.edu/cmtoolkit). The pre-disposing causes or structural factors are underlying factors which only produce violence "remotely and indirectly", while triggers or dynamic factors that influence the evolution of the conflict can be used to identify strategic entry points for interventions to prevent conflicts or establish peace.

Brown extracts twelve underlying facts that predispose some regions to violence. These factors have a catalytic role if rapid changes take place and should also provide a list of twelve possible proximate causes:

Economic/Social factors:
Causes: Economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, economic development and modernization.
Triggers: Mounting economic problems, growing economic inequities, fast-paced development and modernization.

Cultural/Perceptual factors:
Causes: Patterns of cultural discrimination, problematic group histories.
Triggers: Intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination, ethnic bashing and propagandizing.

<u>Structural Factors:</u>

Causes: Weak states, Intra-state security concerns, ethnic geography.

Triggers: Collapsing states, changing intra-state military balances, changing demographic patterns.

<u>Political Factors:</u>

Causes: Discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics, elite politics.

Triggers: Political transitions, increasingly influential exclusionary ideologies, growing inter-group competitions, intensifying leadership struggles (1995, p.577).

The distinction between causes and triggers or structural and dynamic factors is very useful when looking at the scope and goals for media support. Media has a role to play in drawing the attention of the population and leadership to the underlying causes and structural inadequacies, in order to facilitate an agenda for change. Media, for better or worse, also plays very efficiently into the dynamics of conflict. It is equally important to focus on dynamics and deep lying causes and I believe that the timing is decisive for the outcome of these efforts.

As we shall return to in Chapter 4, the UN operates with four phases of operational conflict management:

- *Preventive Diplomacy*, which aims at preventing disputes from escalating into conflicts.
- *Peacemaking*, which aims at bringing hostile parties to agreement through diplomacy.

- *Peace-keeping* is UN-led civilian and possible armed intervention seeking to prevent renewed conflict and expanding possibilities for building peace.
- *Peace-building* seeks to consolidate peace and through agreements ending civil strife.

However, in 2001, the UNSG Kofi Annan supplements the post-conflict peace building as well as the preventive diplomacy with new and very important dimensions in terms of preventive action.

Preventive action address the root causes of conflict and as preventive strategy includes both short-term and long-term measures in collaboration with national, regional and international actors.

With the UNSG's new approach, civil society is meant to play an important role, regional multilateral organisations should be strengthened as partners in conflict prevention and the ultimate goal should be a sustainable peace with a development for all and not just the absence of open conflict. The UN has now left the Realism Conflict Settlement and seems to adhere to the Pluralism School, focusing on Conflict Solution as well as Conflict Transformation while employing Tracks I, II and III activities and actors. Media development is explicitly included in the UNSG's paper on preventive action.

A third approach is founded in the Canadian peace researcher and mediator Jean Paul Lederach's definition of peace-building. In 1997, Lederach agreed with Boutros Boutros-Gali that peace-building is important, but suggests that it is more than just post-accord reconstruction:

> Here, peace-building is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and states needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords (Lederach, 1997, p. 20).

Lederach's peace-building definition in many ways voices UNSG Kofi Annan's definition of preventive action. In this thesis, we shall distinguish between media interventions aimed at diminishing or removing underlying structural causes for conflicts and media interventions aimed at influencing the conflict dynamics in a non-violent direction.

When we focus on the structural transformation of a conflict towards a sustainable peace, the UN's term *preventive action* will be used. This term covers efforts, whether carried out long before, during or after a violent conflict, with the long term perspective of removing structural factors for potential conflicts.

When we focus on media interventions playing into the short term dynamics of conflict, we shall elaborate our models on the basis of the UN's four phases for *operational conflict management* – conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace-building.

There is a strong scholarly field within conflict and peace research reaching out to social psychological theories and methods. There is also significant communication research connecting communication theory to social psychological theories and methods. But the bridge

between conflict and peace research on one side and communication research on the other has not yet been fully constructed.

This has left the intervention approaches from multilateral, non-governmental and governmental bodies to the 'traditional' focus on media independence from state and government, media as a watchdog holding leaders accountable and eventually the establishment of a plurality of sources providing voices of peace in parallel with conflict inciting media. However, I believe that there is greater scope for support to media to reduce the likelihood of violent conflicts. This thesis will look further into the background, potential, strategies and models for media support to promote sustainable peace.

1.1 Overall Research Focus

From our knowledge of the roles of media during the escalation of conflicts, the thesis seeks to define and refine strategies for using support to media as one instrument amongst others to transform conflict into sustainable peace and democratic development. This support should be given without compromising standards for editorial independence. As earlier argued I have chosen to focus on the development of theoretically coherent models and strategies for international media interventions in conflicts. In the field of international donors and agencies supporting conflict prevention, peace-building and democracy, the political and economic agendas behind the support are numerous and the strategies chosen often conflicting. From the political and efficiency point of view, there is the need for at least a minimum level of international coordination and strategic guidance of media interventions in violent conflict

situations. As this is a role, which the UN might be well suited for I have analysed whether the developed models can be used to improve the strategies for multilateral organisations, particularly the UN's work for peace.

Assumption:

I assume that by developing appropriate methods for multilateral media interventions and integrating these methods with conflict management models and conflict resolution theory it will be possible to strengthen and improve the international efforts in preventive action and conflict management. The integration of media in tools for conflict prevention and peace-building should however be done without compromising the professional standards and editorial independence of the media.

Aim:

The aim of this thesis is to analyse to what extent, in which phase(s) of a conflict, under what circumstances and by what means, multilateral and international media support can prevent conflicts and contribute to build a sustainable peace.

I define the situations, where media interventions from intergovernmental organisations or a number of governments who are not directly involved in the conflict are relevant and legal, as the following:

Internal, bi-national, regional or international violent conflicts, where any of the UN organizations' statutes or other jurisdictions in principle could allow multinational interventions, or where a decision has been made by the UNSC, or where one or more governments have or will acquire international help to settle conflicts.

By adhering to this definition, I have chosen only to deal with outside interventions in conflicts, when the intervening actors are not seen to have ulterior national motives, but base their actions primarily on an international consensus as defined above.

The thesis will focus on internal conflicts because internal violent conflicts by far outnumber international wars. While it can be argued that in internal conflicts it is necessary to consider not only the national but also the international sphere, regional and neighbouring countries, that creates an even more complicated picture. Many of the theoretical and methodological considerations in this thesis can be adapted to conflicts between countries, but at its core it is first and foremost related to conflicts between groups within a country and with the given links to the regional context. With the use of the term 'media interventions' I mean:

Interventions where third party countries or multilateral organisations engage in processes concerning local and regional media policy, media content, capacity- and institution-building. Media interventions might also include the establishment of alternative sources or jamming of existing.

Methodology:

The focus of this thesis is the development of models and strategies for media support to prevent conflicts and build peace. Media support has to be seen as one of many elements in the efforts of the international community, particularly multilateral organisations, to settle violent conflicts and prevent repeated outbreaks of violence. It is the ambition to deliver media models and strategies that can be applied to political and practical use for both national and

multilateral agencies in their conflict management and preventive actions. Consequently, the thesis is structured according to functional rather than theoretical approaches in its layout and perspective, which aims to link theory and practice as closely as possible, without simply being a handbook on practical implementation models.

The models and strategies suggested in the thesis will prioritise media support according to its impact and efficiency in preventing conflicts and building peace. This does not exclude us from considering the political, professional, ethical and organisational dimensions of the media in a given conflict area, which are essential for long term democratic or social development. On the contrary, these considerations might prove essential to changing the structural conditions of the society and prevent new conflicts.

The use of media support in conflict management and preventive action is an almost entirely new field of research. I shall build upon the fairly well developed research on conflict management and peace and will not develop new theories and models for conflict management. The scope of the research in this thesis is still significant, because it seeks to bridge the theories and models for media's function in society, with those for conflict resolution.

The functional approach of the thesis combines the practical management of conflicts with the theoretical understanding of the phenomena of conflicts, media and the psychological perceptions within the population. As there are no existing theoretical models integrating conflict and media, I have combined different theoretical frameworks. Models for media in conflict management and transformation will be laid out on the basis of the different

theoretical visions and explanations. I shall test them against existing examples from practical media support given before, during or after violent conflict. This will allow an examination of the validity of the models and be used to make the necessary adjustments accordingly.

In understanding the background and processes which lead to violent conflict, we shall use scholarly literature and firsthand sources focusing on two countries, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The analysis will look at the causes and triggers of conflict with a particular focus on national and group identities, media structure and media content. On the basis of this analysis and with the inclusion of other cases, we can extract characteristics of the media during conflict escalation and relate them to general conflict and conflict management theories and models. In reality, the influence from countries beyond the regions might have had significant impact on instigating the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda, but in order to provide a clear illustration of linkage between the conflicts and the domestic media, I will focus on the internal processes leading to the conflicts. I have also decided not to include the international media in my analysis of the media's role during conflict escalation.

When looking at possible models for media support in conflicts, I have found it important to identify the potential areas for interventions. This is based on the analysis of the factors in the selected cases which lead to violent conflicts. The above analysis has also been the primary source for the elaboration of a timeline for practical phases, which is relevant to media and conflict.

The areas for international interventions include the media landscape and its role in relation to local identities, the media legislation as determining the framework in which media and journalists act, the capacity and institution building processes as well as the media content and its impact on the popular perception of the conflict.

Much of the empirical evidence and data forming the background for my elaboration of models and theoretical approaches are derived from post-war media interventions in the former Yugoslavia. It is probably the region where most models for media interventions have been tested. Some places – Bosnia-I-Herzegovina and Kosovo – have been UN mandates, while others have seen a number of international peace building and democratization initiatives carried out in cooperation with local governments and civil society organisations. Together with Latin America, it is the region where the most research and documentation has been made on the role of media. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that examples and approaches can be identified to create comprehensive models and methodologies for media in peace-building.

However, as the countries of former Yugoslavia are within the European ambit, with its own particular characteristics, I have included examples from other countries and regions. By including cases from a number of conflicts and organisations working with media interventions I add to the general validity of the models and strategies developed in the thesis. It must be said, that whatever models and strategies we develop will always have to be adapted to the particular environment and conditions in the target country. Even then, they will fail in some cases and have to be adjusted according to the experience we gain in this field.

Among the models for media intervention, I will look at support to content co-produced between the conflicting parties' media. While relevant quality content is important when designing communication strategies the audience reception is equally important to take into consideration. To test the hypotheses I develop about mechanisms and models, I have consequently co-designed and analysed focus group studies in the former republics of Yugoslavia – Bosnia-I-Herzegovina and Serbia. The focus group analysis falls into the critical discourse analyst Norman Fairclough's three dialectically related dimensions: *Communication Product, Discursive Practices* and the *Sociocultural Processes (*Schrøder 2003 p.48-49*).* Further methodological considerations about this analysis will be detailed in context with the actual interpretation of its findings.

I have not analysed in depth strategies and methods for capacity and institution-building within the media, but have where appropriate referred to these areas of support. Another area I would have been happy to look at more closely is the role of civil society and concepts of empowerment, ownership and partnership related to media in conflict prevention and peace-building. It is a vital area – not only when dealing with conflicts, but also as part of strategies promoting development, good governance and health. Being aware that neither civil society nor ownership and partnership are simple methods to implement nor always constructive, I have left this area for future research in communication and conflict transformation strategies.

Finally, I personally have substantial experience from peace-building media interventions through my work as the managing director of the Baltic Media Centre (BMC) Fund for ten years and as consultant

during the writing of this thesis. I have worked with the design and implementation of media interventions in a number of conflict and transitional regions. This has certainly contributed to my academic inquiry and research questions raised in the thesis, which are all of relevance for the implementation of media interventions. The risk of course, is that however cautious I strive to be, my personal experience might colour my choices of theories and models. Sans the practical experience, I might in some cases have chosen otherwise.

It is my hope that this thesis will not only function as an original academic piece of work, but will also be of use and an inspiration to the multitude of multilateral and international donors and agencies working for a more peaceful world.

1.2 Key Fields and Questions of Research

With the above considerations in mind, the key research fields for examining the potential of media support to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and building of sustainable peace are as follows:

Nature of Media Support:
Support can contain many elements in the media field, all of which will have an impact on the likeliness of peace or war. Support can be given to the media's content in preventing conflict, or through the structure, ability and capacity of a post-conflict media landscape to absorb the given conflict potentials between population groups or countries. Its impact can be achieved through restrictions on conflict

inciting content or through the establishment of new alternative and peace-oriented voices.

But support to media can also lead to media playing an active role in the reconciliation process and the transformation of a conflict from being violent to being oriented towards human rights, democracy and sustainable development. The long term strategy for peace-building must necessarily link to other development measures. The thesis will discuss the potentials of these and related areas of international support to media.

National and International Actors:

The thesis will further discuss who the international and local actors are and can be. What are the roles of multilateral organisations, national donors, international media non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international professional media organisations? Who are the viable local partners to work with to design and assure implementation of the desired activities? Is it public, commercial, non-profit or community broadcasters, which are best to meet the communication challenges in the specific conflict? Is it print media, civil society organisations or international media? The choice of local media might not be a simple one, but depends on the nature and values of the different kinds of media, the functions and roles they are suited to carry out fulfilling different needs and also the concrete context, be it political, geographic or historic. Furthermore, it would be appropriate to consider how external support to media can be given without compromising a future role for the journalists and media during the development of democracy.

International actors have quite different roles and mandates in dealing with violent conflicts. National donors, who often support media in their strategies, reflect national interests as much as concerns for populations struck by violence. The international media NGOs partly reflect concerns for the populations, but must also as non-profit businesses take into concern the interests of the donors, who pay for their work. To a certain degree, this is also the case for multilateral organisations like the UN, European Union (EU) or World Bank, albeit these organisations have so many member countries that they can primarily focus on the optimal support to media in conflicts without paying all their attention to the interest of individual countries.

Legality

It is also necessary in the thesis to analyse the legal framework for international support or interventions in conflict areas. What are the conditions which must be fulfilled before the UNSC, multinational, national or non-governmental support or interference is legal, according to international laws and conventions? What situations would entail the implementation of specific kinds of interventions?

Why multilateral:

I have chosen to focus on strategies for multilateral actors because of their all-encompassing political mandate, which in theory allows them to act for the common good and beyond the interests of individual countries. Furthermore, multilateral organisations like the UN and its agencies, the EU and other regional organisations are the only ones who would have the credibility and political legitimacy to impose standards and coordinate support to media in conflict situations. Finally it is clear that in many cases, the UNSC is often the only authority which can provide mandates of a substantial

nature to intervene in conflicts against the will of the conflicting parties. However, neither UN, the UN family, nor the regional organisations have developed the strategies and instruments for supporting media to foster sustainable peace in conflict regions. This makes this thesis the more needed.

Cross-cutting measures:

It is important to find out whether and to what degree there is a feasible potential in linking media and other conflict management measures and preventive actions. Should one consider media interventions to strengthen traditional Track I activities like diplomacy and armed interventions? While there is also a potential in integrating media activities with other Track II civil activities based on civil society organisations, this has not been my priority. Instead, my focus has been on an analysis of how media support could be given during the various phases of conflict management and long-term preventive actions.

1.3 Synopsis

The thesis analyse the theories, methods and necessary questions area by area, before comprehensive strategies for media in conflict prevention and peace building are laid out in the concluding chapters.

This dissertation consists of three parts:

Part One

Besides the Introduction, part one includes chapter two and three, which both give us useful tools to develop future strategies.

2. Theoretical Background and Scope of Research for the Thesis

Chapter 2 looks back at existing theoretical concepts, models and findings, which are useful contributions to our understanding of conflicts, political communication and the social psychological conditions for those individuals, who are recipients of media content in contexts of conflicts. This chapter enables us to analyse our cases also from a theoretical perspective as it in Part Two helps us to identify and develop theoretically argued strategies and models for conflict management and transformation.

3. Media's Role in the Escalation of Crises and Outbreak of Conflicts

In Chapter 3, I seek to identify characteristics and patterns of the media along the timeline of conflict escalations in countries torn by internal wars. By looking back at conflicts it helps me later to define phases during the escalation, which allows external help to prevent conflicts, as well as it allows me to identify the areas, which can be the target for media interventions – both during conflict escalation and in a post conflict situation. Finally, the experience with media in these cases helps me later to define the nature of different media in relation to their independence from political and ulterior interests behind a conflict.

I have chosen two cases – namely the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. They were very different conflicts, took place

in respectively Europe and Africa, and in both cases media
played a significant role before and during the violence.

Part Two

The second part of the dissertation includes Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and
explores strategies for using communication in prevention and
transformation of conflicts. In my development of such strategies, I
look back to my findings from the conflict escalation in the two
cases. However, I also pull in experience from a number of other
cases, whether it is from international media support post-conflict or
it is from the processes ahead of the conflict. To include experience
from different post-conflict strategies across the globe I help
verifying a general validity of the findings.

4. Phases and Nature of Media for Interventions

In this chapter, I paint the broader picture of possible
media interventions, their timing, targets, internal and
external actors.
One of the key questions – theoretically as well as in
practical media assistance – is to choose the media to
support. To provide a helpful tool for this I have with help
from the findings in Chapter 3 systematised different types
of media according to their accountability to society, their
editorial independence and the professional standards of
their programming.

In this chapter, I have identified the different areas of
media intervention and linked it to other international
efforts in conflict prevention and peace building. Through
comparing different principal approaches to the definition of

phases, this chapter allows us to see the broader perspective of short, mid and long-term media support in the identified areas.

This chapter sketches what is a coherent overview of possible media interventions related to broader conflict preventing goals as relevant to the individual phases, involving local and international actors. This overview points to areas of intervention, which are relevant for a closer elaboration in the chapters to come.

5. Media Content – formats, ethics and functions

One of the relevant areas when working with media in conflict prevention and peace building is support to content in the local media. Based on already developed models for conflict resolution, reconciliation and transformation involving civil society this chapter seeks to adapt these models to see how different types of programmes or articles can contribute to reduce conflicts in different phases along the post conflict timeline.

The success of relevant content supporting de-escalation of conflict depends very much on the audience reception. To test my outlined model, a number of focus groups interviews carried out in areas of the former Yugoslavia are analysed to find out to what degree the model can be generally verified for future use.

International financing and support to articles or programmes in media walks on a razor's edge between

being external interference in editorial control, attempts to pay propaganda, and undermining future strategies for editorially independent media as one step towards democracy. Therefore, I analyse the ethic principles, codes of conduct and the role of journalists in conflicts to extract modes and standards, which should be followed in situations, where international actors support content in local media.

On basis of the sketched and tested model and taking into consideration the ethical and journalistic principles for content support, I try in the end of this chapter to outline a strategy for post-conflict support to particularly journalistic content in media.

6. Media landscape, Capacity and Institution-Building

In this chapter, I only look at the structural areas of post-conflict media interventions. This is areas, which in a mid and long-term perspective determine the institutional and legislative framework for media and consequently can seek to safeguard society from media inciting to violent conflicts. This is also areas in which internal and external actors can promote their own interests in the media market loyal to their imagery and identities.

Therefore, I analyse the international and local interests seeking to develop the media landscape in common or separate directions. The media landscape is so to say the goal, while market forces, legislation, capacity and institution-building, as well as the actual implementation of

this are instrumental to the development of a desired
media landscape.

By discussing the roles of private, national and multilateral
actors intervening in development of the media landscape
and by drawing on the characteristics of different types of
media as developed in Chapter 4, I develop a coherent
strategy. This strategy for development of the post-conflict
media landscape connects in this chapter strictly to
different scenarios of identity conflicts.

This leads to the key focus for international support and
interests in media legislation and institution building to
facilitate transformation of the conflict and building of a
sustainable peace.

The third part builds on the integrated model developed
above. It is through an institutional analysis of the UN
testing the model and its relevance for improving the
strategies of the UN in this field. The Conclusion points to
the future scope of work in this field in research and in
practice.

Part 3
In part three we shift focus from developing models and strategies
of a general nature to be used in international media interventions.
Instead, we focus in Chapter 7 at the key institution for operational
conflict management playing into the dynamics of conflict as well as
the immediate pre- and post conflict – namely the UN. Is it possible
to transfer parts of the developed strategies into operational conflict
management and has the UN the necessary legitimacy and capacity

to become the backbone of international strategies for media interventions.

Finally – in Chapter 8, we draw on the practical and theoretical conclusions from Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 to suggest a coherent and comprehensive outline of strategies as an answer to the theses we made in the introduction chapter. The conclusion finally points to future perspectives for theoretical and practical development of the use of media in conflict prevention and peace-building.

7. UN – mandate, strategies and experiences

While the two previous chapters have focused on post-conflict media interventions this chapter turns to the operational conflict management as carried out by the UN. As the chapter also aims to discuss the UN's legitimacy, capability and structure for carrying out media interventions, playing into the dynamics of conflict, as well as to examine whether the UN could be a guiding and coordination partner in international media support I examine the international legislative framework for external interventions towards local media in pre-, during and post-conflict situations.

I further analyse the UN's strategies, hindrances or openings for including media interventions into its other Track I and II conflict management efforts – both on its legal basis and in its practical implementation. To illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the UN I look back at cases where the UN, with or without the UNSC mandate

has intervened in the media field, as well as I interview
representatives employed by the UN.

Finally, in this chapter I draft a strategy for the UN, which
might be useful in the field of media interventions.

8. Conclusions – theories, models and scope for future research

Chapter 8 pulls together the theoretical approaches and the
practical models into coherent strategies for international
media interventions as well as it points to the differences in
roles and possibilities for the UN and other partners.

Finally, the conclusion suggests future perspectives
elaborated --from this thesis to develop theoretical and
practical use of media in conflict prevention and peace-
building.

2. Theoretical Background and Scope of Research for the Thesis

To analyse to what extent and by what means multilateral and international media support can prevent conflicts and contribute to build a sustainable peace it is necessary to set up a theoretical framework. In an area as complex and multi-layered as media in conflict prevention and peace building I have to draw on several theoretical directions. A theoretical understanding of the nature and dynamics of conflict, and of the impact and role for individuals in a conflict environment as well as of the function of media and communication is needed. It is hard to find any coherent theory and vision for this area, and the thesis will consequently have to draw on and combine theories of conflict resolution, social psychology and media. In this chapter, theoretical concepts, models and findings of importance to the ambition for this thesis will be identified.

First of all in order to have an understanding of violent conflicts, their background, dynamics and the interests of the actors before, during and after the conflict, a close examination of conflict management literature is imperative. I have selected the American Director of Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, Michael E. Brown, as the key authority on this for his theoretical clarifications in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*. This work provides an understanding of the background and reasons for the outbreak of violent conflicts, distinguishing between internal conflicts and their international dimensions.

For analysing the dynamics of conflict, I have chosen two different approaches. In his book *Constructive Conflicts – from Escalation to Resolution* (1998)*,* American sociologist and Professor Emeritus of Social Conflict Studies, Louis Kriesberg, sees every conflict as progressing through points on a circle, which illustrate the dynamics of every conflict. This is, however, viewed differently in the American peace researcher at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Michael Lund's book *Preventing Violent Conflicts* (1996). Lund views conflict as a curve, changing in intensity and providing better or less favourable options for conflict interventions.

Secondly, we need to look at theories and models which are rooted in conflict management theory and point to ways of building sustainable peace, stimulate reconciliation and prevent new violent conflicts. For this I have chosen the Canadian sociologist, mediation practitioner and professor in International Peace Building at Eastern Mennonite University, Jean Paul Lederach. Specifically, his book: *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (1997) defines the actors in a combined effort for reconciliation and transformation of society, as well as the timeline for such processes. A theoretical contribution to Lederach's book is from the American PhD in Conflict Resolution and director of Race Relations 2020 in Columbia, Maire Dugan, whose work *The Nested Paradigm of Conflict Foci* provides a bridge towards the use of media content in peace-building.

Thirdly, with a view to the media's role in projecting images of the conflicting parties, we need to understand psychosocial mechanisms and how people's minds are affected by circumstances and influence from specific actors. An obvious source for this is the retired

American professor in Social Ethics and former Director of the Programme on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Harvard University, Herbert Kelman, for his contribution in *Internal Conflict: Methods and Techniques* (1997), edited by the American professor in International Organizations and Conflict Resolution, I. William Zartmann and American PhD in International Relations, J. Lewis Rasmussen. Similarly, the American Professor in Conflict Management at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Daniel Druckman, offers a constructive approach on how to alter the prejudices and perceptions of others during peace-building (1994, p.43-68). Furthermore, as the great majority of violent conflicts are internal, it is useful to look at anthropological approaches to national, cultural, ethnic or religious identities and to the imagination of nation, as well as the moral panic and public rituals developed and used during conflict escalation. To this end, we shall look to the Irish professor of Government and Asian Studies, Benedict Andersson, Yugoslav PhD in Political Sociology at Kingston University, Spyros A. Sofos, UK Professor of Sociology at London School of Economics and Political Science, Stanley Cohen, as well as the American Doctor of Sociology, Philip Elliot.

Fourthly, we must have a comprehensive understanding of the role that media plays during conflicts. My literature review illustrates the gap in theories about media during the escalation of violent conflicts and during peace-building. To give us an insight into the media's role in society, the public sphere and in different forms of democracies, I have chosen to use the U.K. Professor of Sociology at University of Cambridge, John B. Thompson's *The Media and Modernity – A Social Theory of the Media* (1995). As some of the internal conflicts today occur in small geographical, ethnic or political areas of society, it is worth looking at the potential of

alternative or citizen's media. For this use I have looked to the American Professor in International Communication John D.H. Downing's *Radical Media – Rebellious Communication and Social Movements* (2000), as well as to the Colombian PhD in International Telecommunication and associate professor at University of Oklahoma, Clemencia Rodriques' *Fissures in the Mediascape – An International Study of Citizens' Media (2001).* As implicit or explicit media messages during or post conflict are not necessarily received and perceived by the audience as they were intended by the creators and distributors of the messages behind, I shall also look at theories of audience perception. For this use we turn to the Danish communication researcher Klaus Bruhn Jensen and his book *A Handbook of Media and Communication Research (2000).*

2.1 Causes, Dynamics and Management of Violent Conflicts

Conflict management models usually adopt the more practice-oriented approach of phases across a given conflict. The phases for interventions have been conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building, also reflecting the traditional Track I instruments from third parties, namely the use of diplomacy to prevent conflicts or make peace, and the use of armed international forces to prevent and stop conflicts and to keep the peace. As the examples in my thesis show, it is hardly possible to isolate an individual violent conflict from the tensions and repeated outbreaks of war and violence, which occur in conflict areas. We shall look at other models of understanding conflicts, which the development of conflict management theory and practice through the past two decades, have made numerous and multifaceted.

To determine the role of the media, we need to go back in history, to the organisation of society, diverse identities and traditions, which are all framing the media structure, legislation and institutional traditions.

In 1995, thirty-five major armed conflicts (over 1000 persons killed in a year) erupted. They were all, in spite of some cross-border fighting, internal conflicts (Brown, 1996, p. 3). Internal conflicts are often characterised by deliberate attacks on civilians or even genocides like in Rwanda, Bosnia or the Darfur province in Sudan. The conflicts often exert a great impact on neighbouring countries by dispersing refugees or establishing training camps and weapon routes through them. But the reverse has also been observed. In Afghanistan, Rwanda, or in the late phase of the war in the now dissolved Yugoslavia, the neighbouring countries had their own interests to promote through the perpetuation of internal conflict. Today, after the end of the Cold War, the prevention, settlement and transformation of internal conflicts into sustainable peace have become major tasks for multilateral organisations.

As we described it in the introduction chapter, the different schools of international relations are often reflected in the policies of actors dealing with conflict management.

Michael E. Brown, Associate Director of the International Security Program at Harvard University, thinks along the lines of the Pluralist School. Together with fourteen colleagues, he offers an analysis of on-going conflicts in eight regions in his book *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflicts* (1996). The eight regions are the Balkans, East-Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, South and

South West Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. The purpose of this analysis is to look into the causes of internal conflicts and to distinguish between the conditions that make violence more likely and the proximate causes of such violence.

Much scholarly literature about internal conflict focuses on the permissive conditions and the structural, political, economic, social, cultural and perceptual forces working on a mass level as the explanation for violent conflicts. Michael Brown, however, finds it a weakness that the proximate causes or the role of the elites and leaders in instigating violence are not identified (p. 576). He also finds that the role of neighbouring states in triggering conflicts is poorly defined. For media interventions immediately before, during and immediately after violent conflicts, the elaboration on proximate causes or triggers is very interesting because the interventions can be suited to the particular circumstances of the conflict. The permissive conditions or deep-lying causes behind conflicts are of concern only to longer-term media support.

The distinction between the mass- and elite- levels in instigating violence is of crucial importance when I seek to define the role of media in conflict prevention and peace-building. While the electronic media in almost all contexts is the most important for the broader population, the print media is mainly consumed by the elites. If for example conflict management theories would isolate the responsibility for initiating conflicts to the elites and the opinion of the masses did not have any significant importance, we should consequently not care about the mass media and in this case, the electronic media. Today however, the mass-level perception does have significant importance for the leaders.

The sociologist John B. Thompson, University of Cambridge, stresses this difference in his book *The Media and Modernity – a Social Theory of the Media* (1995):

> Prior to the development of the media, political leaders were invisible to most of the people over whom they ruled, and they could restrict the activity of managing their self-presentation to the relatively closed circles of the assembly or the court. But today it is no longer possible to restrict the activity of self-presentation in this way. Whether they wish to or not, political leaders today must be prepared to adapt their activities to a new kind of visibility which works in new ways and on an altogether different scale (p. 119).

Although many internal conflicts are triggered by mass-level factors, Brown claims that "…the vast majority are triggered by internal, elite-level factors. In short bad leaders are the biggest problem." (p. 575). The elite-level triggers are ideological convictions, economic motivations of drug barons and power struggles among competing elites, driven mainly by personal and political ambitions. Based on the book's analyses of the on-going internal conflicts, Brown concludes that when political elites are vulnerable, group histories are antagonistic, and domestic economic problems are mounting (p. 576).The distinction between the pre-disposing and proximate causes of internal conflicts does not differentiate between the elite- or mass-levels. Neither does it include the catalytic role of neighbouring states, which is essential as their development can play a major role in triggering violence. Brown himself sees the list

as only a starting point and posits that most conflicts are elite-triggered and result from power struggles between political leaders.

Brown further illustrates the regional dimension of internal conflict as having two sides. The possible effects on neighbouring states are causing refugee flows, economic, military and instability problems, as well as possible inter-state war. The actions by neighbouring states can be humanitarian, defensive, protective, opportunistic interventions and invasions (p. 592).

The distinction Brown makes between pre-disposing and proximate causes is very similar to what Michael Lund classifies as Structural Factors and Dynamic Factors (Lund, 2004). The structural factors only produce violence "remotely and indirectly" (Lund, 2004 Sais-jku.edu/cmtoolkit – Causes of conflict), while dynamic factors which influence the evolution of the conflict must be identified as early as possible to "identify strategic points at which interventions can have real results" (Lund, 2004 Sais-jku.edu/cmtoolkit – Causes of conflict). The importance of the two scholars' distinction is that in analysing a conflict to define strategies for interventions, we must be clear about the extent to which a long term, structurally-oriented approach or a short term impact on the dynamic of a conflict escalation is desired.

Not surprisingly, Michael E. Brown (1996) stresses that international efforts in conflict prevention should both address the underlying problems through sustained long-term efforts, as well as through a series of more aggressive efforts focus on the proximate causes of internal conflicts – the triggers that turn potentially violent situations into armed confrontations (p.607). Of interest to our later discussion will be the role of multilateral organisations in conflict

prevention. On this Brown finds it clearly more appropriate for the UN to intervene in a cooperative manner, compared to coercive actions, which were taken in Yugoslavia and Somalia. The risks borne for coercive actions are much larger than for cooperative actions, which UN carries out in agreement with local leaders. Only when crimes against humanity are committed, such as genocide or the deliberate slaughter of civilians, should the international community engage in coercive actions in spite of their being high-cost and high-risk (p. 620).

What we have learned from Michael E. Brown's study of all on-going internal conflicts in eight regions in 1995, is that violent conflict does not only have pre-disposing causes, which require long term efforts to mitigate. Violent conflicts also occur as a result of proximate causes or dynamic factors, as Michael Lund puts it, and leave room for equally dynamic instruments for preventing the conflicts. We have further learned that most internal conflicts must be seen in a regional context, because of the problems a conflict causes its neighbouring countries, or more likely due to the interests or actions the neighbours have taken towards it. Again this indicates a dimension which must be taken into consideration in most conflict preventing and peace-building media interventions from external organisations or countries. Finally and not least importantly, Brown points to the fact that internal violent conflicts can be caused by mass-level and elite-level factors and that power struggles at the elite-level about resources, personal, political ambitions, hunt for personal gain and group histories play significant roles as proximate causes. When we develop models for media interventions, it is consequently important not only to look at the media as swaying the masses towards or away from violence, but also to examine the

relations between the two groups as they are dealt with through the media.

Louis Kriesberg, an American sociologist and peace researcher, describes in his book *Constructive Conflicts – From Escalation to Resolution* (1998) how violent conflicts tend to follow the same cycle (p. 24-25). The Simplified Conflict Cycle shows the different stages in a conflict, from Bases through Manifestation, Escalation, De-escalation, Termination and Consequences back to Bases again. External actors can attempt to bring a conflict back or forth from a destructive phase to a more peaceful phase.

> Conflicts not only escalate; they also de-escalate after a brief or extended transition. A protracted conflict may have many escalating and de-escalating episodes, and only in retrospect can we discern a long-term transformation from intractable antagonism to de-escalation leading to a resolution of a conflict (Kriesberg, 1998, p. 24).

Conflict-escalation through Kriesberg's lenses is an intended or incident polarization between two parties, which through a number of psycho-social processes at the personal, group or national levels, escalates towards a violent stage. A gradual escalation takes place between two adversaries who have severed their internal communications, allowed prejudices, and stereotyping about each other spread. To reduce conflict escalation, confidence building measures are seen as ways out of near-violent situations to a de-escalation and termination of conflict. Along with confidence building measures can be included some media-related measures such as the exchange of journalists across conflict barriers, cooperation and exchange programmes, or the development of particular programme

formats providing mutual information and insights into the

adversaries in a conflict. This is suggested and elaborated on by

Smruti S. Pattanaik, research-officer at the Institute of Defense and

Strategic Analysis in New Delhi, in the chapter *Proactive Confidence-Building* Measures - for the Pakistan-India conflict - to the book *The Challenge of Confidence-Building in South Asia*, edited by Moonis Ahmar (1994, p.110-114).

As a simplification, the Realist school sees conflict as a disturbance of the status quo between states or groups within society. The conflict management approach consequently focuses on the methodology of bringing this disturbance to an end, primarily through coercion and diplomacy, but as described in *The Challenge of Confidence-Building in South Asia* (1994) dealing with the Pakistan-India conflict, other instruments may also be used. For the Realist school, there might still be a number of predisposing causes to conflicts, but the aim is not to transform the conflicting societies through systemic changes in order to reduce the risk for new conflicts. As part of conflict management, Michael E. Brown, John Paul Lederach and most contemporary peace researchers follow the theoretical and practical line of seeking to transform conflicts and societies to reduce the likelihood of new violent conflicts erupting. This is done with a view to some of the power relation perspectives from the Realism school.

2.2   The Process of Transformation, Reconciliation, and Peace-Building

One of the few scholars working with both media and conflict theories is Dov Shinar, Professor and Chair, Department of Communication Studies, Ben Gurion University, Israel. In his article about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, *The peace process in cultural conflict: The role of the media* (2002), he describes how the Oslo

process, with its magnitude of symbolic events towards peace, offered possibilities for the media to participate in the re-conciliation process. This was done successfully with the Israeli public until violence escalated in 2000, triggered by Sharon's promenade at Temple Mountain. With renewed violence against the Israeli population, the reconciliation model was abandoned primarily because of the "end-of-conflict" expectations it had raised and was now derailed through continuous reports about violence. By the 2001 election, Ehud Barak lost spectacularly. Shinar describes the media process between Oslo and the 2001 elections as follows:

> Inspired by professional norms of efficiency and news value, the media preferred to emphasize the openness of public opinion to reconciliation, positive governmental attitudes in this direction, and historical deductions from previous peace processes. Two major professional strategies were used in this context: the first was polarization and contrast, focusing on reconciliation against the background of the violence that has preceded and accompanied the peace process. The second was the coverage of media events related to reconciliation (p. 8-9).

Dov Shinar points to the difficulties for the media to act within an open-ended transformation model, which reduces interest and produces lower news value because of the following characteristics:

- **Complexity**: The transformation model demands the media to present, and audiences to understand complex processes, whereas both the media adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model focus on simple

events which increase production efficiency and have higher news value.

- **Historical Duration**: The transformation model requires the media do describe (and audiences to perceive) the long course of events. Also historical insight must be provided and understood. This requires more work and reduces news value. In contrast, the adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model emphasizes the present, demands less effort on the part of the media and their audiences and has higher news value.

- **Rationality**: As it emphasizes logic and rationality, the transformation model requires the investment of more effort by the media and by audiences. The adoption and later the abandonment of the reconciliation model involves emotional factors which have higher news value and are less labor-consuming in media production and consumption alike.

- **Personalization and Concretization**: The transformation model focuses on collective values and abstract symbols, while the adoption and abandonment of the reconciliation model involves relations between people and concrete entities. The latter is clearly less labour-intensive and has higher news value (Shinar, 2002, p. 8).

To some degree, Dov Shinar provides a feasible understanding of the shortcomings of a pure reconciliation approach and of the choices to be made by the media. One crucial choice is whether the media will and should deliberately play a constructive role in

peaceful development. We shall come back to this in a later chapter. By focusing on the rationality-based conflict transformation as a useful alternative to the reconciliation model, Shinar does not take into consideration the option of working deliberately with both models in a timeline of phases. I shall in Chapter 5 provide a possible model for integrating reconciliation and transformation, which seen from a media perspective does not necessarily suffer from all the disadvantages claimed by Shinar.

In his book *Building Peace – Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (1997), John Paul Lederach, a Canadian scholar and practitioner of conflict resolution, seeks to encompass all aspects we have discussed in his pursuit for sustainable peace. Where traditional peace-building has focused on establishing cease-fires and peace accords between adversaries, Lederach's ambition is far more than bringing a conflict back to the peaceful status quo. He addresses sustainable peace through a reconciliation process between the conflicting parties, a network of relationships across the society to promote justice, and the predisposing causes of conflicts.

While Lederach's practical experience lies within reconciliation through personal encounters and training, he develops an integrated framework compassing several other elements. Central to his concept of an integrated framework is that any given immediate intervention is connected to movements toward a longer-term goal (p. 75). Recognising that crisis management and political reconciliation are linked efforts, Lederach underscores the difference in time perspective for the two. *Transformation* is in Lederach's concept the change from one status to another and ultimately to a peaceful relationship. *Sustainability* is "a proactive process that is capable of regenerating itself over time – a spiral of peace and

development instead of a spiral of violence and destruction" (p. 75). The Time Dimension in Lederach's peace building moves from Immediate Action (2-6 months) over Short-Range Planning (1-2 years), Decade Thinking (5-10 years) to Generational Vision (20+ years) (p. 55-57). To define the processes following this timeline, he has used the Nested Paradigm of Conflict Foci, developed by the American peace researcher and theorist Maire Dugan (1996, p. 9-20).

Dugan's Nested Paradigm is helpful to understanding Lederach's integrated framework. It also gives us a perspective on media content as a peace-building element in a post-conflict situation. Dugan uses a practical example, which illustrates the concept very well. A violent conflict between African American and white gangs of young boys had occurred in a school. A conflict practitioner might view this as a problem, which would demand a solution to the issue or for the trigger that had started the fight. But whilst the same practitioner might see the issue as "imbedded within a relationship that needed to be reconciled" (p. 56) and would seek to incorporate prejudice reduction, increase the two gangs' "…understanding of one another and promote reconciliation in a deeper sense" (p. 56). A peace researcher, however, might see the fight between the two school gangs as caused by the pre-disposing "…context of a society built on racial inequality and economic inequity" (p. 57) and would consequently seek to change society and social structures that create and perpetuate racism. The practitioner would on her side not change the roots of racial tensions, while the researcher would not be able to solve the immediate problem. Dugan (1996) therefore adds a third, immediate level – the subsystem (p. 57). The school might at that level develop a programme that "would address the social issue of racism in the context of the relationships in the

subsystem" (p. 57). Consequently the subsystem level also provides a connection between the scholarly and practical approach. "By such means, the school could bring to the surface and address systemic racism while engaging in concrete programmatic activity that would deal with the immediate issue of gang violence and the need to reconcile the two groups of boys" (p. 57).

If we use this model as an example for programmes produced and broadcasted across conflict lines in an internal conflict, it would roughly fit in with the following parallel attempts to prevent continuous conflicts:

1. **Issue**
   News and current affairs stories dealing with the issue of a violent conflict seeking to find a mutually acceptable solution to the disputed issue.

2. **Relationship**
   Human touch stories, magazines and documentaries dealing with everyday life in all conflicting groups of the population to reduce prejudices and stereotypes as well as to increase mutual understanding and prepare for better relationships leading to reconciliation.

3. **Subsystem**
   Human touch stories, magazines and documentaries putting a greater understanding of each adversary's interests, motives and societal context. The aim of allowing the audience of the conflicting parties to discuss from a wider understanding of the causes and triggers in the conflict avails the possibility of changing the backgrounds

and preparing the audience for a qualified, insightful reconciliation.

4. **System**

Investigative, historic and thematic programmes pointing to systemic weaknesses in the society that would have to be changed before human and political reconciliation can take place. Discusses the future visions for a transformed society in sustainable peace.

We shall later in this thesis test such a model through focus group analyses of TV-programmes produced and broadcasted across the countries of South East Europe. As we shall see, Lederach puts Dugan's Nested Paradigm on his own timeline and it seems tempting to also look at the four levels to address as being different post-conflict stages, which are each feasible targets for interventions at their point of progression towards peace.

In Lederach's *Nested Paradigm: The Time Dimension in Peace-building* (1997, p.77) he describes the Issue circle as crisis intervention comprising humanitarian assistance and achievement of a cease-fire. The Relationship circle is described as preparation and training for building a capacity to deal more constructively with conflicts. The Subsystem circle becomes a circle of Design of Social Change in which the system design is disputed. Finally, Dugan's System circle is described by Lederach (1997) as the desired future, involving distant but desirable structural, systemic and relationship goals (p. 77).

The most reputed model developed by Lederach is the description of the actors in building peace. In a pyramid with three layers, the

upper level is the Top Leadership, the mid-level is the Middle-Range Leadership, and the bottom is the Grassroots Leadership (p. 39). For Lederach, who as a practitioner had been engaged in encountering conflict resolution, the mid-level is the most feasible entry point in a process of problem and conflict solving workshops and peace commissions. This might also be the point in organising other initiatives like media collaboration, as the Middle-Range Leadership in terms of radio and TV directors, editors-in-chief and others who usually have a professional identity distinct from their position of power. But it could also be discussed as to how far their authority will go without the blessings of the political, military or religious leaders.[1]

The use of mass media, however, does reach beyond the grassroots leaders to a fourth layer, at the base of the pyramid. We shall later consider if it is relevant to adjust Lederach's pyramid of actors to a strategy for use by media in conflict prevention and peace building. What are interesting for our case are the features Lederach describes as being characteristic for the leaders, who are very visible. In a conflict situation, publicity and profile are essential for a leader to establish concern for the constituency he represents in order to gain the most possible from any negotiated peace. The degree of publicity achieved by a leader is also determining his position within his own group and society, as well as it through global media, can give even rather obscure leaders international prominence and star status. When media prominence is used to

---

[1] In Afghanistan for example, I have found it necessary to involve also the political level as in the case of initiating the programme Good Morning Afghanistan at Radio Afghanistan (BMC, 2003, p. 4). The same was the case in Nigeria (ibid, p. 11). In Southeast Europe (ibid, p. 12), the political leadership was only involved at a later stage, while all agreements on media collaboration was made with the director generals. Some of these ensured political backing themselves while others did not need it.

both strengthen one part's credits in a negotiation and support the personal and political ambitions of the leader at the same time, it is easy to understand how crucial it is for leaders to control the media immediately before, during and immediately after a conflict (p. 38-40).

2.3 Social-Psychosocial Patterns for Media in Conflicts

The American professor in Social Ethics, Herbert C. Kelman, includes in his paper *Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict* (1997) social-psychological dimensions as an integral part of international relations theories on conflicts and conflict resolution (p. 191-233). Kelman claims, that in intergroup and intercommunal conflicts, fears of threats to a group's survival together with need for identity and security often form important subjective parts of the causes of conflict. Objective factors like struggles for territory or resources form other parts of the causes (p. 195). Interestingly, Kelman finds that the needs and fears of populations are mobilized and often manipulated by the leadership in all international conflicts. In ethnic conflicts, the fear of annihilation of an ethnic group is often tied to a fear of personal annihilation and the process of conflicts driven by these collective needs and fears (p. 197).

When we look at ways to end a violent conflict, it appears that every political community – a nation or smaller – can itself be divided in several ways. The leaders have to react to internal accusations that they have betrayed their own people if they enter into peace negotiations, not only from the opposition, but also from popular anxieties and doubts, which might be fuelled by the opposition. The

leaders consequently have to take into account both the internal divisions and the needs and fears of the adversary. As the attempts of leaders to respond to public moods, shape public opinion and mobilize group loyalties often stimulate conflicts, they also make it more difficult to resolve the conflict (p. 200).

Kelman gives us a valuable insight in the dynamics of social psychological mechanisms involving the broader population, the elite, and the leaders during conflicts. Public opinion – or collective moods - can be very important factors in the course of conflict. Public opinion can either be a strong support for a leader, who wants to initiate a conflict or enter into peaceful alternatives, or it can be an opposition to the leadership in both cases and consequently leave less room for manoeuvring. The leadership has often sought to move public opinion in a specific direction, supporting its own policy in a conflict. Should that policy change, the leaders would encounter a public opinion less favourable to the changes. In protracted conflicts, the collective norms and historical consciousness will often make public support to escalation of the conflict more likely than to conciliation. As Kelman states:

> There is no question that ambitious, often ruthless, nationalist leaders manipulate memories in order to whip up public support for their projects. But the fact remains that these memories – and the associated sense of injustice, abandonment, and vulnerability – are part of the people's consciousness and available for manipulation" (p. 214).

It is important for the leadership to enjoy popular support in order to countervail the costs and risks of conflict. The use of national or

group symbols is important when creating a collective understanding that security and survival of the collective as well as of the individual are at stake. People tend to be more prepared to accept risks when a conflict can be seen as an attempt to avoid losses rather than an attempt to achieve gains (p. 216). During conflict escalation and conflict, a strong group loyalty develops, pressuring every person not to oppose the course of conflict, at the risk of being marginalized. This group loyalty appears in nearly all conflicts. It is a support to the leaders during escalation, but also a risk to leaderships seeking negotiated peace. They always have to protect themselves from internal opposition if they seek to compromise with the enemy. These are obstacles we need to take into account when developing models of peace-building.

Another important factor in conflict escalation is the perceptual process involving the two sides. One element is what Kelman and earlier the American professor in development psychology, Urie Bronfenbrenner (1961, p. 45-56) and the American psychologist and propaganda analyst, Ralph K. White (1965, p. 261-74) calls the *Formation of Mirrored Images* (Kelman, 1997, p.223). In generalized terms, one group or nation sees itself as peaceful, well-intentioned and only defending itself against the enemy, who is aggressive, evil and only responding to the language of force. The images of the others are mirrored in self perception. The tendency on both sides is also to perceive the enemy's evil action as inherent in its nature, while one's own action is situational (Jones et Nisbett, 1971, p. 1-16). Furthermore, in a less common element of mirror image, one group might distinguish between the enemy's leaders as evil and the broader population as being misled or manipulated by the leaders, while one's own group has complete harmony between rulers and citizens (White, 1965, p. 261-74). It is, however, far from

the case that one group distinguishes between leaders and population in the adverse group.

When we work with the possibility of media interventions to prevent conflicts or build peace, it is important to know whether it is possible to break the circle of conflict escalation, group loyalty and mirrored images through alternative or new information. Not surprisingly, Kelman tells that conflict images are highly resistant to new information that challenges their validity. This is a valuable point when giving international support to media before, during or post-conflict. The establishment of new media in a conflict situation might not necessarily have any significant impact on change in popular attitudes.

> The concepts of selective exposure, selective perception, and selective recall all point to the fact that our attitudes help determine the kind of information that is available to us (Kelman, 1997, p. 226).

Only by the way we, on the basis of our own attitudes, select the publications we receive and the media we use, will there be a chosen exposure to confirmative information. We also tend to perceive the information available to us in a way that is congruent with our attitudes and use this as a framework to explain our own observations. Finally – Kelman says – we are more likely to remember confirmatory information because it fits into our pre-existing framework and because we find it more useful. Our choice of exposure to information also is reflected in our choice of persons to communicate with or groups to accept (p. 227-231).

On the one hand, cognitive psychology shows that we feel uncomfortable and are willing to change our attitudes if there is inconsistency between feelings and beliefs, attitudes and actions or between our own attitudes and those of important others. But in cases of strong attitudes like with enemy images in a conflict we tend to "screen out" information, which is incongruent to maintaining cognitive consistency. When we see that resistance to disconfirming information is particularly powerful in a conflict relationship, there are a number of explanations for this. The images of the enemy and conflict-related self-images are central parts of national or group identities, in which both leaders, population groups and individuals are under severe group pressure. The opportunities for taking the perspective of the other side is limited and there is hardly any interaction between the parties if the interaction is not governed by conflict norms and the empathy required is difficult to achieve. Finally, the likelihood of acceptance of disconfirming enemy pictures is minimised because the enemy is often seen as inheriting or being disposed of for hostile behaviour. Kelman stresses, however, that there is evidence that conflict images can change. "The challenge for scholars and practitioners of international conflict resolution is to devise the means to overcome their resistance to change" (p. 231).

From another perspective, Benedict Anderson, Irish professor of Government and Asian Studies, touches on aspects similar to Habermas' analysis of the public sphere in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois Society* (1991). In Anderson's book *Imagined Communities – Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (1990), he focuses on the national consciousness and nationalism as having significant roles in violent conflicts. Originally the print media

and later electronic media have played significant roles in the process of creating national consciousness and coherence. Anderson defines a nation as:

> an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is *Imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion (p. 15).

The imagined community is also what Spyros A. Sofos in his analysis *Culture, Media and the Politics of Disintegration and Ethnic Division in Former Yugoslavia* (1999) finds has played a significant role in the coherence of the post-war Yugoslav nation. The role of mass communication in these processes of imagination has been complex.

> It ranged from constituting frames of shared interpretation, public debate and collective action, to standardizing cultural resources and publicizing definitions of the situation which reified and naturalized national communities (p. 162).

Mass Communication has, according to Sofos, "enabled the formation and maintenance of public spheres roughly coextensive to modern nations and been central in the homogenization and creation of national cultures and identities" (p. 162).

While Sofos recognises the importance of mass communication contributions to the *construction of imagination* of national communities, he also adds the very important observation, that mass communication "has also another, negative aspect – that of

destruction and *oblivion* of alternative frames of interpretation, debate and action and of alternative versions of community" (p. 162). According to Sofos, in Yugoslavia, the lack of debate about the fundamental issues of the nation contributed to the fragmentation of public spheres and ultimately the dissolve of the nation.

This, according to John Paul Lederach (1997), is a general tendency:

> Cohesion and identity in contemporary conflict tend to form within increasingly narrower lines than those that encompass national citizenship. In situations of armed conflict, people seek security by identifying with something close to their experience and over which they have some control. In today's settings that unit of identity may be clan, ethnicity, religion, or geographic/regional affiliation, or a mix of these (p. 12).

The British sociologist Stanley Cohen describes in his book *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (2002), the British society's reaction *to* youth groups like Mods and Rockers. He fosters the term Moral Panic, which is:

> A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media (p. 1).

In the third edition of his book, published in 2002, Cohen re-defines the term and particularly *Panic*:

> The very usage of the term moral panic, so this argument
> starts, implies that societal reaction is disproportionate to
> the actual seriousness (risk, damage, threat) of the event.
> The reaction is always *more* severe (hence exaggerated,
> irrational, unjustified) than the condition (event, threat,
> behaviour, risk) warrants (p. XXVIII).

The term and the process behind it are often used by sociologists to describe inter-group or inter-identity conflicts and can in some cases explain the instigated violence.

2.4   Characteristics of Media in Society

I have already touched upon the influence of popular attitudes to the processes of conflict and peace-building. We have also with help from Kelman discussed the selective use of media, depending on common attitudes for the recipients and in the media. It is necessary for our goal to discuss the connection between the senders and recipients of messages. Thompson's social theory of the media contributes to our attempt to understand media in conflict and particularly the potential for media in conflict prevention and peace-building:

- We need to understand the media's role as a symbolic power and the importance of visibility for the power as well as for alternative forces.

- We further need to understand how the mediasation of culture changes the focus from traditional cultural values,

and how the appropriation of media messages adds to both understanding and self-understanding.

- Finally we can benefit from Thompson's understanding of the new version of the public private dichotomy and his suggestion for a regulated pluralism.

Referring to Max Weber, Thompson (1995) notes that two distinct forms of power – coercive and symbolic power – are necessary for the authority of a state. Coercive power is the possibility to use physical power against possible opponents, while the symbolic power is the capacity to "influence the actions of others and indeed to create events, by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms" (p. 15-17). Thompson rightly says that we cannot be sure to what extent the distribution of symbolic forms actually gives the power legitimacy in all the groups within the state. Nor do we know if a popular belief in legitimacy is necessary for the stable exercise of political power.

Nevertheless, we know that symbolic power is widely used by all states to a certain degree. Be it in terms of national flags and national hymns, group manifestations, or in terms of established discourses like democracy, religion or nationalism. It is, however, suggests Catherine Bell (1992), being brought from ritual symbols of what we share to the management of conflict and the making of social inequality:

> The orchestrated construction of power and authority in ritual … engage(s) the social body in the objectification of oppositions and the deployment of schemes that effectively reproduce the divisions of the social order. In this

> objectification lie the resonance of ritual and the
> consequences of compliance (p. 215).

Philip Elliott was among the first to relate political rituals to the study of mass communications. In his paper *Press Performance as Political Ritual* (1980), he leaves the traditional understanding of ritual in the social anthropological research as solely religious and defines it as:

> Rule-governed activity of a symbolic character involving
> mystical notions which draw the attention of participants to
> objects of thought or feeling which the leadership of the
> society or group hold to be of special significance (p. 147).

Nick Couldry, who in his book *Media Rituals – A Critical Approach* (2003) seeks to analyse the "ritual space of the media" in which any appearance in media becomes so attractive to all people, that the media itself is obtaining excessive power and legitimacy. In essence, this is not only a desire for governments and political power, but is also reflected in reality shows, talk shows or in celebrity programmes. This is a perspective which is more useful for modern and complex societies than for most of the societies where internal violent conflicts occur.

While it is obvious to Thompson that political leaders today must adapt their activities to a new form and degree of visibility (1995, p. 119), it is also clear that the struggle to become visible is a central aspect of the social and political upheavals of the modern world.

> The development of social movements, such as the
> women's movement and the civil rights movement, provide

> ample testimony to the fact that the claims of hitherto
> subordinate or marginalized groups are advanced through
> struggles for visibility in the media" (p. 247).

Thompson consequently argues that the process of cultural transformation since late medieval times has been looked at through broad changes in values and beliefs by social theorists, in attitudes and orientations. Instead the focus should be on new symbolic forms, and the new communication structures through the invention of new techniques and new media organisations. The mediasation of culture (p. 45).

Media is becoming increasingly dominant in contributing to the individual's identity and attitudes:

> In interpreting symbolic forms, individuals incorporate
> them into their own understanding for themselves and
> others. They use them as a vehicle for reflection and self-
> reflection, as a basis for thinking about themselves, about
> others and about the world to which they belong" (p. 42).

While the process of receiving messages or symbolic forms is far from an uncritical, automated reception and acceptance by the recipient, Thompson describes the process as an appropriation:

> In appropriating a message we adapt it to our own lives
> and life contexts. We apply it to a set of circumstances
> which, in the case of media products, are generally
> different from the circumstances in which the message was
> produced (p. 42).

Thompson distinguishes between face-to-face interaction as dialogical and in a context of co-presence, mediated interaction as a dialogue between two individuals using the telephone, paper or other technical media to communicate, and mediated quasi-interaction as a predominantly one-way communication to an indefinite range of potential recipients (p. 82-84). Today, ten years after the 1995 publication of his theories, one would have to develop a fourth category for the use of internet communication, which in chat rooms, interactive news or analysis sites usually connected to traditional print or broadcast media, allows for both personal two-way communication and at the same time dialogical communication to a range of potential recipients.

When analyzing and measuring the impact of the media in relation to popular support or discontent with war or internal conflicts, several factors play a role.

Firstly, it is important to know technically the actual diffusion of various media like radio, television, newspapers and Internet access in a given country. Furthermore, it would be useful to know the consumption of the individual media by different segments of the population. Secondly, in the tradition, which the Danish communication researcher Klaus Bruhn Jensen calls *Gratification Sought* (2002, p. 142), it is likely to relate the impact of media to both social conditions and psychological needs. Klaus Bruhn Jensen refers to the 'chain of communication' elaborated by Katz et al (1974) as (1) the social and psychological origins of (2) needs which generate (3) expectations of (4) the mass media or other sources which lead to (5) differential exposure (or engaging in other activities), resulting in (6) need gratification and (7) other consequences. The gratification research might only give general

answers to the public perception of media and genres, while not analysing the specific audience responses to concrete media content, but it still contributes to the understanding of the media's functions for its audience.

A key research emphasis is on media setting the agenda for public debate as well as for political decision-making. Instead of focusing on messages brought about by media and accepted by the audience, this tradition looks at three kinds of agendas – those of the media, the public and the political decision-making. In our context, the key questions are to what degree the political elite through the media can tune the public agenda in favour of or away from conflict, and to what degree the public or sub-publics can influence the policy level into or away from conflicts. Finally, where media freedom permits, to what degree the media can set the agenda in favour or against violent conflict. McQuail (2000) stresses that

> The evidence collected at that time and since consists of data showing a correspondence between the order of importance given in the media to 'issues' and the order of significance attached to the same issues by the public and politicians (p. 455).

For our purposes, it is consequently interesting to find out, whether communication intended at dissolving prejudices and stereotypes about former enemies has a resonance among the viewers. Further investigation to discern if media content can be *framed* to play a role for the audience perception in different phases of post-conflict situations would also be useful (McQuail, 2000, p. 454).

Finally, it is worth looking at the circumstances and function of communication, which decides if and to what degree the public appropriates an intended message, attitude or opinion as argued by Thompson.

One of the interesting aspects of defining the different models of communication is that the strength and ultimately the impact of the communication differ from one to the other. In a face-to-face interaction, the participants employ a multiplicity of symbolic cues – through gestures, smiles, intonation, eye-contact, etc. This makes the face-to-face situation a very strong mode of communication.

The mediated interaction taking place between two remote persons lacks the voice, and in almost all cases, the view of each of the communicators. "As the range of symbolic cues is narrowed, individuals have to fall back more and more on their own resources in order to interpret the messages conveyed" (Thompson, 1995, p. 84).

As mediated quasi-interaction is our key area of concern, we shall make a closer examination of the characteristics described by Thompson. The number of symbolic cues is very rich on television compared to radio and press, because the communicators can be seen and heard. Programme editing means that viewers can be cast through time and space. In some aspects, there are of course narrower varieties of symbolic cues than in face-to-face interaction. In my view, there exist a number of additional means to add symbolic cues through bringing a variety of symbols that can be recognised and interpreted by the recipients into the picture. Radio provides many of the symbolic cues that the print medium does not. The communicators cannot be seen, but songs, poems or sound

bites add some symbols to the communication. For example, it also is possible to move through time and space in a radio programme. However, for both electronic and print media,

> the recipients can control the nature and extent of their participation and can use the quasi-interaction to suit their own needs and purposes, but they have relatively little power to intervene in the quasi-interaction and determine its course and content (Ibid, p. 98).

What can we learn from the above arguments, in the context of violent conflicts? First of all, it is clear that the media has become increasingly important as a mediated quasi-interaction between power and people. In other words, in a complex society where the direct interaction between power and people has diminished drastically, the visibility for governments, opposition, and minority groups in the media has become crucial for their legitimacy. As Lederach (1997) states:

> Publicity and profile are essential for establishing the concerns of that constituency, yet the focus of the publicity is on the leader. Such publicity and profile further consolidates and maintains a leader's base and legitimacy (p. 40).

While the importance of visibility is unquestionable to any leader or group who wants legitimacy to enter into war or to create dialogue and build peace, it is more debatable as to what degree the messages delivered through the media by the respective leaders are perceived by the audience as desired. The direct messages provided through the media will, if in conflict with the reality of the individual

listener or viewer, be detected as unreliable or if the audiences'
understanding of the outer world is different from the sender of the
messages be questioned. Further media messages are discussed
with other individuals after reception and the individual's
understanding of the messages will ultimately reflect the comments
and criticism from others (Ibid, p. 42).

However, while the factual wording of messages is questionable in
its impact, it is worth thinking of them in their symbolic form, which
as Thompson suggests, will serve as a vehicle for reflection and self-
reflection. On the basis of his analysis of media during the conflicts
in ex-Yugoslavia, Spyros A. Sofos sees the following elements in
Philip Elliott's definition of public ritual as being especially important
(1999, p. 167):

1. The affirmation or imagination of community among
   participants.
2. The element of negotiation in ritual performance: rituals
   are not simply offering ready-made definitions of collective
   or national identity; they often draw on customary,
   familiar, traditional cultural elements in order to invite
   subordinate social groups to participate.
3. The element of 'emotional' (i.e. non-rational) participation.

Thompson's theories and Sofos' analyses indicate that it would be
impossible to rally popular support and legitimacy for a war if the
leaders do not use the media subtly. A hypothesis could be that if
encouragement from the leaders to enter into conflict are not finding
resonance within the circumstances and self-understanding of the
relevant population groups, they are likely not to have the desired
impact. The choices of symbolic cues in a mediated quasi-interaction

have to be recognised and must meet the expected interpretations of the targeted groups of the population. The same goes for media messages, which are meant to enhance the mutual understanding, encourage reconciliation and a sustainable peace. Also such messages must be directed to the contexts and discourses of the relevant parts of the population. At the same time, it is obvious that one should pay particular focus to the balance through which the adversaries and the relevant population groups are given visibility in the media during a peace process.

In striving towards models for using media in conflict prevention and peace building, it is important to identify solutions, which balance private, public and alternative or citizens' media. This balance has among donors been one of the most disputed topics in the international support to media.

Historically, an independent press serving as a critical watchdog has also been a private press.

> Liberal thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill saw the free expression of opinion through the organs of an independent press as a principal means by which a diversity of viewpoints could be expressed, and enlightened public opinion could be formed, and the abuses of state power by corrupt or tyrannical governments could be checked (Thompson and De Luce, 2002, p. 238).

Thompson believes that what Habermas describes as the bourgeois public sphere with the potential to criticize the state, has changed. The development of communication media has created a new kind of publicness, which is different from the traditional public life,

it is a publicness of openness and visibility, of making available and making visible, and this visibility no longer involves the sharing of a common locale (Ibid, p. 235-236).

Furthermore, the main threat to individual freedom of expression no longer derives from the state. With the growing concentration of resources in the media industries and increasing globalization, the threat is more likely to come from the "…the unhindered growth of media organizations *qua* commercial concerns," according to Thompson (Ibid, p. 239).

Thompson asks himself how it will be possible at an institutional level to renew public life and stimulate a kind of publicness, which is "neither part of the state nor wholly dependent on the autonomous processes of the market" (Ibid, p. 240).

The answer, he suggests is to implement what he calls *the principle of regulated pluralism*:

> It is a principle which takes seriously the traditional liberal emphasis on the freedom of expression and on the importance of sustaining media institutions which are independent of state power. But it is a principle which also recognizes that the market left to it self will not necessarily secure the conditions of freedom of expression and promote diversity and pluralism in the sphere of communication (Ibid, p. 240).

That demands not only restrictions on the ownership concentration of commercial media, but also favourable conditions for

development of media organizations that are not part of the large conglomerates. It also requires the separation of media institutions from the state.

The traditional distinction between private and public media has been based on the private-public dichotomy with the state media on one side and everything but the state on the other. Consequently, the private media would include global, regional, national and local commercial media as well as non-profit mainstream, community, alternative or citizen's media. The public media would without further distinction be the media controlled by government, parliament, and public authorities. If we look at the characteristics of public media from Thompson's perspective instead, "it is a publicness of openness and visibility, of making available and making visible" we reach other conclusions. With the threat against freedom of expression being at least as serious from the economic concentration or globalisation of commercial media as from the state, it is necessary to look at other modalities when we define media. In chapter four, I try to systematise media – not from a private-public dichotomy but from editorial independence and professional standards in their content allowing balanced and diverse access.

However, we shall also consider two attempts to define alternative or citizens' media, which might be of relevance in more localised conflicts.

John D. Downing seeks in his book *Radical Media – Rebellious Communication and Social Movements* (2001) to combine what seems a political manifest and a contribution to a scholarly approach to radical media. By *radical media,* he refers "to media, generally

small-scale and in many different forms, that express an alternative vision to hegemonic policies, priorities and perspectives" (preface). Downing seeks to substantiate the term *community media* and seeks to combine

> the inclusive populist meaning of the word with a sense of social connectedness over at least a generation, indeed, with the local communication exchange and networks that have grown up over time (p. 39).

His analysis starts from an American perspective with no mainstream public service media, as is the case in most of his international examples. Latin America is the only continent, which hardly has national state or public service media (p. 43).

Downing seeks to combine two models for radical media organizations: One is the so-called Leninist model, which he says was abused in its historical context, but successfully used *Agitprop*:

> an abbreviation for the combination of short-term information tactics to bring immediate abuses and problems to public notice (agitation) and longer-term political communication strategies (propaganda) to shape the hearts and minds of the public in a coherently Marxist-Leninist direction" (p. 68).

Downing also believes in the other model, the Self-management model. Though he acknowledges that the ownership of a media in collective hands does not guarantee anymore than the expression of that collective's position, he believes that they must be organised in ways promoting development power. This is by Downing seen as

"the positive possibilities for human achievement inherent in cooperative social life, which, up to the present, the construction of economic and political life most often sidelines" (p. 42).

Downing's promotion of the radical media is in many ways a double edged sword. There is no guarantee that a radical media, which expresses *an alternative vision to hegemonic policies, priorities and perspectives* is also a media, which contributes to peace and prevention of conflict. On the contrary, there are all risks that the radical media as representing religious or ethnic or politically deviant interests can contribute as much to building a conflict by restricting other views from being heard.

However, their impact seems to remain local, at least until the recent attempts to network nationally and regionally between the local media succeeded. According to a study of twenty-two participatory communication projects in Latin America, carried out by O'Sullivan-Ryan and Kaplún (1978) and referred in Clemencia Rodriquez's *Fissures in the Mediascape* (2001), the conclusion is that these projects "…have no real impact on the prevailing national communication system"(p.13). Consequently, the visibility of alternative political voices in the vague democracies seems to remain local. Some of them, however, are or have been instrumental to the churches and have served other interests than those of the local community to a large degree.

In the comprehensive study *Fissures in the Mediascape – An International Study of Citizen's Media* (2001), Clemencia Rodriguez departs from the traditional understanding of communication academics and media activists, in which alternative media is viewed

as a counterbalance to the unequal distribution of communication resources that come with big media corporations.

> This origin has located the debate within rigid categories of power and binary conceptions of domination and subordination that elude the fluidity and complexity of alternative media as a social, political and cultural phenomenon (p. 3).

Rodriguez also arrived at this conclusion after having experienced the failure of alternative media in building a new communication order. In the mid-1970s, the Non-Aligned Movement launched the New International Information Order, which in 1978 upon suggestion from USA's ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) was re-named the *New World Information and Communication Order* (NWICO). The concept was based on research showing that reporting about Third World countries was pre-dominantly made by First World agencies, the reporting in Third World countries was dependent on First World perspectives, and the mass media was increasingly monopolized by First World media.

The NWICO was abstract in its demands. One of the definitions reflecting the interests of the non-aligned countries was given by Cees Hamelink in 1979:

> an international exchange of information in which states, which develop their cultural system in an autonomous way and with complete sovereign control of resources, fully and effectively participate as independent members of the international community (quoted in Carlsson, 1998, p.43).

As Ulla Carlsson points to in her 1998 paper on the rise and fall of NWICO (p. 61), Rodrigues concludes that twenty years after the initiative, the "information and communication flows remain unbalanced, but the mass media are controlled by fewer and fewer owners" (p. 7).

Cees Hamelink noted in his diagnosis of the MacBride recommendations for the NWICO[2] note that the term has practically disappeared from the multilateral debate.

> Under pressure to modernize their communication infrastructures, Third World countries were urged to privatize media industries in fear of being 'left out' of the communication revolution. In an attempt to join the newly labelled "information society", Third World countries opened the gates to TNCCs (transnational communication corporations – ed.) and shifted away from national communication policies and regulation (Rodriquez, 2001, p. 9).

Rodriquez' perspective is to no longer look at alternative or radical media as opposed to the mainstream mass media and contributing to the establishment of an alternative information flow. Instead, she

---

[2] In 1976, a UNESCO commission chaired by Sean MacBride collected data about the inequalities between First and Third World countries and gave its recommendations to change this. Among the data were the following: Europe produces an average of 12,000 new book titles every year, African nations less than 350. The flow of telephone, telex and telegraph data among Third World countries is less than 10% of the world's total. The flow of news from First to Third World counties is 100 times more than the flow of news from the Third World to the First. While Europe broadcasts 855 hours of television programming to Africa, only 70 hours of African television reaches European countries (Rodriquez, 2001, p.5).

takes her point of departure in C. Mouffe's *theory of radical democracy* (1992, p. 225-239).

The radical democratic concept "implies seeing citizenship not as a legal status but as a form of identification, a type of political identity: something to be constructed, not empirically given" (Ibid, p.231). Citizens have to enact their citizenship on a day-to-day basis, through their participation in everyday political practices and "the citizen is not, as in liberalism, someone who is the passive recipient of specific rights and who enjoys the protection of the law" (2001, p. 19).

Radical democracy changes the political action from being interest groups opposing the state to political actions contesting the symbolic social codes,
identities and social relations within family, workplace, gender or ethnic relations. Consequently, Rodriguez shifts from alternative to citizens' media, which imply that:

> a collectivity is *enacting* its citizenship by actively intervening and transforming the established mediascape; second, that these media are contesting social codes, legitimized identities , and institutionalized social relations; and third, that these communication practices are empowering the community involved, to the point where these transformations and changes are possible (Ibid, p. 20).

In other words, Rodriguez perceives alternative media as following a given political line, seeking to achieve a common goal or change society in a linear fashion. The often chaotic appearance of citizens'

media must be seen as spaces for localised struggles or negotiations between democratic and non-democratic forces. Citizens' media are not by definition working for specific rights from local or national authorities.

Can we use the citizen's media in our approach to developing models for conflict prevention or peace building? As we have seen, the citizens' or alternative or radical media have not had any documented impact on changing the unbalanced information flow, or influencing the prevailing national communication system. However, they may be efficient frameworks for the encounters and reconciliation processes within traditional conflict resolution projects. With the increasing wiring of the World, the citizen's media, be they traditional or Net media seem capable to set both national and international agendas. The Internet can link local media together as in networks like ALER in Latin America and ANEM in Serbia. The Internet can have also gain significant impact through campaigns as in the Pepsi Campaign at Harvard University (Danitz and Strobel, 2000). While the use of Internet in conflict regions still has limited impact on the domestic political agenda, its links to outside countries and international civil society organisations might have significant influence on the parties involved in violent conflicts. This is an area worth exploring further. However, I believe it particularly is possible to make use of Rodriguez' theoretical framework for citizens' media in localised, communal conflicts as in Nigeria, India and elsewhere for example, and particularly in the post-conflict reconciliation process.

Conclusions:

In this chapter, I have looked at theories and models with which to comprehend conflicts, dynamics of conflicts and approaches to peace building and conflict prevention. I have further investigated the social-psychological factors, which influence people during conflicts and at the characteristics of media in order to devise ways of using media in conflict transformation.

To comprehend the causes, dynamic and management of violent conflicts this chapter has served several concepts from which we can elaborate our strategies and models. One key concept is as developed by Michael E. Brown, Louis Kriesberg, Michael Lund and others to distinguish between pre-disposing structural causes and proximate dynamic causes or triggers of the conflict. In my development of concepts for media support, I must consequently assure that both structural and dynamic causes will be addressed.

Equally important is to elaborate on the goals for conflict preventing and peace building media interventions. In the introduction chapter we defined with the help of Reimann the difference between conflict settlement, conflict resolution and conflict transformation as well as the different levels of international interventions at track I, II and III. As pointed out by Director of Center for International Conflict Resolution, at University of Columbia, Dr. Andrea Bartoli, an analysis of possible media support must claim to deal with the levels of all three tracks, as well as it must move freely between the conflict resolution, conflict settlement and conflict transformation approaches.(Interview, Bonde, December 2004).

Dov Shinar distinguishes between media's potential role, whether they post conflict follow a short and mid term reconciliation model or a longer-term conflict transformation model. As well, he points to the shortcomings of media's reconciliation model he also points to the practical difficulties for media to be involved in transformation. To point to solutions in this dilemma, John Paul Lederach offers us useful solutions by looking to the peace building process as running through different phases with each their emphasis. Lederach stresses that already in the immediate post-conflict intervention the phases towards longer-term goals of conflict transformation must be set. Even more useful for media interventions does it become, when Lederach's model for progressing phases towards sustainable peace is integrated with Maire Dugan's Nested Paradigm. By dealing with issue, relationship, subsystem and system along the timeline of progressing phases, she provides a useful vision for how to overcome some of the practical difficulties, Dov Shinar's rightly points to for the media if they are involved in an open-ended conflict transformation process. This model I will adapt, discuss and test in chapter 5 as a useful approach to support to content.

One of the aspects, which this chapter raises, is the relationship between leadership and population in all phases from pre- to post conflict. Michael E. Brown notes that while popular support is important, the vast majority of internal conflicts is triggered by elite-level factors. Herbert C. Kelman agrees but finds from a social-psychological approach that leaderships through mobilizing and manipulating the needs and fears of the population it gains popular support behind the conflict. For this purpose, the media is an important tool. John B. Thompson stresses that whether political leaders want it or not they must adapt to the kind of visibility

working today presenting themselves and their actions to the broader population.

Among the characteristics used in the media to gain popular support in the course of conflict are theoretical concepts as described by Bronfenbrenner and White the *formation of mirrored images*, by Cohen *moral panic,* and by Elliot *public rituals.* One of the practical difficulties for providing alternative information, which might diminish popular support is, what Kelman claims as the concepts of selective exposure, selective perception, and selective recall depending on the personal attitudes. While the selectivity concerning exposure, perception and recall might be right, McQuail finds that data shows that both the public and the politicians will give the issues given priority by the media also a higher priority. In other words, if the existing media in a given conflict area in spite of the politicians' interests and influence can stay diverse and impartial in their programmes there are reasons to believe that the population is less tempted to choose to do without that media and the agenda consequently influencing politicians and population.

The chapter also touches upon one of the issues, which will be pursued further in chapter 4 and 6 – namely the discussion about the dichotomy between private and public media. While the public sphere as originally described by Habermas anticipated that a rational, public discussion of the decisions of the political leadership should be based on privately owned media, Thompson develops *the principle of regulated pluralism.* In a publicness of openness and visibility, of making available and making visible one should focus on the independence from economic as well as from political interests.

Through building our theoretical framework, I in reality also did a literature review within the field of this thesis. It remains clear that there is practically no scholarly literature combining peace research, conflict management, social-psychological and communication research. By referring to theories within each of these areas and by combining conflict management and peace-building models with researched results from media interventions in conflict situations, we shall seek to develop comprehensive and coherent models and methods, which add media as an additional dimension to crisis management and conflict transformation.

First, however, we shall explore the role that media can play in the escalation of crises and outbreak of violent conflicts in the next chapter.

3.   Media's Role in the Escalation of Violent Conflicts

To develop strategies for media intervention in peace-building, it is necessary to know the role the media played during the escalation of conflict. It helps me later to define phases during the escalation and point to timely entry points for media interventions. As well, it allows me to identify the areas, which can be the target for such interventions during conflict escalation and in a post conflict situation. The chapter also illustrates phenomena of the media, which I later can use to define the nature of different media in relation to their independence from political and ulterior interests behind a conflict.

We shall also look at the pre-conditions underlying the apparent reasons for a conflict. What effect has the creation of nation states in the colonial era had? What role have economic and social circumstances had and how important have ethnic, social, geographic and national identities been in the creation of conflicts?

The question of whether media has contributed to the background or even initiation of a concrete conflict can only be answered if various levels are considered:

- Do the established media structures and legislation in countries of conflict reflect the ethnic, geographical and political divides, and how is editorial freedom and social responsibility balanced?

- What appears on screen or is broadcasted through
  loudspeakers is, at the end of the day, most important for
  the media's impact on war and peace. The content both
  reflects the media structure as well as legislation. However,
  the content is also a result of the institutional editorial line,
  ethical standards and guidelines as well as the
  professionalism of the staff. Finally, the additional political
  or economic pressures in the escalation of a crisis play a
  role. The important question is therefore, if and how all
  these factors influence the build-up of a conflict?

This chapter will further analyse whether there has been a difference
between state-owned, private commercial or private political and
religious media in terms of their functions during crisis escalation
and conflict. Have particular political forces been able to influence or
even control the most important media?

The focus will remain on the local media of the conflict zone, but as
the perception of a given conflict in the international media appears
to have an impact on the views of the political legitimacy of the
conflicting parties, the chapter will further touch upon the tuning of
the international media by adversaries.

The conflicts that I will examine are all internal conflicts. The case
studies are from the industrial and developing parts of the world
respectively and represent two continents – Europe and Africa. They
illustrate two different types of conflicts: the disintegration of a
federal state structure in Yugoslavia and the political and social
power struggle in Rwanda.

3.1   Presentation of Conflicts

In the post-Cold War era, armed conflicts have increasingly turned away from being wars between nations. Instead, around 90% of all violent conflicts are now internal conflicts – between governments and political opposition groups or between majority governments and minorities seeking independence and land, as well as between quite sharply defined population groups living in the same country, each with their separate identity.

Up till the nineteenth century, nation states were the building blocks for popular identification. Through the Cold War, the tight control exercised by the USA and USSR limited the scale of local internal conflicts, revolts and religious mobilisations, which never escalated into a nuclear mega conflict between the two superpowers.

After the Cold War, numerous internal conflicts erupted across Africa, Central Asia, and South East Europe as well as in other regions. The nation state's role as a point of identification was challenged during those years.

John Paul Lederach (1997) finds that:

> Cohesion and identity in contemporary conflict tend to form within increasingly narrower lines than those that encompass national citizenship. In situations of armed conflict, people seek security by identifying with something close to their experience and over which they have some control. In today's settings that unit of identity may be clan, ethnicity, religion, or geographic/regional affiliation, or a mix of these (p. 12).

The international media tend to see ethnicity or religion as the main explanations for armed conflict. It is, however, questionable to what degree ethnicity and different cultural or religious interests of ethnic groups form part of the background for armed conflicts. Laitin and Rothchild (2005) see ethnic belonging, political ideologies or religion as mainly rallying cries in the mobilization and collective identity group, while what is really at stake is land, economic resources or other forms of control (*Causes of conflict*, online).

This seemed to be the case during the **disintegration** of former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia has, since World War Two, maintained a careful balance between its Western and Eastern alliances. Parallel to the end of the Cold War, the disintegration and decentralised development of the political and economic system in the country gave rise to a number of individual but interrelated conflicts. These were rooted in the wide gaps in socio-economic levels within the country and were also reinforced by strengthened republic and ethnic identities and the absence of national identity under the latest communist governments (Jenkins et al, 1996, p. 4).

Another problem was that various principles of nation-building acted against each other. Slovenia, which separated relatively peacefully in 1991, was the only linguistically, religiously and territorially homogeneous republic. The other republics were formed primarily along historical borders, the most ancient being Bosnia's, which except for a short period between 1929 and 1945, by and large go back to 1699. Bosnia was linguistically and historically united, but was territorially divided that year into three categories of citizens based on religion and ethnicity. Based on ethnic terms, the minorities were called Serbs and Croats, while the majority were

called Muslims by their religious identity. All three lived amongst each other and often mixed.

All the republics, except Slovenia, were multi-ethnic and most had large numbers of Serbs living there. Serbia itself was not only ethnically heterogeneous, but under Tito was itself politically split into three territories - Serbia proper and the autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Croatia was composed of territories with different histories, climates and dialects. Many Croats lived outside the republic, most of them in Bosnia-i-Herzegovina and also in Serbia and Montenegro, but in smaller numbers. In the words of Danish professor in History and Serbo Croat Karsten Fledelius:

> The cohesive forces in Yugoslavia were the bad historical experiences with ethnicity-based nation building from the Second World War, the threat from greedy neighbours and great powers, the pride in the self-liberation of the country from German, Italian and Bulgarian occupation, the realisation of a common, specific socio-political project – the workers' self-management – and the charismatic leadership and international prestige of the Croatian-born Josip Broz Tito, who was supported by a small circle of committed partisan comrades. One by one these forces were weakened or disappeared from 1980 onwards (2005, notes).

This mix of ethnic and religious groups across Yugoslavia made the country's disintegration incredibly violent through the attempts to ethnically cleanse the republics, in order to create homogeneous national identities.

During World War Two, the Croats tried to cleanse the country of Serbs, the Serbs supported the efforts by the Bosnian Serbs to establish and ethnically clean Serb entity (later Republic Srpska) and to reduce the Albanian majority in Kosovo, while Croatia in its Krajina region killed or put to flight hundred thousands of Serbs and in Bosnia cleansed parts of the republic for Muslims and Serbs. Montenegro and Macedonia were both multinational and split between two ethno political forces, the latter with recurring violent confrontations.

In Rwanda, a different type of violent conflict took place, with its outset in a socially biased **political power struggle**. After decades of single-party control the Government was opposed by other representatives from both the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. It reacted by pointing to the 10% Tutsi minority as a common enemy for all Hutus. By singling out the Tutsi minority as a different and dangerous ethnic group that wanted to seize control of the country, the government ignored that Tutsis and Hutus had the same culture, religion and geographical origins. In other words, they were in spite of different physiologies of the same ethnicity (McNulty, 1999, p.276). In a conscious and controlled campaign, large parts of the Hutu population became involved in one of the most dramatic and massive genocides against the Tutsi minority. The root causes go back to the social divide between Tutsi as stockbreeders and Hutu as farmers with their different social roles and prestige during the colonial times. Tutsis in neighbouring Burundi had contributed to triggering the conflict but it was essentially a political power struggle, which exploded into a violent conflict, with around a million civilian deaths and with a third of all Hutus involved in the fights.

We shall in an analysis compare and systematize the causes of the
selected conflicts. We shall further compare the different media's
role during conflict escalation and the conflict itself. From the
existing analyses and empirical observations of media behaviour, we
shall look for common characteristics as well as those which
distinguish the different types of conflicts in question.

The underlying reasons for armed conflicts as described earlier by
Michael Brown (1996) are structural, political, economic/social and
cultural/perceptual factors that have developed over time, such as
weak states, discriminatory political institutions or economic
systems and cultural discrimination. The role that the media defines
for itself or is defined to take on can either diminish these factors or
leave them untouched. We shall also discuss that through our cases.

3.2   Yugoslavia – History

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Population: 4.025.000
Ethnic groups: Serb 37%, Bosniak 48%, Croat 14%
Religion: Muslim 40%, Orthodox 31%, Roman Catholic 15%, Other
14%
Independence: March 1992

Croatia
Population: 4.500.000
Ethnic groups: Croat 90%, Serb 5%, Other 5%
Religion: Roman Catholic 88%, Orthodox 4%, Muslim 1%, Other 7%
Independence: 1991

Macedonia
Population: 2.045.000
Ethnic groups: Macedonian 64%, Albanian 25%, Turkish 4%, Roma 3%,
                          Serb 2%
Religion: Macedonian Orthodox 70%, Muslim 29%, Other 1%
Independence: 1991

Serbia and Montenegro
Population: 10.830.000
Ethnic groups: Serb 63%, Albanian 17%, Montenegrin 5%, Hungarian 3%,
                          Other 13%
Religion: Orthodox 65%, Muslim 19%, Roman Catholic 4%,
                          Protestant 1%, Other 11%

Independence:	Founded 2003 on remaining parts of Yugoslavia
Slovenia	
Population:	2.010.000
Ethnic groups:	Slovene 92%, Croat 1%, Serb 1%, Other 6%
Religion:	Roman Catholic 71%, Lutheran 1%, Muslim 1%, Atheist 4%, Other 23%
Independence:	1991
The CIA World Fact Book 2005 [Accessed 17th May 2005].	

Table 1: Countries of former Yugoslavia

Former Yugoslavia was founded as a federal republic led by Josip Tito in the aftermath of Second World War. Behind the last Yugoslavian federation were centuries of different histories for the participating federal states:

Serbia's time under the Ottoman Empire from late fourteenth century to the middle of nineteenth century, Croatia's seven hundred years under the Hungarian crown, Slovenia's five hundred years under Habsburg rule and the city states on the Adriatic coast with close relations to the Italian cities were periods in which the Balkan peoples settled geographically according to their religion. The Muslim Ottoman Empire led to large continents of Muslims in the Albanian, Kosovo and Bosnian areas, as well as in Macedonia, North Greece and South Bulgaria while leaving the Eastern parts of Balkan to Constantinople and Central Balkan to independent Slavic churches. The rest of the region was more connected to West European Catholicism. Interestingly, the divisions were not along ethnic or linguistic lines.

During the nineteenth century – the century of the nation state – the Serbs were the first among the South Slavs to establish a standardised literary language and have a uniform cultural folklore. The establishment of an independent Serbian Principality in late

1830s paved the way for Serbian nationalism (Jenkins et al, 1996, p.254). With the linguistic similarity between spoken Serbian and Croatian languages and the relation to Slovenian language and culture, a political vision of creating a joint country resulted in 1918 in the establishment of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – later Yugoslavia.

Nationalist movements very soon after worked for a separation into independent nation states. The fascist *Ustase* movement in Croatia, which had been supported by Mussolini, was allowed to establish its own nation state through the German occupation of the Balkans. This lasted until the defeat of the Germans at the end of the Second World War

3.2.1 Image of a Nation

Through the victory of Tito's guerrilla movement during World War Two, the ground was laid for yet an attempt to unite the area. This time a federal Yugoslavian state comprising Serbia, Vojvodina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia was established under Tito's leadership. With the multitude of ethnic, religious, national and political interests comprising the nation, only strong national symbols with Tito as the main uniting force could keep the country together.

Sofos A. Spyros (1999) writes on the disintegration and ethnic divide in former Yugoslavia that the nationhood existed as a system of cultural signification. The discourse of nationhood and that of ethnicity comprises processes, categories and knowledge through which communities are defined. Historically, mass communication has played a crucial role in these processes of imagination of

national communities. It has enabled the formation and maintenance of public spheres and been central in the homogenization and creation of national cultures and identities. Spyros finds that the role of mass communication ranges from constituting frames of shared interpretation, public debate and collective action, to standardizing cultural resources and publicizing the definition of the situation which reified and naturalized national communities.

Importantly, Spyros stresses that the contribution of mass communication to the *construction of imagination* of national communities also has another, negative aspect – that of *destruction* and *oblivion* of alternative frames of interpretation, debate and action and of alternative versions of community.

Yugoslavia was an excellent example of this. It could most appropriately be described as a semi-democracy with a high degree of personal and economic freedom, but with neither provision for criticism of the ruling communist party nor a plural political party system. During the first decades of post-World War Two Yugoslavia, the government attempted to stress similarities and to suppress divisive factors among the South Slav ethnic groups. There was an official sanctioning of the 1954 Novi Sad declaration of Croat, Montenegrin and Serb linguists, regarding the oneness of the Serbo-Croat language, the promotion of official versions of Marxist-Yugoslav history and the support of attempts to establish a Yugoslav 'cultural space', especially in high culture.

During the first twenty years of post war Yugoslavia, the dominant print and electronic state media lent all their authority to the symbols and public rituals of the Tito-led state. The media was

controlled and monitored by the Yugoslav Communist Party. News was delivered by the sole news agency – *Tanjug* - and the print and broadcast media all had to obey the political line of the Communist party and focus on protocol news. In spite of some degrees of editorial freedom, the media were not providing an open debate of the leadership of the communist party and did not question the Yugoslav nation, in spite of a decentralized structure for most media.

After twenty years of economic growth from the late 1960s, unbalanced economic development in the different republics precipitated economic decline. This led to a re-emergence of "nationalism", which of course was also rooted in the political attempts over the last century to establish nation states before and during the creation of an all-Yugoslav state. President Tito accepted the mounting pressure from the republics and provinces to gain more independence in order to secure economic growth. As a result, Yugoslavia was transformed into a confederation in which the centre loosened its power through the installation of a new constitution in 1974.

3.2.2 Divided identities

As political, economic and cultural powers after 1974 resided with the republics, the media also became primarily republican in terms of control, framework of reference and the focus of content.

Up through the 1960s and 1970s, the individual republics had their own radio and television services, and several newspapers were established by the regional authorities. Whether the print media was

social property[3] or state-owned, in reality the local communist party was in control.

The Yugoslav Constitution provided for the freedom of the media, freedom of speech and of association in Article 166. However, Article 203 also prohibited using this freedom to disrupt the foundations of the socialist self-management democratic order, endangering the independence of the country or stirring up national, racial or religious hatred.

Similar restrictions were put on the media in a number of laws and most endangering to press freedom was the fact that the restrictions had also been incorporated into federal and republic criminal codes (Thompson, 1999, p. 11). This provided a very flexible tool for both federal and republic authorities to control and punish journalists, owners or media outlets. The Criminal Code was supplemented with a Law on Prevention of the Abuse of Freedom of the Press, which gave the Public Prosecutors the right to ban publications before or after they were published.

The media played down the numerous contradictions within the Yugoslav state for years. They ignored the opposition to the creation of a federal state, opposition from parts of the population to a communist system for the state and later the increasing nationalism and ethnic separatism. The media, in this case the state media, followed the political line of the government, turning a blind eye to its role as a platform for a dialogue between contrasting arguments.

---

[3] "The ideologists of Yugoslav Communism had devised the concept of 'social property' as a distinctive model of public ownership which would avoid the 'state capitalism' of Soviet-style command economies. 'Social property' had no titular owner; in theory it belonged to the whole of society, which entrusted it, so to speak, to segments of society (companies, cultural and sports associations, professional institutions, hospitals, schools and so forth) for use on behalf of the whole" (Thompson, 1999, p. 9).

Up through the 1980s, however, "Yugoslav media often flouted the law and the will of the authorities with media from transgressing the 'precisely defined limits' of their freedom" (Thompson, 1999, p. 12). This liberalization was possible because with the de-centralisation after 1974, the League of Communists had become internally competing republic and provincial units and in many cases allowed their local media to be critical of the others. By the mid-1980s, not only media but also the school systems were fragmented into eight republic and provincial curricula. The communication was still more intra-republic than federal inter-republic. In this process, the mass media played a very significant role by actively supporting, publicizing and amplifying nationalist definitions of the situation and by demarcating national and ethnic boundaries in the social imaginaries of the post-Yugoslav order[4].

The 'public sphere' of socialist Yugoslavia was segmented along republic borders. Despite its name, Yugoslav Radio-Television was not really a 'Yugoslav' (federation-wide) institution. It had progressively become an effectively coordinating network of republic and provincial broadcasting organizations. Till the 1980s, the nine television stations situated in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and the Serb provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina had extensive programme collaboration. Through this, participating stations produced and delivered news from their own local area to the federal system according to the size and resources of each station. The federal system then coordinated programme schedules and distributed all news and programmes to all nine

---

[4] A detailed analysis of the role of media in strengthening the nationalization of the public sphere in Yugoslavia at the expense of federalism is given by Sofos in *From 'Yugoslav' to National Cultures: Ethnic Conflict and the Nationalization of the Public Spheres of Former Yugoslavia* (p. 259-270).

stations. In that way, almost all reports were broadcasted at every participating station.

With the increasing republic and provincial identity, the participating stations began to produce news reports, which could propagate their own republic's views and agendas. As this became more obvious, the federal collaboration turned competitive and conflicting. Towards the end of the 1980s, when Belgrade was in reality controlling four television stations – in Belgrade, Titograd (Podgorica) and the two provincial capitols Novi Sad and Pristina – resistance from the other participants towards Serb dominance surged to new heights.

In 1987, by the end of what can be called the distant pre-conflict phase, which in theory could either continue as a sustainable peace or lead to crises and possibly violent conflicts, the status of the media was as follows:

> The constitution provided for the freedom of expression, media freedom and the right to organisation, but several laws and regulations restricted the right to criticize the foundation of the political system in the country. Till the de-centralisation of political powers into the different republics, the media had obeyed the intentions of the law by turning a blind eye to all systemic malfunctions, popular dissatisfaction and alternative interpretations of the nation. The Yugoslav media had, through collaboration, reflected Yugoslav unity, but was now disintegrating into local media along republic, ethnic and nationalistic political lines. As a

consequence, the de-centralised media structure was used to propagate its own political targets rather than being an instrument for empowered inclusion in a joint national imagination. One of the side effects was that, for better or worse, it became possible for the media in one republic to be critical of policies in other republics, though they often restricted criticism, when it was directed at their own local authorities.

3.2.3 Media in the Pre-Conflict Phase

1980	Yugoslavian President Josef Tito dies.
1988-90	Widespread dissatisfaction in Kosovo.
1985	Economic crisis begins and escalates in the following years.
1990	First multiparty elections in all republics. Nationalist leaders win in all republics. Slobodan Milosevic becomes president of Serbia.
1991	Slovenia and Croatia declare independence from the Yugoslav federation. The federal army fights against Croatia but accepted the Slovenian independence.
1991	Serb-dominated provinces declare independence from Croatia and alliance with other Serbs.
1991	Macedonia declares independence.
1992	Bosnia-i-Herzegovina declares independence.
1992	Bosnian Serbs began the siege of Sarajevo, which was under Muslim control.
1993	Armed conflicts between Croatia, its Serb provinces and Serbia continue.
1995	American bombardments of Bosnian Serb army in Bosnia.
1995	Signing of Dayton Peace Accord in December ends the war in Bosnia, as well as the conflicts between Serbia and Croatia. Federal Bosnia-i-Herzegovina included a Serb and a Muslim/Croat republic.
1998	Albanian revolt in Kosovo against Serbian rule. Serb soldiers persecuted and possibly committed a massacre against Albanians.
1999	NATO bombs Serbs in Serbia including Kosovo.
2000	Elections in Serbia effectively lost by Milosevic.
The CIA World Factbook 2005 [Accessed 17th May 2005].	

Table 2: Chronology of events in the Pre-Conflict Phase in Yugoslavia (1978-2000)

The centrifugal or disintegrative power described by Maire Dugan (2003) which ultimately tore Yugoslavia apart, had its background in the different identities and ambitions of the ethnic and national

groups included in the Post War Yugoslavian nation. What we see in the pre-conflict period might be with Serbia in the primary crisis-escalating role, but the disintegration of Yugoslavia was a cause, which gained resonance, particularly in Croatia and Slovenia and also in the Kosovo province of Serbia, where the 90% Albanian majority sought recognition as a republic.

"Then came Kosovo", as Goran Milic, former news editor and presenter at TV Belgrade, told Mark Thompson (Thompson, 1999, p.18). By that time – in 1988 - Slobodan Milosevic was seeking political compensation for the loss of a strong federation in which Serbia dominated, by focusing on Serbian nationalism and dominance over its provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo.

TV Belgrade broke the traditional cooperation practice by sending its own correspondent to Kosovo instead of using reports produced by TV Pristina. This change happened right before Slobodan Milosevic visited Kosovo, where he had reputedly delivered a speech, in which he told the crowd from the Serb minority that "No one shall beat you again" (Thompson, 1999, p. 18). The reference to the Serb defeat on the Kosovo Polje in 1389 was given prominent exposure with a nationalistic slant on Serbian radio and television. Following that event, the other Yugoslav republics and provinces also began dispatching their own correspondents to provide live policy coverage from Kosovo.

While the root causes were plentiful and were further triggered by a severe economic crisis, there was no doubt that in the field of media, the Serbian government headed by Slobodan Milosevic outdid all the republics in its exercise of control in order to gain popular support for its own policies.

The Kosovo speech of Slobodan Milosevic fits into the observations, which Spyros A. Sofos (1999) makes on the use of *Public Rituals* on TV to bring the Serbian viewers a sense of societal insecurity because of the perceived danger facing the Serbian nation (p. 166).

Sofos stresses that when examining the relationship between mass communications, public rituals and nationalism, the following elements are important:

1. The affirmation or imagination of community amongst its participants.

2. The element of 'negotiation' in ritual performance: rituals do not simply offer ready-made definitions of collective or national identity; they often draw on customary, familiar, traditional cultural elements in order to invite subordinate social groups to participate.

3. The element of 'emotional' (non-rational) participation. In particular, Elliott (1999) argued that (ritual) tries to add spiritual and emotional communion to any sense of political unity (p. 146).

Serbia did, according to Spyros, seek to establish a national identity for Serbs living as minorities in Bosnia-i-Herzegovina, Krajina in Croatia, and the Serbian province Kosovo. Examples of this were the mass baptism of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo Polje as well as the return of Prince Lazar's relics to Kosovo, which passed through Serb populated villages and monasteries from Croatia through Bosnia-i-Herzegovina to Kosovo Polje. These events were given

prominent television coverage in 1988-1989 and contributed to the perception of spiritually-bonded Serbian communities, threatened by the Albanian majority in Kosovo and the still looser federal unity.

Thompson (1999) describes in his comprehensive book on media's role before and during the Balkan wars, the way the Serbian leadership used media as a model

> which identified and stigmatized a national enemy, homogenized Serbs against the threat, and called for resistance. After the Albanians of Kosovo, the enemies were Slovenes and Slovenia, then Croats and Croatia, then Bosnia and its Muslim population (p. 169).

The numerous examples of media behaviour given by Mark Thompson are indeed supportive to the interpretation given by Spyros A. Sofus. Sofus (1999) describes the steps of the media model in Serbia from 1987 to 1990 (p.168-72), which can be simplified as follows:

First, the Serbian state- and Church-controlled media published materials, which victimized the Serbs in Yugoslavia. Historic events, like the persecution of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs by the Croatian *Ustashe* during Second World War, are transferred from being historic to present dangers for the Serb people.

Secondly, an intensive process of identifying enemies of Serbia and the threats they represent was started. Thompson listed them as the Albanians, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims and to a lesser degree, the Vatican and the USA. Milosevic spread the perception that Yugoslavia was undermining 'Serbian rights', as did the

memorandum from the Serb Academy for Sciences had done in 1986, in its description of the Albanians in Kosovo (Fledelius, 1999, p.105).

Thirdly, a process of scapegoating the Kosovo Albanians commenced. The stereotyping of Albanian culture and practices, which had existed in Serb popular culture and memory below the surface for decades, was now made public. Rumours became reality in the Serbian media and Albanians were often portrayed as being primitive, backward, illiterate, and were implicated in thefts, robberies, murders and rapes that took place, or were rumoured to have taken place in Kosovo.

Fourthly, the alleged criminality was not important *per se*, but was part of a broader Albanian 'conspiracy' to drive Serbs and Montenegrins out of Kosovo and to erase any signs or memories of their presence there. There had been incidents of alleged rapes of Serbian women from Serb church leaders in Kosovo during the mid-1980s but rapes were now interpreted by the media as attacks on the Serbian religion and nation. Rape victims were defined as Serbs - S*erbian mothers and wives* - at the expense of their individual and collective identities as *women.* The alleged perpetrators were primarily recognized as *Albanians.* The public interest in Serbia was consequently directed towards the 'rape of the nation by Albanians'.

Fifthly, as described by Senad Kamenica in his Master's dissertation on media as a tool of conflict resolution (2003), a headline in one of the Serbian newspapers saying that "*Croatian Special forces speak Albanian"* after a Croatian search for weapons in the Serbian independence movement for Krajina as "a favourite technique of Serbian propaganda machine: assimilating Serbia's enemies to one

another, epitomizing them as a vast collective driven by a self-evident metaphysical purpose: to sow dissension [sic] among the Serbs before killing as many of them as possible" (p. 48).

Sofus defines the use of media in Yugoslavia as a *moral panic.* In a theoretical review this is defined by Stanley Cohen (1987) for a societal reaction to youth deviance, a process whereby

> (a) condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media: the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to… Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal or social policy or even in the way society conceives itself (p. 9).

Sofus – and I agree – finds it a fruitful term to use in the study of mobilisation of nationalists movements in general.

Strangely enough, in some of its media legislative developments, Yugoslavia did move towards increasing independence from political control, while at the same time sharpening the influence of the federal and republic governments over individuals. In 1989, it became legal to establish large private companies and media groups. The new legislation also gave plenty of space for niche

media in Belgrade with their own editorial freedom, but journalists and media were in reality severely harassed by the authorities. In the countryside, no alternative media existed and the nationalistic discourse provided by national media dominated. Equally important that same year was that new legislation proposed the state media to be pluralistic, objective and follow other European standards for public service media. Media legislation was liberalised, but in practice was not. In Serbia, the rules were abused as much as possible to control and initiate self-censorship and almost half of the RTS news journalists were by that time members of independent Union, which defended their editorial independence.

With the country's first multiparty elections in the Yugoslav republics in 1990 and the election of nationalist political leaders as presidents – Milan Kucan in Slovenia, Slobodan Milosovic in Serbia, Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and the rotating presidency Radovan Karadzic, representing the Serbs, Kresimir Zubak, representing the Croats, and the later president Alija Izetbegovic, representing the Muslims in Bosnia – there was further escalation towards open conflict.

3.2.4 Immediate Pre-Conflict and Conflict Media

In Croatia, the elections resulted in an exchange of key managers, editors and journalists in the main media, a halt on the expected privatization of frequencies and freedom of the media. As in Serbia, prominent radio and television journalists were removed from their popular programmes and young, inexperienced and easily manipulated journalists loyal to Tudjman's HDZ party replaced them. Croatian Television's (HTV) public service obligations, which

were put in place when the law was passed immediately after the 1990 elections, were completely ignored up to and during the wars against the Serb-led Yugoslav army and later Bosnia.

Similar to what we saw in Rwanda was a set of guidelines which was developed for HTV, stating:

- Do not show people weeping and wailing
- Do not broadcast pictures of blown-up, badly wounded and shot Croatian soldiers,
- Do not call the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) anything except 'SERBO-COMMUNIST ARMY OF OCCUPATION'.
- Expunge commentary from reports, give only facts.
- Do not conceal defeats at the front, but stress the tremendous forces employed by the enemy and his unscrupulousness, and always finish such reports with optimistic declarations and avowals.
- Footage must, in keeping with this decree, be previewed and approved by the editor before transmission.

    Signed by the News Editor-in-Chief Tomislav Marcinko and the Editor-in-Chief of Programming Miroslav Lilié at HTV (Thompson, 1999, p. 159)

The coverage of the war in Bosnia had, according to Thompson, been designed to deliver simple messages like, "Croat forces in Bosnia are only defending themselves and their "centuries-old hearths"; all Croats must support this self-evidently just struggle; the other sides, the Serb forces and, since early 1993, the "Muslim forces" too (those loyal to the Bosnian government), are expansionist, aggressive and genocidal" (p. 163).

To keep Croat audiences away from the misdeeds committed by its own armed forces, the pressure on the media and journalists was maintained and intensified during the war. Professional journalists either obeyed or organised themselves, as in the case of Forum 21, as a means to defend their personal integrity even when they had been removed from the television screens.

Whereas media in Serbia and Croatia were centralised, the media in Bosnia was multiplied into three factions/groups, representing the Serb and Croat perspectives, and an all republic and Muslim perspective.

In an expressive description, Mark Thompson shows how the media war leading up to the open conflict was all but a propaganda war on words and images controlled by Serbs and Croats. It also became a physical war on transmitters, infrastructures and media organisations (p. 214). The Croats and particularly the Serbs in Bosnia seized the transmitters of the national public broadcaster Radio and Television Bosnia-i-Herzegovina (RTVBiH). Radio and Television Serbia (RTS), in collaboration with the Bosnian Serb station in Pale, covered half of Bosnia's territory when Bosnia declared itself independent from Yugoslavia in April 1992. Bosnia was by that time already fragmented. Radio and TV began functioning as local broadcasters without providing much of a broader picture of the situation. The month before the Serb minority had begun its attacks against the Bosnian government, the possibility was not even mentioned.

According to Thompson, it is fair to say that while both the Serb and Croat Bosnian media were propaganda media, the Muslim media

and particularly the RTVBiH was somewhat different, maintaining its diversity up to the start of the Bosnian conflict.

During the war in Croatia which broke out in the summer of 1991, the Bosnian mainstream media was careful not to use stereotypes or critical language about the Serbs or Croats. Even when the attacks on Bosnia escalated in 1992, this balance continued. Thompson explains it with two primary facts: The Bosnian government and its forces were composed of all three Bosnian nationalities and the main theme of Serb and later Croat propaganda against Bosnia was the alleged Islamic sectarian ambitions of the leading politicians and their 'treachery' of Serbs or Croats, who had supported the government's defence of Bosnian sovereignty (p. 222). Consequently, the media was cautious not to imply that all Serbs or Croats were part of the aggression against Bosnia.

In another example, Thompson illustrates how journalists in the public Radio/TV Sarajevo reflect that they instead of being impartial actually identify with their own group within the Bosnian population (p. 228). A Bosnian-Serb journalist reports about Serbs in the Krajna region, a Croat reporter about the Yugoslav army destroying houses in a Croat village, and a Muslim journalist reports about a car full of Kalashnikovs heading towards Herzegovina, with Serb involvement suspected.

In the Bosnian media, impartiality, a term we shall come back to later, was used to describe that all sides of the conflict were presented on equal terms, without showing how serious the situation was. The Bosnian journalists of RTVBiH were so hesitant to describe on the actual situation that they 'in the interest of

moderation' avoided naming the aggressor or any of the parties
involved in the conflict (p. 230).

Quite opposite to the Serb and Croat media, which distributed
outspoken propaganda before and during the war, the RTVBiH's
effect on its audience 'disarmed them psychologically' (p. 231). As a
result of the war, the Bosnian government gradually strengthened
its editorial control over the broadcasts, which had hitherto been
very loose. Though it did not become hostile propaganda like the
other sides, it became more one-sided in its Muslim Bosniak taste
and a number of Serb and Croat journalists left the station after
feeling less welcome.

The situation for the media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia during the
pre-conflict, immediate pre-conflict and during conflict was as
follows:

With media in the other republics increasingly showing loyalty to the
republic, the Serb media was, four years before the wars started,
following a route increasing the hostility towards the 'others'
through the use of historic references, victimising Serbs, giving
public rituals prominence, scapegoating Albanians and building
conspiracy theories. The legal framework was liberalised allowing for
media independent from the state and for public service
broadcasting. Newly established media and journalists defending
their editorial independence and diversity were strongly harassed
and persecuted. The nationalistic outcome of the first multiparty
elections gave rise to the same symbolic methods and harassment
of journalists in Croatian media. In both Serbia and Croatia, large
numbers of journalists went up against this development, but were

isolated and harassed. The state media in particular, was the scene for this struggle, with opponents to the nationalist trend were removed from screens and loudspeakers. Shortly after the wars started, the dominant Bosnian state broadcaster remained diverse up to the war reflecting the interests of all three population groups through stories framed to the nationality of the individual journalists. Right up to and through the war, fights about possessing production facilities and not least transmitters made the struggle for media impact on the popular attitudes very palpable.

3.3 Rwanda – History

Population	: 8.4 million
Ethnic Groups	: Hutu 84%, Tutsi 15%, Twa 1%.
Religion	: Christians 93.6%, Muslims 4.6 %, Others 1.8%
Independence	: 1962
The CIA World Fact Book 2005 [Accessed 17th May 2005].	

Table 3: Rwanda – facts and figures

In many ways, Rwanda has a classic history behind the all too well known 1994 genocide. A society distorted by colonial empires, divided into different social groups and afflicted by political power struggles on its way to transitional democracy, provided all too many causes for later conflicts.

The area covered by today's Rwanda consisted of a number of small kingdoms that were conquered by the Nyiginya dynasty three to four hundred years ago. Among the annexed kingdoms were the Tutsis who were led by stockbreeders and the Hutus led by farmers. By getting livestock, the Hutus could advance socially and quit their Hutu status, becoming Tutsis, while a Tutsi who lost his cattle became poor and identified as a Hutu.

The pre-colonial ruling system for Rwanda had been divided into three areas of responsibility with a *Chef du Gazon*, a *Chef du Sol* and a *Chef de l'Armée*, consisting of a Tutsi, a Hutu and a representative from the Twas who were both farmers and stockbreeders (Bizumuremyi, 2001), respectively. With the country divided into districts, the same division between the Chef du Gazon and Chef du Sol was also mirrored at that level. This division of responsibilities contributed to the coherence of the country as stated by Bizumuremyi:

> Au niveau du patriotisme, partager des responsabilités sur un même territoire donne à ces « fonctionnaires » - comme le dirait Benedict Anderson – le sentiment de partager la même « communauté imaginée » (Bizumuremyi, 2001).

Another element that kept pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda united was the myth of having one common God for Tutsis, Hutus and Twas – a God of Rwanda, who cared especially for Rwanda.

In spite of the inequalities and the exploitation that occurred between Tutsis and Hutus, the nation had been kept together through their shared experiences in terms of the triple system, the common Rwandan God and a common culture.

As early as 1894, when the Germans wanted the Rwandan kingdom to become a German mandate, the state was well organized, centralised and orderly, in comparison with other African states. The Germans consequently chose to respect a system of indirect rule in the country.

With the German defeat in World War One, the Belgian government was given the mandate to administer what today is Rwanda and Burundi, called *Ruanda-Urundi*. Ruanda-Urundi became administratively unified with the Belgian colony Congo. The Belgian governor in Congo was in charge of a Vice Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, who was in charge of the two Belgian representatives in Rwanda and Burundi who were above the countries' respective kings. It was a direct and detailed rule of two very different countries – the centralised monarchy in Rwanda and the federal monarchy in Burundi.

The whole imagination of Rwanda as a common nation providing influential positions for all major population groups changed when the Belgian colonial rule broke down the tripartite system and gave administrative privileges to the Tutsis, whom they judged as being more intelligent than the Hutu farmers. The colonial administration used the ownership of cattle as an ethnic distinction between the intelligent and unintelligent, the big and the small, the rich and the poor, the Tutsis and the Hutus. Pancrace Twagiramutara stresses that

> the ethnicising ideology put into force through such a practice of ethnicised politics and administration gave rise to the emergence and the development of an ethnic-based class awareness (1976, p. 113).

However, by the beginning of twentieth century, the distinction between the Hutus, Tutsis and Twas was more connected to social, political and economic standing, ethnic adaptability and changes in the latter (Twagiramutara, 1976 P. 112). Twagiramutara refers to the clergyman De Lacger pointing out in his writings:

> *Mututsi* and *Muhutu* are words that tend … to be more
> adjectives today, more labels under which there are
> capitalists and workers, the rulers and the ruled, without
> any significant prejudice to birth (Lacger, 1939).

The breakdown of the system where all parts of the population felt responsible and respected for their areas was, according to Edouard Bizumuremyi, one structural background for later dissatisfaction. Though there was a social upward and downward possibility between the Hutus and Tutsis, it is debatable whether this was frequent and open enough to break the perception of social and power imbalances between Hutus and Tutsis that also existed during pre-colonial times.

Already before the revolution, the imbalance between Hutus and Tutsis was outspoken, for example in the bi-monthly magazine *Kinyamateka*, which in articles from the late 1950s became extremely outspoken against not only Belgian colonial rule, but also against the Tutsis and the king.

In a country like Rwanda, which had a high illiteracy rate by then, a bi-monthly magazine with a circulation of less than 25,000 copies would not have had a significant impact on the broader population. Instead, it most probably served as inspiration for the political Hutu elite, securing their backing of the revolution, overthrowing the king and outmanoeuvring the Tutsis from power.

From the revolution of 1959 to independence in 1962, elite Hutus changed Rwanda from a kingdom to a republic. They killed many Tutsi whom they blamed for the privileged collaboration with the

colonial regime and alliance with the church. After the Hutus took power, 150,000 Tutsi fled to the neighbouring countries.

The Tutsi within Rwanda lost all important positions and were generally discriminated against. A killing of hundreds of Hutu in Burundi in 1972 led to new violence against Tutsi in Rwanda and waves of Tutsis to neighbouring countries (Article 19, 1996, p. 12).

In 1973, General Juvénal Habyarimana assumed power as the President through a military coup and installed a dictatorial one-party regime. He created the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) in 1975, fomenting a personality cult and embroiling all Rwandans in it, with himself hailed as the sacred ruler. By the time of the 1978 Constitution (Gatwa, 1998, p. 5), the President controlled all political areas and senior appointments.

The situation for the media in Rwanda during the distant pre-conflict phase was as follows:

Due to the high illiteracy rate, the dominant medium was Radio Rwanda, which since 1973 had been loyal to the president and had not allowed other political views. Radio Rwanda was uncritical to the cult-based nation-building and did not expose the Tutsi population. Few print media existed and none of them criticised the president and his government.

3.3.1 Media in the Pre-Conflict Phase

1978	MRND is the only political party allowed by President General Juvénal Habyarimana.
1988	Widespread dissatisfaction from Hutu and Tutsi opposition.
1988-1990	Several new newspapers and publications start.
1990	October War - The RPF recruits Tutsi refugees from abroad and attack Rwanda.
	November - The Director of ORINFOR controlling Radio Rwanda is dismissed and a new radical Hutu director is employed.
1991	June - The new Constitution provides for multiparty democracy.
	November - The Press Law allows independent broadcasters.
	1992 April - The coalition government includes opposition parties. The Director of ORINFOR is dismissed. The former director of ORINFOR and radical MRND members prepare for the launch of RTLM.
1993	July - RTLM starts broadcasting.
	August - Arusha Peace Accord is signed between members of the government and RPF to share power, repatriate refugees, merge the two armies.
	October – The elected Hutu President of Burundi is assassinated. The Hutu Power Campaign is launched against the power sharing.
1994	April – Habyarimana is killed in a plane crash
	April to July – almost 1 million moderate Hutu and Tutsi are killed in genocide. Only MRND and radical Hutu members survive in the government.
1994	July – The RPF overthrows the government and takes control
	1995 The Transitional National Assembly adopts the 1991 constitution with amendments, including the Arusha Peace Accord and peace agreements, and the transition to democracy begins.

Table 4: Chronology of events in the Pre-Conflict Phase in Rwanda (1978-1995)

National and international dissatisfaction led to public demonstrations and intellectuals requesting a multi-party democratic system in the late 1980s. A consequence of the dissatisfaction was the establishment of a commission to draft a constitution and a transfer to multiparty democracy. Another consequence of the outspoken protests from both Hutu and Tutsi opposition was the establishment of several new magazines and newspapers between 1988 and 1990. According to Jean-Pierre Chrétien (1995), these newspapers were generally moderate in the beginning and some of them actively promoted a democratic development with a plural political party landscape. Others turned out to be mouth-pieces for the extremist Hutu political forces.

One of the publications, which the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the Rwanda Tribunal) later found to have incited genocide was the news magazine *Kangura*. Among many other articles, the magazine published the 10 Hutu commandments, which later became a point of reference for the other extremist publications and media (Bizumuremyi, 2001). In parallel with the *10 Hutu Commandments,* Kangura also published the *19 Tutsi Commandments*, which encouraged Tutsis to replace the Hutus in positions of authority and keep in mind that "the Hutu are created to be servant to other" (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1999, p. 4). In other words, the 19 Tutsi Commandments were by Hutu media distributed as what Kelman as cited in Chapter 2 would call the formation of the mirrored images that Hutus had about Tutsi intentions (Kelman, 1997, p.223). Both examples were seen by the Rwanda Tribunal as promoting fear and hatred among the Hutu majority and mobilizing them against the Tutsi minority. Kangura called itself "The Voice that Awakens and Defends the Majority People".

In one issue, the Kangura stereotyped the Tutsi as being liars, thieves and killers. On the magazine cover, the question "What weapons shall we use to conquer the *Inyenzi* once and for all?" was answered with the depiction of a machete.

The main source of information for the wider population was, however, the national Radio Rwanda. In 1991, some 29% of all households owned radios, a number that rose to nearly 60% in urban areas (Forges, 2002, p.?). Many who did not own radios listened to broadcasts at friends' homes or at bars in the neighbourhood. Due to the high illiteracy rate and because the international media did not broadcast in the national language

Kinyarwanda, made Radio Rwanda became the all-dominant radio. Radio Rwanda had kept a hesitant distance from stereotyping against Tutsis up till 1990. Like many traditional state radios, it had conveyed messages from the government to the governed, but still kept a relative openness and balanced approach to the Tutsi issue (Article 19, 1996, p. 47). Radio Rwanda was the voice of the state and of its president. His admonitory speeches were heard daily and were the way in which the Rwandan population could be reached all over the country. Alison Des Forges tells in his "Silencing the Voices of Hatred", that the radio announced official meetings, nominations to and removals from government posts, and the results of nationally-administered school examinations.

Following the widespread political dissatisfaction with the government in the late 1980s and 1990 a minor invasion took place in October 1990 from the 7000 member RPA. In the neighbouring countries, where around 600,000 Tutsi-refugees from the 1959 revolution lived, the RPA believed that the dissatisfaction would make it easy to overthrow the government and gained support from the Uganda government and Belgium to attack the country (Article 19, 1996, p. 13). The October War immediately led to restrictions on movement within Rwanda, obstructions to the distribution of newspapers and the harassment of journalists.

Though Radio Rwanda disseminated inaccurate and distorted information about the Uganda-based Tutsi exiles in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Hutu extremists then accused Christophe Mfizi, the director general of l'Office Rwandais d'Information (ORINFOR) since 1974, of limiting the president's right to bring anti-Tutsi messages on Radio Rwanda. This allegation was raised in Kangura. A few days later, the director general was dismissed and

replaced by Ferdinand Nahimana, who gained fame in the later process of the International Criminal Court of Rwanda. As director general of ORINFOR, he oversaw all media, including Radio Rwanda, and soon more virulent and distorted broadcasts took place (Article 19, 1996, p. 29).

The vague steps towards democracy a year earlier were not reflected in Radio Rwanda, which refused to air news of opposition parties. However, in 1991, a demonstration forced the government to provide a limited slot for the opposition parties and a new constitution simultaneously opened for multi-party elections and freedom of expression. It was followed by a Press Law, which guaranteed every person the right to establish and operate a radio or television station. The latter gave room to *Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM), but the licensing procedures were still regulated by government bodies and the legislative freedom for everybody to establish media was not carried out in practices (Article 19, 1996, p. 45). The freedom of expression as carried out by journalists had severe restrictions. Similar to the situation in Yugoslavia and other countries, the journalists were subject to penal code punishment if they were to

> incite the population to revolt against the established authorities, either to incite or attempt to incite conflict amongst the population or to cause alarm and seek to bring turmoil to the territory of then Republic (Code penal Rwandais, 1977).

Journalists who criticized the government, particularly on its handling of the RPF invasion in October 1990, risked being charged and punished through Article 47 of the 1991 Press Law, with

between two to ten years prison (Article 19, 1996, p. 55). It should be remembered that the RPF from Uganda broadcasted propaganda into Rwanda via its own radio.

In early 1992, Radio Rwanda spurred attacks on Tutsi and members of the political opposition for the first time (Article 19, 1996, p. 53). Following an outcry among members of the opposition and pressure from international donors, Ferdinand Nahimana was dismissed from his post as director of ORINFOR in April 1992. A transitional coalition government was formed that same month.

Through political in-fighting between the MRND and earlier opposition parties over the next two years, the radio actually ended up with fewer biased programmes, but still broadcasted inflammatory reporting against the Tutsi occasionally (Article 19, 1996, p. 49). This illustrates that state media in a transitional phase might be seen – not as editorially independent – but as a joint property of the whole political elite, whether in government or the opposition. In this case, attempts were made to secure neutrality between the different interests. The new parties in the coalition did not eliminate the prominent MRND journalists, but sought with limited success to moderate the hostile attitude to Tutsi and a less negative attitude to the on-going peace process with the RPF. Though the MRND still seemed more influential than the coalition partners, the programmes did improve towards being more objective and it became clear to the MRND and the Hutu Power sympathisers that the state broadcaster had become a space for power struggles and was no longer a mere mouthpiece.

3.3.2 Immediate Pre-Conflict

In the same year, the dismissed director of ORINFOR, Ferdinand Nahimana, and other members of the ruling MRND engaged in setting up the first private radio station in Rwanda, RTLM, which started broadcasting in April 1993. It quickly gained popularity through its modern music, informal studio talk shows, communication with the audience and phone-ins.

The broadcasts of RTLM changed from October 1993, when the democratically elected Hutu president in the neighbouring Burundi was assassinated. The radio became inflammatory and incited hatred against the Tutsi population in Rwanda, claiming that they, like the Burundi Tutsi who killed their president, would also be dangerous to the Hutus in Rwanda (Article 19, 1996, p. 49). In the time leading up to the genocides in 1994, the population was continually reminded of the importance of defending the 1959 revolution. It became a totem in a Hutu Power discourse.

The radio RTLM received several formal warnings from the Minister of Information, because they not only breached the Press Law, but also the written agreement with the government "not to broadcast programmes likely to incite hatred, violence or any form of division" Article 19, 1996, p. 55).

Up to and during the genocide, RTLM actively incited genocide, through spreading false rumours, stereotypes, and hate speech. The President defended RTLM against any attempts from the Minister of Information, representing the earlier opposition parties, to use legal means to diminish the incitement. He did this by referring to the freedom of the press as a guiding principle. Consequently, RTLM

continued broadcasting names of individual persons, who were said to oppose the Hutus and instructions about where to find them were given as part of the broadcasts. As the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda later concluded, the management of RTLM was guilty of genocide. This also shows that liberalization of electronic media can be done under the cover of the noblest motives, but in the case of Rwanda was a deliberately planned process towards establishing a MRND radio out of the political power struggle, but with clean and untouched loyal MRND messages to encourage genocide.

The situation escalated drastically when a plane crash on the 7th of April 1994 killed the Rwandan president. A new interim government consisting only of extremist Hutu power people took power. The Minister of Information was assassinated and the Director of ORINFOR fled the country, while many of Radio Rwanda's moderate journalists were killed and substituted with extremist Hutus. Few days into the genocide, Radio Rwanda was also turned into a weapon in the hands of those Hutus who were committing genocide (Article 19, 1996, p. 80).

The situation for the media in the pre conflict and immediate pre conflict was as follows:

In the pre-conflict phase, a liberalisation of media regulation forced by popular dissatisfaction led to new private print media balancing moderately between Tutsi and Hutu, but also led to publications building stereotypes and hatred towards the Tutsis. Radio Rwanda became scene for the struggle between government and opposition and increasingly so after the first multiparty elections. Led by a

license given to the private RTLM pursuing the political interests of the President and the radical Hutu power the scapegoating and incitement to violence against Tutsi escalated. Right before and during the genocide RTLM actively pointed to Hutus and Tutsis to be killed. The Hutu opposition and Tutsi journalists and managers were excluded from Radio Rwanda or killed.

3.4   Conclusion

3.4.1 Root Causes and Triggers

When comparing the conflict in Rwanda with those in the former Yugoslavia, there are a number of similarities in the root causes. The historic analysis of the two countries has indicated that parts of the roots of conflict lie in their history.

History
Both Rwanda and Yugoslavia became independent states after centuries of colonial or imperial rule. That has resulted in somewhat artificial or at least difficult state formations, comprising multiple ethnic, religious, geographical groups or even historic nations and with tensions in the structure of society deriving from this rule. The outcome for the states was consequently strongly divided societies with identity conflicts, which were strengthened through differences between favoured and less favoured groups. Yugoslavia was founded as a country comprising numerous nationalities and ethnic identities. Rwanda was established as a unification of a number of kingdoms by the colonial rulers, which might have relatively homogenous ethnic, religious, and cultural identities, but also a tradition for different social roles in society depending on the group

identities as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. The Tutsi minority had ruled the Hutu majority during colonial time and when the Hutu took over after independence revenge from both sides formed part of the motives and roots of conflict.

Both cases confirm, as discussed in Chapter 2, that most internal conflicts do have regional implications – either as being instigated with some involvement of the neighbouring countries, or through refugee streams and economic burdens for the neighbours. As in the case of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, it has often gone both ways.

Regional implications

The countries have for many years had continuous internal violent conflicts, which have all had strong regional implications. In Rwanda, Tutsi-refugees from the end of the colonial period have formed resistance movements in the neighbouring countries, which frequently intervened in Rwanda. Former Yugoslavia was after the Second World War built as a federation on the roots of a pre-Second World War kingdom. It had through the national, ethnic and religious population groups, direct historic links to or potential conflicts with Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Italy and Austria.

Yugoslavia has, since its creation after World War Two, had a one party democracy with clear restrictions on criticism of the communist party, but with rather liberal personal rights. There was a tradition for civil society influence in companies, organisations and media. But the democracy was still limited to the degree in which the superior power of the communist party should be respected.

De-centralisation

Through the 1970s and up to the beginning of the civil wars in 1991, the federal government and institutions gave due to a weakening in the national economy substantial political and economic competences to the federal states. Substantial differences in economic development and social standards between the different republics and provinces of the state as well as within each of them have created severe tensions in the country. The increasing de-centralisation of power, economy, and culture led to new ambitions of individual states, republics and provinces. In an unlucky way, the development in Yugoslavia delivered almost all the typical root causes for conflicts suggested by Michael E. Brown (1996, p. 577). There were economic problems, problematic group histories dating back to the era of the Ottoman Empire and re-vitalised during World War Two. There was a weakening national state and an exclusionary national ideology. All of the structural causes were present and though they individually might not have been sufficient to cause conflict, they seemingly reinforced each other.

Triggers

What triggered the conflicts? As we have seen there was in Rwanda dissatisfaction from the Tutsi, who had lost their privileges and in substantial numbers were refugees outside their own country. There was also widespread popular dissatisfaction with an autocratic government, but from the perspective of the people, there were not many indications that the Hutu majority was seriously upset against the Tutsi minority.

In Yugoslavia, however, there was widespread and growing popular dissatisfaction with the economic decline, with the economic and social differences between the individual republics, and consequently a growing feeling of localised identity.

What triggered the conflicts, however, was in essence taking place at the political elite level. At one level, the authority of the Rwandan Hutu president was challenged by Hutu and Tutsi opposition leaders requesting democracy while being backed by popular dissatisfaction. At another level, the introduction of democracy followed by a power sharing between the government and opposition parties led to a temporary de-escalation, till the situation abruptly exploded after a dubious plane crash killed the president.

In Yugoslavia, the vacuum after Tito's era of Yugoslav independence during the Cold War followed by the results from the first multiparty elections in 1990, which triggered a wave of nationalism and violent conflicts. The mobilizing power, which had been used by the winners of the elections in the republics of Croatia, Bosnia-i-Herzegovina and Slovenia, was the cry for independence and in Serbia the national interests of Serbs wherever they lived in Yugoslavia.

Democratic transition

The lessons we can learn about the introduction of multiparty democracy differ between Rwanda and Yugoslavia, but are far from convincingly positive – at least not in the early phases. Let's compare with yet another country – Nigeria, which is scattered with 350 different tribal based ethnic groups in 36 states and plagued by communal conflicts.

Up through the 1990s, Nigeria experienced military governments, which were corrupt, mismanaged the economy, ignored an increasing drugs production, created wide spread poverty and not least were isolated by the important international partners in North America and Europe. The international community in the 1990s

added to the bad economy by putting economic sanctions and stopping all development aid to the country because of the totalitarian regime. With the transition of power from 1998 to the democratic elections planned in May 1999 the international policy changed.

Numerous carrots were offered to Nigeria (Ellsworth, 2000):

> On a visit to Kano Nigeria, the US Ambassador, Williams Twaddell, promised that if Nigeria returned to democracy, sanctions would be relaxed. In the Nigerian media, references were made to sanctions being lifted and trade being increased (p.?).

The American scholar Kevin H. Ellsworth does in a study *The Global Ideational Origins of Nigeria's Communal Conflicts: Democratic Discourse & Sharia* (2002) explore the consequences of the newly established democracy for the apparent rise in numbers and death tolls of communal conflicts. In his analysis, democracy becomes the *empty signifier*[5] through which *all* struggles are expressed, so that the chains of equivalences which are unified around this signifier tend to empty it.

Democracy, however, became the discourse for first the Nigerian elite and soon after, the entire population's. Based on international socialization and later the promises from the democratic

---

[5] Ellsworth (2002) refers to Laclau's definition: An empty signifier is, strictly speaking, a signifier without a signified". In footnote (3), he replaces Laclau's use of Order with democracy in one of the examples and suggests, "If a pro-democracy struggle is successful, 'democracy' may become the signifier of all struggles against the nondemocratic'. 'Democracy' also "becomes the surface inscription through which all (such) struggles will be expressed, so that the chain of equivalences which are unified around this signifier tend to empty it, to blur its connection with the actual content with which it was originally associated."

government, the population believed that democracy was not only synonymous with international support but also with eradication of poverty and growing wealth for everybody. Democracy became a discourse in which many expectations were raised.

While Ellsworth finds that the many promises from the West were socializing Nigeria into a capitalist democratic society, he questions whether such a behaviourist approach can produce the deep social changes necessary for a consolidated democracy.

During one of my visits to Nigeria in May 2001, the federal television – NTA – ran a five day series of one hour prime time programmes called *Dividend of Democracy*, celebrating the second anniversary of the newly democratically elected government. The programmes were planned from the office of the Minister of Information and National Orientation, Professor Jerry Gana, and let journalists and a selected audience put critical questions to various ministers about whether they had provided concrete results addressing the demands of the Nigerian people, ranging from repairing holes in the road to more fundamental questions.

Nigeria has had a history of communal conflicts, which most often started as a result of local boundary or political conflicts between different ethnic groups. Ellsworth conducted a survey of the number of communal conflicts and their death tolls from 1997 to 2002 based on the archives of the Nigerian *Post Express* (Ellsworth, 2002). The survey shows a very significant a rise in the number and death toll immediately after the introduction of democracy. This subsided after a year, but the death toll rose again with the introduction of Sharia laws in the North, from the third quarter of 2001.

The Nigerian scholar Samuel G. Egwu (1998) examined a number of rural communal conflicts in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He concludes that struggles about land and equal access to markets are key issues to understanding the conflicts, but continues:

> While the land question remains paramount in explaining the phenomenon of rural ethnicity, the conflict is exacerbated by elite manipulation and the jostling for power and privileges among the political class. Thus, in addition to the prevailing economic decline, the return to competitive politics since the commencement of the transition from the Babangida dictatorship to civilian rule seemed to have increased the intensity of such ethnic conflicts and cultural polarisation (p. 69).

Ellsworth's analysis of the communal conflicts immediately after the election of a democratic government in 1999 shows that most are rooted in either conflicts about economic resources or democratic representation for minorities. The population of Nigeria with its very short and limited experience of democracy was, particularly in the North, more centred on local ethnic and state identities than about identities as individuals in a democracy representing the common interests of the population.

> Speaking with a focus group of Ibo before the cabinet
> appointments were made, they all voiced deep confidence
> that this democratic government would have to incorporate
> them into the government. "What if they do not?" I would
> ask. Their final response was "There could be war
> (Ellsworth, 2000, p. 16).

It might have been incidental that the genocide in Rwanda took place shortly after the introduction of multiparty elections; and that the multiparty elections in Yugoslavia mobilized the population behind nationalistic policies for the different republics and soon led to a number of internal armed conflicts. Ellsworth argues that the empty promises from the international community to Nigeria created expectations in the population which could not be fulfilled and which ultimately gave rise to local conflicts. There is good reason to believe that the transitional period during which democracy has not yet taken root as a tradition and thinking in all layers of society is a period with increased risks for conflicts. This, however, is not the subject of this dissertation and is only raised as an issue to be explored further by others. The role of the media in this process of democratisation also seems to pose a number of interesting questions and challenges.

3.4.2 The Media's Role during Conflict Escalation

We have in this chapter analysed the role of the media from the distant pre-conflict phase to the immediate pre-conflict phase and conflict phases. We have further looked at the legislative framework, the media structure, conditions for professional journalists and the content of the media in the span of this timeline.

<u>Media legislation</u>

Looking at the media legislative framework, we have observed that in Rwanda, a liberalisation allowing private commercial media took place less than two years before the genocide. In Yugoslavia, exactly the same happened. Liberalisation allowing private, commercial media two years before the conflicts was followed by the adherence of state media to international public service standards, including independent and impartial reporting.

This raises two questions: Why did this political liberalisation happen in a situation where internal tensions were escalating within the countries and the political leadership? The other question is equally interesting. Did legislative liberalisation help prevent the conflicts and if not, why?

When we try to explain why it happened, it is necessary to understand that neither democracy nor legislative liberalisation comes from one-sided goodwill or out of the blue. Both are a result of pressure from political groups, popular movements or international political pressure. There is no doubt that the governments of Rwanda and Yugoslavia were pressured by internal dissatisfaction. They were also under international pressure partly because of the regional implications of the ongoing conflict in Rwanda and the new power balance following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Pressure from professional associations like public service broadcasters in the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), the Yugoslav journalists themselves and

so-called human rights civil society organisations probably also had an impact on the liberalisation.

Whether the legislative liberalisation helped to prevent the conflicts is quite a complicated question. On one side, there is nothing indicating that it should have encouraged or fostered conflict. The Rwandan president argued that freedom of expression rendered it impossible for the government to prevent the RTML from circulating hate speech. As we shall see in Chapter 7, this is incorrect. On the contrary, the Rwandan government had in international treaties and laws all necessary means to stop it.

On the other side, it is necessary to distinguish between legislation and actual implementation. Both in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the issuing of broadcast licenses to new private media took place very slowly and to a very limited degree. The number of alternative voices to the state media was very limited. In Rwanda it was only the RTML, while in Yugoslavia it was in the pre-conflict phase primarily print media.

Thirdly, the habits of the audience played an important role. The RTML was one of the few international exceptions where a new broadcaster very swiftly gained greater popularity than the existing state broadcasters, who till then had enjoyed a monopoly. The primary reason for this was its fresh and unique programming through the use of popular music mixed with phone-ins and a rather modern style. This was quite new to the Rwandan market and was quickly absorbed. In Yugoslavia however, the market situation was quite different. The existing broadcast media was rather

professional, highly popular and already had significant editorial freedom in the distant pre-conflict phase, as long as they did not criticise the communist party and the government. In the pre-conflict and immediate pre-conflict phases, the media also gained the freedom to criticise the other republics or the federal government. Under these circumstances, new media did not gain any significant audience.

In other words, legislative media freedom did not in itself permit the media to distribute hate speech. As the way new liberal media legislation is implemented is far more important than the formal introduction of new laws, I dare to conclude that in a tense situation prior to conflict, there is no idea to focus on new legislative standards from the international actors. Far more important are the efforts to safeguard the existing openings in laws and legislative practice as well as the journalists' and editors' personal security, access to information and expression.

Media landscape

What we noted in pre-conflict Yugoslavia was that the national broadcasting system gradually decentralised. The republic-wide broadcasters gained importance, resources, more broadcast time and a larger audience the closer Yugoslavia came to the commencement of conflicts. In parallel, the federal system was hollowed out and the principle of letting journalists from the republic broadcasters feed into the federal news and other programmes ended up giving, not a common identity, five or six different identities in the same programmes.

The closer Yugoslavia came to conflict, the more each republic broadcaster served as the main source of information for the viewers and listeners.

In contrast to the relatively advanced and open media system in Yugoslavia, Rwanda had its old fashioned formalistic state radio as the only means of communication to the broader population. This lasted till the immediate pre-conflict situation. Until then the radio had been entirely supportive to the government, while it actually in the immediate pre-conflict situation was 'shared' between the different political interests. By the start of the genocide it was again entirely controlled of the political powers in favour of the genocide.

Professionalism
The journalists in Rwanda were hardly professional in the sense of adhering to journalistic principles of impartiality, pluralistic, factual or critical. Rather they were employed as and were to be seen as civil servants fulfilling an information mission for the state. This is not to say that they could not personally have had a critical attitude to the government or that they were in favour of the killings. But there was no professional pride, tradition or code of ethics binding them together against abuse or hate speech.

It was quite a different situation in Yugoslavia. In Croatia and Serbia, the republic governments began to intimidate journalists in the immediate pre-conflict and during the wars, moving the well known and professional journalists away from the important programmes, through imposing compulsory leave of absence or transferring them to programmes with little audience. In their place,

new, young journalists, who had earlier worked as stringers or
freelancers, were hired to take over their positions. In Serbia and
Croatia, journalists either organised themselves into new journalist
unions, which protested and had as their primary responsibility the
defence of journalistic ethics and which functioned in parallel with
the official unions, which primarily oversaw social functions. Or
journalists established their own associations – like Forum 21 in
Croatia – working against the political control of media and
journalists.

Clearly it became very difficult to operate as a professional and
independent journalist in the period immediately before the
conflicts, and clearly the widespread use of penalties against
journalists, editors and media critical to the governments in
combination with harassments from tax authorities made it difficult
to raise alternative voices to the state media's war mongering.

In Bosnia-i-Herzegovina, the situation was markedly different. The
media and journalists in Sarajevo-controlled Bosnia seemed at all
levels eager to maintain journalist ethics in the sense that they did
not use hate speech or negative messaging about the other side.
During the Serbian and Croatian attacks on the pre-dominantly
Muslim part of Bosnia, journalists of Serb and Croat origin who had
maintained a decent professional balance, were gradually pushed
aside by the Muslim leaders who ended up taking over the
management positions. The situation was, however, no way near
that in Serbia and Croatia.

Content in Phases
In the analysis of the content and attitudes of the dominant media
in *distant pre-conflict,* we noticed that Radio Rwanda as well as the

Yugoslav broadcasters and main print media refrained from questioning the existing political system. Radio Rwanda in this period did not stereotype or produce significantly one-sided reporting against the Tutsi population, but it provided free and unlimited access to the radio from the totalitarian government, supported the totem of the revolution and did not convey any criticism against the rulers. There was, as Sofus described it for Yugoslavia, not only a contribution of mass communication to the *construction of imagination* of national communities, but also another negative aspect – that of the *destruction* and *oblivion* of alternative frames of interpretation, debate and action and of alternative versions of community. This was definitely the case in Rwanda.

During the first twenty years in post-war Yugoslavia, the dominant print and electronic state media lent all their authority to the symbols and public rituals of the Tito-led state. In spite of some degrees of editorial freedom, the media for years ignored or played down the numerous contradictions within the Yugoslav state. They ignored the opposition to the creation of a federal state, the opposition from parts of the population to a communist system for the state, and later the increasing calls for nationalism and ethnic separatism. Consequently, deep-rooted problems and popular dissatisfaction never had a voice, which could instigate a real pressure towards the politicians in order to remove some of the destabilizing factors.

It is clear that in the distant pre-conflict phase, where it would have been possible to make changes in society minimizing the risk for

conflicts, the media had effectively not focused on any of the injustices, democratic deficits or economic conflicts that might have led to political action. The media had, in spite of political control, every chance to be aware of that problematic background. Instead of being a public sphere for contrasting arguments, the media kept the telescope to the blind eye.

Entering the *pre-conflict phase,* both Rwanda and Yugoslavia experienced widespread popular dissatisfaction. In Rwanda, where several new print publications started three to four years before the genocide, there was no clear picture of content and attitudes. Some of the new papers were rather liberal and promoted democracy, but could and <u>did not</u> according to Article 19 criticise the government for its handling of the conflict with the Tutsi. Others began as mouthpieces for the extremist Hutu power supporters to spread stereotypes, prejudice and hatred against the Tutsi.

Magazines like Kangura built among its, albeit limited, readership what Stanley Cohen calls *Moral Panic* – letting the Tutsi become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; with its nature presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion (1987, p.9). When the governmental Radio Rwanda did not want to add to the Moral Panic, the management was changed and the attitude of the radio radicalised till a coalition government two years later installed a more moderate leader.

While Yugoslavia was marked by a strong centrifugal power from its republics, the Serbian media was used to identify and stigmatize a national enemy, homogenizing Serbs against the thread and calling for resistance.

It happened through the intensive coverage of public rituals stressing the coherence between Serbs who were scattered throughout the Yugoslav republics. It happened through unbalanced reporting, which turned Kosovo Albanians into scapegoats for all criminal acts or even conflicts with Croatia. The Moral Panic was clearly prominent in the Serbian media. At the same time however, there was still some though very little use of news and programmes produced by journalists from other republics. On Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro Radio/TV, Serbia had already decided to control all news broadcasted to its own audience. For the niche media and for journalists working outside prime time programming in these broadcasters, there remained the possibility to question and discuss the issue of Yugoslav coherence.

The media in Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Macedonia had not – before the elections in 1990 – begun spreading moral panic, but were rather patriotic in favour of their own republic and were in their content critical towards each other and Yugoslavia as such.

It is interesting that these signs in the mainstream media's programming in Serbia started four years before the war actually started, but when Croatian media began behaving the same way the independence and war between the country and the Serb led Yugoslavia began shortly after. Nevertheless, such attitudes in programming can safely be said to belong to the most tense phase leading up to possible violent conflict.

In the *immediate pre-conflict phase*, where the political escalation of a conflict already has taken place, we see a drastic change. In Rwanda, the private radio RTML encouraged killings of Tutsi and

Hutu opponents on air. The Minister of Information and a number of journalists were killed because they opposed the Hutu Power hate speech against the Tutsi. In Yugoslavia it rarely went that far, but in Serbia and Croatia many journalists were sent on leave or at least moved from the screens and loud speakers. Severe penalty fines or tax harassments took place towards the media and journalists opposing the republic governments. Only in Bosnia was the media still presenting pluralistic views of the conflict, though it partly took place very discretely and without criticism towards Serbia and Croatia, which could have been perceived as the aggressors. The journalists on Bosnian television, who had Muslim, Serb and Croat roots, tended to bias their reports according to their origin. Yet Bosnian media was an exception to the other media in Yugoslavia.

It is interesting to see that the public media in both Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia as the most watched and listened to media were the stage for such severe struggles between professional journalists and leaders in favour of editorial independence, diversity and impartiality on one side and the leadership on the other. This indicates that mechanisms for safeguarding public media's independence well ahead of a conflict might prevent the worst atrocities from the leadership during conflict escalation. Certainly post- conflict practical steps must be taken to build on the remaining professional capacities and to develop the broadcaster in the direction of public service broadcasting.

The following table organises characteristics of the content provided according to the media listed in the leftmost column:

Media/ Characteristics	Addressing systemic roots of conflicts	Supporting triggers of conflicts	Supporting moral panic	Allowing Pluralistic views on the conflict in pre-conflict	Pluralistic views on the conflict in immediate pre-conflict
Government media in Rwanda	No.	Yes, in the final days before the genocide.	Yes, during pre-conflict.	Yes, but limited.	No.
State media in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia	Very little and only during pre-conflict.	Yes, from the view point of the individual republics.	Yes, from the view point of the individual republics.	Yes, but biased in favour of the individual republic.	No.
State media in Bosnia	No.	No.	No.	Yes, but not too open on threatening conflicts.	Yes, but not too open.
Political/Commercial media in Rwanda	No.	Yes, some of them.	Yes, very much so. Other private media less so.	No, not the dominant media.	No.
Political/-Commercial media in Yugoslavia	No	No	No	Yes, but were ignored by the governments	Yes, as far as they could

Table 5: Characteristics of content provided according to media type

Through analyzing the conflicts in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, we have identified a number of important areas of the role the media takes on during the escalation of a conflict. In the next chapter, these areas will be analysed from the perspective of being potential points of intervention during the various phases of conflict.

In the subsequent chapters, we shall look more deeply into the potential areas of intervention seen from theoretical communication, psycho-social and conflict resolution perspectives.

4.   Phases and Nature of Media for Intervention

In the previous chapter, I analysed the roles that different media have played during conflict escalation in two prominent cases. In this chapter, I will paint the broader picture of possible media interventions, their timing, targets, internal and external actors, and will go in depth in the following three chapters on the key areas of intervention in post-conflict situations. Support for content, which contributes to de-escalation, is one possible area for targeting international media support. There are also others which play significant roles in affecting the media's potential in conflict prevention and peace-building. In this chapter, I shall identify the key areas of media intervention, which will be analysed in depth in later chapters.

We shall discuss the different phases of a conflict and the demands and possibilities that these phases offer for media interventions. The definition of phases in conflict management has been discussed and refined over time. If we look at the UN's definitions in the context of military or diplomatic interventions, we have the terms conflict prevention through diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping through troops as well as peace-building in the form of reconstruction of war torn countries. If using the UN's more holistic approach, the definitions are operational and structural conflict prevention, peace-making through diplomacy and peace-building right before and after a conflict. However, we shall look at a third definition, which also introduces us to another understanding of conflict dynamics. Jean Paul Lederach (1999) suggests an approach, in which he defines peace- building as a crisis-driven response to conflict that measures success in terms of arresting disease and

starvation and achieving a cease-fire must be embedded within the painstaking tasks of relationship and confidence building, and of the design of and preparation for social change, which ultimately provide a basis for sustaining conflict transformation (p. 78).

I shall analyse to what degree the phases developed by the UN are sufficient to characterise the various options for media intervention, or whether it is necessary to detail the timing and possibilities for interventions to a greater degree. I shall further examine the different international actors and their potential to carry out media interventions.

A key question – theoretically as well as in practical media assistance – is the choice of media we want to support in order to increase the chance for peace-building or the prevention of conflict. A helpful tool for this decision-making process are the findings in Chapter 3, a categorization of the different types of media according to their accountability to society, editorial independence and their professional standards in programming. One could alternatively have systematised them according to technical distribution, ownership behind the production of content or income generation, but I have focused on defining the de-escalating nature of media according to characteristics which I believe have important roles to play a role in conflict prevention and peace-building.

The role of the media in contributing to conflict or peace links primarily to the content, which is distributed through the media. Parties in a conflict might attempt to influence the agenda the media sets and might seek to pressure owners, managers, editors and journalists to frame their stories in favour of one of the parties. Framing is, in this sense, defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgements and suggesting remedies through "the

use of certain words or phrases, making certain contextual references, choosing certain pictures or film, referring to certain sources and so on" (McQuail, 2000 p. 343).

How successful the parties in a conflict are at influencing the agenda and framing stories depends on many factors. As we shall see in Chapter 5, it depends to a certain degree on the ability of journalists and editors to distance them from the conflict. Even more crucial is the organisational and editorial control of the media and whether this has been formalised to guard editorial independence or, on the contrary, to allow outside interests to intervene.

4.1 Potential Fields of Intervention

In the previous chapter, we analysed the role of media in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia from the distant pre-conflict, immediate pre-conflict and conflict phases. In our analysis, we integrated perspectives on media content, media organisations, media structure and the conditions for professional journalism.

In this context, we shall point to the fields which, through international support and assistance, can influence the role of media in a constructive direction, whether in preventing new conflicts or building a sustainable peace. The premise in this and the following two chapters is that the interventions should take place in a voluntary cooperation between international and local actors at the governmental, media, journalist and civil society level. Only when UNSC has mandated UN or its regional partners with the legislative, executive and judicial power situations without local governmental counterparts will be taken into consideration.

In Chapter 7, we shall analyse the degree to which the UN's strategies for media and communication in operational conflict management are adequate or can be improved. In this chapter we discuss how to assist national and local media in the countries of conflict, in order to change the public discourse, as it appears in the media and in the formal and informal communication of the society, from conflict escalation to conflict de-escalation. The time frame for this analysis is both long and short term, and the focus both content and structural media development.

In Chapter 3, we learned that in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the ruling politicians deliberately used the media to disseminate content, which encouraged prejudice, hatred, and violence against the other sides of the conflict. The interest in conflict does not necessarily come from leaderships but can also be a result of popular dissatisfaction with other population groups and their leaders. However, as Michael Brown was quoted in Chapter 3, most conflicts have been initiated by leaders. In the following, we shall identify relevant fields for media interventions by looking at the instrumental use of media, as leaders would need it to secure backing from the population to the chosen conflicts.

To transform political will from the leadership to content in the media, which incites the broader population to violent conflict, a set of mechanisms must be in place. Whether these mechanisms already exist or risk being established, they are logically also the relevant fields of international media interventions.

1. The leaders need a media structure in place, which can reach the broader population through relevant media

channels. The media structure should itself be easy to control, simple to use, efficient in its reach and favourable to the parts of the population who are the most likely supporters of the rulers' interests.

2. The leaders need media legislation, which can efficiently restrict the media's freedom of expression from being used to criticise the rulers' conflict escalation. They can punish media and journalists who violate these restrictions and can limit the access to information and the establishment of new media. Equally important is that the implementation of media legislation must be in the spirit of the ruler.

3. The leaders need to have loyal managers and editors in place in the relevant media, who do not guard their own professional ethics or actively defend the media's standards of impartiality, diversity and editorial independence.

4. The leaders are best helped by journalists without solid journalistic education, professional experience and professional pride, who are willing to produce programmes or articles, which are rewarded by the representatives of the rulers.

5. Finally, the leaders are keen to have media content supporting the rationale behind the leadership's strategy for entering into violent conflict.

Logically speaking, the media tools needed for the leadership to impact popular attitudes in order to be supportive towards violent

conflict illustrate the areas which media interventions must seek to neutralise in their efforts to prevent conflict and build peace.

In other words, the potential fields for media interventions are:

  a. Media structure
  b. Media legislation
  c. Ethical standards
  d. Journalists' capacity
  e. Media content

These are the fields for potential media intervention, which we shall focus on in the next two chapters. Chapter 5 will deal the possibilities for supporting media content which can contribute to conflict de-escalation, while Chapter 6 will focus on international support to the development of media landscapes, media legislation, capacity and institution-building.

It is important to realize that the power of the rulers to control all five aspects varies, whether it is during conflict escalation, or it is part of a peace process after a violent conflict and with interventions mandated by the UNSC. We shall in the following section analyze and define the conflict phases which are relevant to media interventions.

4.2   Phases for Media Intervention

The conditions and roles of media during conflict escalation are, as discussed in Chapter 3, very much dependent on the timing, which can range from the distant pre-conflict to open conflict phase. In a similar way, the timing of international media intervention in

supporting local media in taking a de-escalating approach and playing a constructive role in the conflict transformation process towards sustainable peace it crucial. It is my belief that the existing definitions of phases tend not to take into account the nuances which determine the options for pre-conflict media interventions, or in other cases, do not include the steps toward conflict transformation and sustainable peace. In this part, we shall seek to describe the phases of conflict with particular emphasis on the dimension of media.

When looking at phases of conflict management, it is prudent to revisit the *Agenda for Peace*, written by the UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali in June 1992 (1992). In his report to the UNSC, he defines the three stages as follows:

- Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

- Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

- Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

At the time there was no agreed upon definition of peace-building. However, Boutros Boutros-Ghali sought to describe peace-building as:

> the construction of a new environment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions. When conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peacemaking and peace-keeping come into play. Once these have achieved their objectives, only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to prevent a recurrence.

In his report, peace-building also includes confidence-building measures between the parties in strife.

Bearing in mind that that the Realism school was still dominant after the end of the Cold War in 1992, Boutros Ghali later remarked in his report that, "The authority of the United Nations system to act in this field would rest on the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic or political peace."

The UN definition of the different phases of conflict originally seemed to be inspired by the Realism school that saw conflict as a disturbance of the political order. But the solution to the underlying causes behind a conflict was, in contrast to the UN's definitions today, somewhat hesitant and much more limited in post-conflict situations.

However, in June 2001, Secretary General Kofi Annan delivered a new report to the General Assembly and the UNSC (2001) with the overall aim of moving the UN from having a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention.

The UNSG found the UN mandate for this new development in the Charter of United Nations as well as in concurrent discussions between member states. A new focus on the prevention of armed conflicts was actualized by the wars in former Yugoslavia and the genocides in Rwanda.

Through this report, the UN displays its understanding of conflict management solely as a means to reinstall peace and orderly circumstances. Instead, a new and comprehensive strategy is launched with a focus on Conflict Prevention. Besides the operational prevention in terms of the preventive deployment of troops and diplomacy, the report highlights the root causes of conflict:

> For early prevention to be effective, the multidimensional root causes need to be identified and addressed. The proximate cause of conflict may be an outbreak of public disorder or a protest over a particular incident, but the root cause may be, for example, socio-economic inequities and inequalities, systematic ethnic discrimination, denial of human rights, disputes over political participation or long-standing grievances over land and other resource allocation.

This lead to the term 'Structural Prevention', which was also used by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997, ch. 4) and refers to

> Such activities before the conflict. As experience demonstrates, poverty, socio-economic inequalities, endemic underdevelopment, weak or non-existent institutions, the absence of good governance and gross human rights violations can provide the conditions that lead to conflict. Measures which are taken to address the broad range of long-term political, institutional and development activities, belong to structural prevention and support national efforts in addressing the root causes of potential conflict situations (UNDPA's homepage, introduction to Conflict Prevention, 2005).

One of the interesting attempts to put into order the various approaches to conflict management is done by Norbert Ropers (2003). He point to the need for social change through the creation of a culture of dialogue. He also believes that there is a need for structural changes. Conflict transformation

> requires a broad range of measures aimed, on the one hand, at eliminating socioeconomic inequalities and, on the other, at building up political and social capacities that will enable those involved to cope with (ethnic) plurality.

In the following scheme, he defines the different approaches to Dialogue Projects as Tracks 1, 2 and 3.

Approach to Conflict Management	Notion of Conflict	Preferred Practical Approach	Measures of Success	Role of Dialogue Projects
Conflict Settlement	Conflict as a problem of the status quo and political order.	Track 1: Diplomacy and power politics at official leadership level.	Results-oriented: political settlements with stabilizing effect.	Organizing pre-negotiations Promoting a political climate of understanding.
Conflict Resolution	Conflict as a catalyst of social change.	Track 2: Direct civil society conflict management, esp. at the middle-ranking leadership level.	Process-oriented: improved communication, interaction, and relations between parties; respect for different collective identities.	Creating a leadership class with experience of dialoguing Workshops on communication, problem-solving, etc.
Conflict Transformation	Conflict as non-violent struggle for social justice.	Track 3: Strengthening capacities of disadvantaged groups to act/to deal with conflict, and capacity of divided/war-traumatized societies to integrate.	Structure-oriented: elimination of socio-economic inequalities between identity groups; good governance; power sharing; creation of cross-cutting civil society structure; building conflict management capacities at the grassroots level.	Practicing communication and interaction skills Providing opportunities for encounter and learning between polarized groups. Empowering groups.

Table 6: The Role of Dialogue Projects in the Context of Different Approaches to Conflict Management (Ropers, 2003, p. 9).

Tracks 1, 2 and 3 work with different layers in society. In an ideal world, that would be done in parallel - to settle conflicts at the political level, increasing the communication and relations between the parties at the leadership level and to structurally eliminate the socioeconomic inequalities between identity groups by building good governance, power sharing, cross-cutting civil society structures and ability of the grassroots to deal with conflict management. This divide between the three layers of leadership in peace-building is borrowed from Lederach.

It is widely recognised that the level of interventions following Track 1, diplomacy and military peace interventions, follow the UN-model of phases, which means conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building.

Lederach, however, believes that a model for peace-building should deal not only with settling the obvious armed conflict, but also broader systemic concerns.

As we shall see in Chapter 5, the nested paradigm of conflicts is likely to be adapted to the media as a tool for peace-building. But we also have to take into consideration that, while the media can be used as actors in peace-building, they can also be quite efficient tools in the initiation of violent conflicts. We have to recognise that the media are efficient propagators of conflict and should be taken into account as part of international conflict prevention before violence appears, in order not to increase mutual tensions.

In other words, it is too early to give up the idea of trying to prevent violence from breaking out in a short-term perspective,

while working towards sustainable peace in the mid-range and long term perspectives.

It is clear that, what Lederach calls peace-building covers the same sort of interventions as what the UN refers to as structural conflict prevention. The UN makes it clear by saying that conflict prevention should cover both the period long before a violent conflict, and should the conflict occur, the period after the conflict again. In other words, if one sees the many protracted conflicts as circles of phases on a timeline, the structural conflict prevention efforts should be continuous and result in still smaller and fewer circles, which fully disappear towards the end of the timeline.

Although one could argue that peace-building and structural prevention are one and the same thing. Traditional operational conflict prevention, peace making and peace keeping would then be left to armed interventions and diplomacy. As we analyse the UN's operational conflict management playing into the dynamics of immediate conflict in Chapter 7, we shall also leave the inclusion of media and communication till we discuss UN's strategies.

Local actors

Lederach (1999), who focuses on the post-conflict process of peace-building, has analysed the different local actors who could potentially participate in this process. He presents his model in a pyramid and distinguishes between the levels (p.39): Level 1, the top leadership, at the apex; Level 2, the middle range leadership, in the middle; and Level 3, the grassroots leadership, at the base.

The top leadership are the military, political or religious leaders who have high visibility and are concerned about the kind of press

coverage given to their statements and the interests they represent. The top leaders can be from governments, resistance movements or represent other constituencies. They use the media partly to promote the constituencies they represent, partly to legitimise their own positions and power within their own constituencies.

The top leadership is usually perceived as those persons with whom negotiations and agreements can be carried out, as the key actors in diplomatic interventions. Lederach, however, stresses that the hierarchical power often is very unclear as many leaders at the other levels of the pyramid often do not fall in line behind the more visible leaders. In spite of the fact that any peace accord has to be made with the top leadership, the actual actions are often taken in far more diffuse ways within the society and at other levels of the pyramid.

The middle-range leadership is less visible and is freer to move in processes of peace making. Often they are known by the top leaders and are very knowledgeable about the mindsets and living conditions of broader sections of society. Therefore the middle-range leadership is important in any peace-building process.

Middle-range leaders can lead effectively because they are highly respected individuals, occupy formal positions in civil society and are engaged in networks of groups and institutions.

An additional reason for working with the middle-range leadership is that many of them are involved or have had relationships with their counterparts of a similar level within the opposing ranks in a

conflict. This could be a professional association or networks cutting across the identity divisions within the society.

Finally, Lederach describes Level 3 as the grassroots leadership. They operate at the base of the society, which is characterised as having a survival mentality. The leaders are directly involved in local communities, are members of indigenous NGOs, officials in health or refugee systems. They know the fears of the population and, where it exists, the deep-rooted hatred and animosity on a daily basis. There are many representatives at this level, but they are important if peace building at the other levels should have a chance to impact the broader population.

Lederach's model of actors lends itself readily to the media field and seemingly to both the pre- and post- phases of violent conflict.

At the top of the pyramid are those who politically are in control of media legislation, media structure and media content. In most cases, these are presidents, ministers of culture, government representatives, or political leaders from opposition, minority groups or local communities.

The middle range leadership are the director generals of public broadcasters, television and radio directors or editors-in-chief. For larger private broadcasters and print media, the same categories apply, as with the managers of regulatory bodies and administrative authorities responsible for implementing media legislation and regulation.

Types of Actors

**Media Approaches
to peace-building**

Few

Level 1: Top Leadership
Military/political/religious leaders
seeking high visibility in and
control of the media.

Loosen control,
play down
hostility and
encourage
de-escalating
initiatives.

**Level 2: Middle-Range
Leadership**
Radio-/TV-directors,
public administrative leaders,
Intellectual/religious leaders
and relevant members of
parliament

Provide practical
solutions and
infrastructure for
media platforms and
cooperation across
conflict boundaries.
Secure access and
accountability to the
public as well as
codes of conduct

**Level 3: Grassroots
Leadership**
Journalists, producers and
editors, accountable to both
leaders and the broader
population. Responsible for
formats, framing and
production of content.
Leaders of media NGOs,
journalism schools, human
rights organisatons.

Production of de-escalating
programmes and articles on
reconciliation, examining
systemic inadequacies,
possible visions and
transformation of conflict.
Strengthening of journalistic
training systems, long term
civil society activities in
favour of human rights,
access and freedom of
speech.

Many

**Figure 1: Media Actors and Approaches to Peace-building adapted from Lederach's
Actors and Approaches to Peacebuilding, 1997, p.39**

Finally, the grassroots leadership in the field of media would include leaders of human rights, freedom of expression, professional journalist and media associations, community media, local media and other civil society organisations. In larger media, the journalists, producers and editors can be seen as being in line with the grassroots leadership, being in touch with the needs, aspirations and feelings of the people, while also internally designing programmes to meet these demands.

The dynamics between the three levels can be important when designing media interventions. As long as we talk about interventions which are not forced upon the representatives of a given country or group, the obvious entry point would be the middle range leadership. The middle range leadership within the media will be influenced by the professional journalists and editors as a counter balance to the top political leadership. The middle range leadership within regulatory bodies and administrative authorities will equally be under the influence from both media leaders, journalist leaders and the visible political leadership.

If international interveners stimulate a dynamic in which the middle range media leaders are open to cooperation with the journalist and editor levels, then the leaders will act as a defence against political interference, while the journalists and editors will be the mediators between the population's aspirations and the actual possibilities within the organisation.

Ideally, international support should seek to facilitate a vertical dialogue and dynamic between these levels to ensure that the possible changes are rooted with all parties. Ideally the grassroots

leaders from human rights, freedom of expression and professional media associations can be the external voices outside the media, which promote the agenda of independence and accountability of the media in the journey towards sustainable peace.

In cases where international or multilateral actors intervene with a UNSC mandate, it might be most feasible for them to deal with the top political leaders while other international actors like media NGOs and individual donors can deal with the middle range and grassroots leaders simultaneously.

4.3   Steps to a Coherent Approach

In the following section, we shall try to integrate the phases of conflict, description of the media landscape and the possible interventions coherently. While these sketches offer an overview of what actions might be feasible and under which circumstances, the following Chapters 5 and 6 will analyse what can be done in the fields of support to media legislation, new media structures, capacity building and content in greater depth. Chapter 7 focuses on the operational conflict management from a UN perspective.

There are several ways to define phases before and after a violent conflict. The definitions we till now have looked at range from the UN's operational approach, the UN's preventive action following a transformative approach, to Kriesberg's simplified conflict cycle and Lederach's integrated framework for peace-building. I shall not attempt to develop a new understanding of the conflict cycle but will offer a simple timeline, which can be adapted to the UN's operational and transformative approaches, as well as to Lederach's

post-conflict time dimension in peace-building. I am fully aware that conflicts and particularly protracted conflicts as described by Kriesberg (1998, p. 24-25) have many escalating and de-escalating episodes, but as with all other peace-building efforts also media interventions have to play into the dynamics of the particular conflict. Similarly, it is obvious that the development in each individual conflict might stretch the timing and its phases in its own direction. One example is the role of the media in what I call the immediate pre-conflict phase. As we saw it in Chapter 3, the Serb mainstream media were some three years ahead of the Croat media in building stereotypes, public rituals, and moral panic, but the open conflict only appeared right after that both sides escalated these trends. Never the less I believe that in a larger perspective these symptoms are characteristic for the period very close to the outbreak of violence, as it also was the case in Rwanda.

In this overview I have also suggested possible local actors for the relevant interventions, while I shall suggest international actors on the basis of Chapter 7.

4.3.1 Distant Pre-Conflict

Years or even decades before an armed conflict erupts, the media can and should play a role in building awareness of the inequalities, injustices, imbalance of powers or other factors, which are the root causes for future conflicts. As shown in the case examples, this has seldom been the case in the mainstream media. They have for various reasons turned a blind eye to these problems, primarily due to the absence of genuine democracy with developed civil society organisations and institutions. It is often possible to predict a

regression towards violent conflicts, even from distance. In today's international community, this should attract some attention from the multilateral organisations.

<u>Possible Interventions:</u>

a. Aim: Remove the root causes for future violent conflicts through structural and systemic activities.

b. Areas of Media Interventions
   - Content
   - Media structure
   - Media legislation
   - Ethics
   - Capacity building

c. Local Actors: Parliament, Government, regulatory bodies, broadcasters and print media, media, minority and human rights NGOs.

4.3.2 Pre-Conflict

In the pre-conflict phase, most media have built and fuelled prejudice against their adversaries. This is a phase during which the top leadership of governments, independence movements or threatened minorities seeks to gain control over the media. The media institutions are a scene for internal fights between professional management and journalism on one side and staff obeying the political will of the top-leaders on the other. In this phase, it must be possible for international media interventions to support genuine media ideals like neutrality, diversity and

objectivity. We shall look at possible intervention models in the section to come.

Possible Interventions:

a. Aim: Through monitoring and dialogue, to revitalise positive relationships between conflicting partners and to find practical solutions to issues of conflict.
b. Areas of Media Interventions:
   - Content
   - Media structure
   - Media legislation
   - Ethics
   - Capacity-building
c. Local Actors: Media NGOs, broadcast and print media, media councils and ombudsmen.

4.3.3 Immediate Pre-conflict

In the immediate pre-conflict phase, we have seen that all significant media either are under total control or have been harassed and closed down. The space for questioning the top leadership in its conflict building record is either minimal or non-existent. Media is creating moral panic by spreading prejudice, stereotyping and even hatred against the 'others'. Some media are even actively encouraging popular participation in killings and fights. It is impossible for the population to rely on any media as neutral in this phase. Either possible intervention must through cross-conflict self regulatory means prevent media from broadcasting and distribution conflict escalating journalism, or the

interventions must have the shape of reliable, trustworthy alternative sources outside the control of the top-leadership. In communal conflicts, the more professional media are careful not to fuel the conflicts. This phase calls on multilateral actions.

Possible Interventions:

a. Aim: To prevent outbreak of conflict through high-level negotiations, monitoring of human rights situation and protection of exposed identity groups.
b. Areas of Media Interventions:
   - Content
   - Media structure
   - Ethics
   - Capacity building
c. Local Actors: Media-NGOs, niche media, cross-conflict media councils.

4.3.4 During Conflict

With the exception of communal conflicts in which we have seen public or national private media trying either to mediate or at least balance the information (Dayal, 2005, p. 12-13), the phase during conflict leaves the domestic media completely untouchable. Too many things are at stake – both for the top-leaders, the involved mid-range media leaders and journalists as well as for large parts of the population. It is hardly possible to change the media's role in a de-escalating direction, and it is in this phase the population is most blinded towards what is going on. The population has severe needs for humanitarian information as well as neutral information about

the conflict. This phase leaves a key role for the multilateral organisations and other external actors to ensure the provision of relevant humanitarian information. This can, by Security Council mandate, take place through existing media or through the establishment of their own media in and outside of the country of conflict.

Possible Interventions:

    a. Aim: To stop violence through the provision of neutral humanitarian assistance and support to peace-making high-level negotiations..

    b. Areas of Media Interventions:
- Content
- Ethics

    c. Local actors: Civil society organisations – cross-conflict media councils, transmitters of humanitarian information.

4.3.5 Immediate Post-Conflict (2-6 months)

This phase is often neglected by international donors and organisations dealing with media interventions. Everything is unstable, difficult and most likely without sufficient technical and management structures. But this phase is important for two reasons. The population is in dire need of humanitarian information and information about the state of the country, the top-leadership and the future plans. It is also the phase in which all options are open, and during which the immediate short term media interventions must be linked to the future design of media and

society structures. The multilateral organisations have the legitimacy to intervene and should be prepared to do it.

Possible Interventions:

a. Aim: To re-establish order and popular trust through humanitarian assistance, peace-negotiations settling issues of conflict, reestablishment of relationships.
b. Areas of Media Interventions:
   - Content
   - Media structure
   - Media legislation
   - Ethics
   - Capacity building
c. Local Actors: Humanitarian organisations, national broadcasters, other media.

4.3.6 Post Conflict Planning (1-2 years)

This is the phase in which the future media legislation, structure and management is negotiated and planned between local and international partners. It is also a phase in which it is important to re-establish relationship between the conflicting parties – both at top, middle-range and grassroots levels. During this phase, many national donors and media NGOs get involved in supporting the media, but by experience it is always done in an un-coordinated and haphazard way. Through intellectual leadership and strength in terms of resources, the multilateral organisations should, in collaboration with the local authorities, point to a direction for the potential international partners to go. This phase should begin establishing a framework of national and international networks to

increase the communication between media leaders on all sides. It is also crucial that media during this phase increase the mutual knowledge and understanding between the conflicting parties.

Possible Interventions:

    a. Aim: Reconciliation, social change and civil society networking across conflict boundaries.

    b. Areas of Media Interventions:
- Content
- Media structure
- Media legislation
- Ethics
- Capacity building

    c. Local Actors: Government, regulatory bodies, media, training and educational institutions, media-, human rights- and minority NGOs.

4.3.7 Post Conflict Peace-Building (5-10 years)

This is the phase in which the conflict should turn into the development of new visions and solutions to the root causes of conflict. It is important to support a media structure which in its content raises the awareness of the imbalances that have to be adjusted. It is also the phase in which the systemic visions could be developed with the media as an efficient tool. At the multilateral level, the actors must now be the organisations focusing on long term development. Support to the media must also be given with a

development perspective, and structures providing professional and stable media governance must be implemented.

Possible Interventions:

    a. Aim: To diminish the root causes for future violent conflicts through structural and systemic activities.

    b. Areas of Media Interventions:
       1. Content
       2. Media structure
       3. Media legislation
       4. Ethics
       5. Capacity building

    c. Local Actors: Parliament, Government, regulatory bodies, broadcasters and print media, media-, minority-, and human rights NGOs.

4.3.8 Transformation of Conflict Society (20+ years)

In this phase, relationships have been re-established, reconciliation has taken place but a sustainable peace needs to be assured. It is assumed that the role of all multilateral organisations working with media must come to an end. The professionalism and balanced media behaviour must be developed through international and local networks or organisations. It is important for the media to continue stimulating the peaceful relations, raise the issues in society that have to be dealt with in a long term perspective, stimulate development and the debate about a future joint vision.

Possible Interventions:

a. Aim: To finally remove root causes and involve all society into the development of joint values, visions and systems through support to governments, local and minority leaderships as well as civil society organisations.

b. Areas of Media Interventions:
- Content
- Media structure
- Media legislation
- Capacity building

c. Local Actors: Regulatory bodies, legislators, government, media, media-NGOs and other civil society organisations.

Possible interven-tions/ Period	Distant Pre-Conflict	Pre-Conflict	Immediate Pre-Conflict	During Conflict	Immediate Post-Conflict	Post-Conflict Peace-building	Transform-ation of Conflict Society
Aim	Removal of root causes of the conflict.	Mediation between adversaries and solution of conflict issues.	High level negotiations, monitoring, protection of diverse identity groups.	High level negotiations, humanitarian assistance.	Humanitarian assistance, re-establishment of relationship and state structures.	Reconciliation, social change, civil networking between adversaries.	Involve society in the development of joint values, visions and systems.
Media Interven-tions	Structure Legislation Ethics Content Capacity	Structure Legislation Ethics Content Capacity	Structure Ethics Content (Capacity)	Ethics Content	Structure Legislation Ethics Content Capacity	Structure Legislation Ethics Content Capacity	Structure Legislation Content Capacity
Local actors	Government, regulatory bodies, media managers, media-, minority-, and human rights NGOs.	Media NGOs, media, media councils and ombuds-men.	Media NGOs, niche media, cross-conflict media councils.	Civil society organizations, cross-conflict media councils, transmitters of humanitarian information.	Humanitarian organisations, national broadcasters, other media.	Government, regulatory bodies, broadcasters and print media. Media, minority and human rights NGOs.	Regulatory bodies, legislators, government, media, media NGOs and civil society organisations.

Table 7: Timing of possible media interventions

4.4 The Nature of Media

One of the key questions to be asked when planning media interventions in violent conflicts is whether a stimulation of media freedom through providing more voices independent of the government, or strengthening the social responsibility of already existing media will contribute more greatly to diminishing the incitement to violence and increase understanding between the counterparts.

If we go back through the history of print and electronic media, we will discover that there has been an ongoing conflict between the prioritisation of media freedom and stressing the social responsibility of media towards the public and society.

In the early days of the printing press, media freedom was closely link to private media ownership and the freedom from the state to discuss and potentially criticize the rulers' decisions, be they from the church or the government. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, this is analysed further in Habermas' description of the bourgeois Public Sphere (1991). Media Freedom was, particularly in America and England, defined as press freedom from state control and from restrictions on free speech. In the aftermath of World War Two, media development took place along three parallel tracks. Already at the time, the concentration of media ownership threatened to leave the critical public sphere in the hands of a few, with commercial considerations as the guiding principle. In 1947, the American Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the Press attempted to meet the challenges of media concentration as well as to protect decision makers in particular, from sensationalism by defining a social responsibility for the press (Hutchins et al, 1947). This was

done with the view to increase citizens' access to the media. The commission suggested that the media should be given full editorial freedom and access to information, while it in return must give access to a pluralistic debate, providing the necessary information for the populace to actively participate in democracy, be factual, true and impartial. This became the ethical foundation for the internationally reputed American press and its own code of ethics. In parallel, however, a 'libertarian' model, as defined in 1956 by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm in their publication *Four Theories of the Press*, gained ground.

The libertarian theory defined itself primarily in its freedom from government, not by possible purposes for the media and positive benefits to the populations. In principle, this approach to media freedom stresses the right for every person to establish a publication – in theory this also applies to a broadcaster – but neglects the fact that most people cannot afford it and so the editorial discretion lies with the owner rather than the journalists or editors. Furthermore, it does not take into account that the control of opinions is not only an issue of governmental control, but also that of owners, many of whom belong to huge multinational media consortia and who possess substantial societal power. Denis Mcquail (2000) criticises the libertarian theory for identifying press freedom very closely with property rights – "the ownership of the means of publication, neglecting the economic barriers to access and the abuse of monopolistic publishing power" (p. 154).

The third track was the development of public service broadcasting. In America, the public broadcasting system (PBS) consists primarily of three hundred and fifty independent, non-profit broadcasters supported through paid memberships, financial contributions from

local communities, states, business ventures and non-governmental organisations. Public Service Broadcasting in a European sense was originally an answer to the scarcity of broadcast frequencies and for many years the public service broadcaster had the national radio and television monopoly in the smaller European countries. Financing was normally guaranteed by the parliaments through license fees paid by all citizens owning a radio or television. In return for the frequency and the guaranteed financial basis, the public service broadcasters would deliver communication services to the society and citizens as stated in the legislation. The goals for public service broadcasting vary from case to case and commonly accepted definition does not exist[6]. Generally the goals are:

- Editorial independence from all political, economic and vested interests.
- Universal reach – transmitting to and received by all parts of the population.
- In its programming, it should cater for all tastes, interests and needs, provide quality, diversity and impartiality, take minority needs into consideration as well as strengthen national culture, language and identity.

The key problems in relation to public service broadcasting are the broadcasters' financial dependence on regulators, the obligation to cater for the wider interests of society, minorities and national identity versus the need to secure sufficient audience in a competitive and often homogenous broadcast sector while seeking to be responsive to the viewers' expectations (McQuail, 2003, p. 14). Editorial independence varies, from public service broadcasters being editorially independent within their mandate of obligations to

---

[6] One definition is given by Denis McQuail (2000, p. 157), though this is not an acknowledged one.

society and citizens, to state broadcasters being indirectly
dependent on the government or parliament, according to its
proportional representation, to governmental broadcasters being
entirely dependent on the government. While public service media
originates from the limited wavebands for broadcasting, nothing in
the concept prevents it from including print media.

With these options in mind, Cees J. Hamelink (1999) puts forward a
feasible definition of media independence for UNESCO in his
comparative study on regulatory conditions, one that maximizes the
space for independent editorial work of publishers, editors,
journalists and broadcasters and minimizes opportunities for
interference with this independence. Media independence is defined
as:

> the autonomous control over editorial content by
> publishers, broadcasters, editors and journalists. This
> control implies that the work of collecting, editing and
> publishing information is conducted within the framework
> of editorial aims that are articulated and adopted by the
> professionals involved and without interference from third
> parties (public authorities or private-interest groups)
> (Hamelink, 1999, p. 9).

The libertarian understanding of media freedom does not imply
freedom from the owner's interests and consequently, according to
this principle, nothing prevents the owner from using the freedom
in ways which might add to conflict escalation. What counts is what
attracts the largest profit by serving the needs of a given public.
Any social responsibility for the media is seen as interference in
both media freedom and in the free market (McQuail, 2003, p. 15).

From a peace perspective, the establishment of media operating only for the sake of profit might add new voices, which might also turn out as positive or negative contributions to peace, depending on what attracts the largest audience consumption. Only target groups with large consumption levels are worth targeting commercials at. Consequently, from a normative perspective it is impossible to claim that the mere establishment of such new media is an adequate step towards peace. Nor would such media want to be either the target for international or multilateral support to peace-building.

Media freedom from a market and owner perspective is primarily an American concept anchored on the Freedom of Expression, as part of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights,* and media independence as defined above by Cees Hamelink has a global perspective (United Nations, 1948).

Of importance to our perspective is the diversity, which is one of the benefits of media freedom and the freedom of expression. To put it simply, diversity presupposes that the more channels of public communication which exist, the more variations in content and attitudes there will be. Consequently it is more likely that there will be several different discourses and not only one discourse of conflict. From that perspective, purely commercial media without obligations to society might strengthen diversity, which though is counter-balanced through increased media concentration.

Denis McQuail (2000) adds a *normative perspective to diversity*, requiring that:

- Media should *reflect* in their structure and content the various social, economic and cultural realities of the societies (and communities) in which they operate, in a more or less proportional way.

- Media should offer more or less equal chances of *access* to the voices of various social and cultural minorities that make up the society.

- Media should serve as a *forum* for different interests and points of view in a society or community.

- Media should offer relevant *choices* of content at one point in time and also *variety* over time of a kind that corresponds to the needs and interests of their audiences (p. 171).

If we use Nigeria as an example, the normative perspective on media diversity is only partly ensured through the public broadcasting system, while the large contrast between the Northern and Southern parts of the country is reflected in the commercial media. They are, for market reasons, much stronger and have a greater presence in the wealthier South. The majority of print media is produced and published in Southern Nigeria and as there is not a conscious balance between the number of journalists employed from Northern and Southern regions, rural and urban areas, Muslim and Christian groups. The media is easily exploited as a mouthpiece for voicing prejudices and stereotypes.[7]

What can be discussed is whether media, which is largely focused on local issues and a local market, is providing the critical questions to local identities' interests, compared to larger regional or national

---

[7] Based on interviews with numerous journalists and editors conducted by myself, ONASANYA, A. and MAHMOOD, W. (2002) in *Nigerian Media – Overview, Evaluation and Draft Programmes for Change*.

interests. Generally speaking, this is seldom the case for local media, even in well developed democracies.

This raises the question of the *impartiality* of the media and journalists in a society of diverse local, ethnic or other group identities. If we look at what serves peace better or what provides reliable information, which can be used as a basis for engaging in democratic choices, then it is important to be given a perspective which is *neutral* and *balanced*, reflecting all interests in society on a given subject of conflict. As in all journalism, *truth* and *factuality* are crucial values also in de-escalating quality journalism. In extracting the characteristics of importance to de-escalating reporting, whether before or after a conflict I have chosen the term *impartiality* as indicator along with *diversity*.

In other words, it might be attractive for the media from a market perspective and for the journalists, who feel that they belong to a certain identity group, to be partial and subjective in their reporting. We shall return to this in Chapter 5. From a normative perspective however, we accept that the media can and should be accountable for discouraging conflict or to provide distorted or false information, hindering the populace from taking part in democratic decision-making. McQuail (2000) defines *media accountability* as:

> all the voluntary or involuntary processes by which the media answer directly or indirectly to their society for the quality and or consequences of publication, with particular reference to matters of the general public good (p. 180).

From an anthropological perspective, the existence of a diversity of media reflecting diverse local interests and identity groups is, in

most contexts, strongly desirable. A close knit network of local or community media might engage and involve the population in a democratic process. As was the case in former Yugoslavia, where the de-centralisation of the media not only led to increased patriotism within individual republics or entities, but also to enhanced antagonism, it is less simple to claim the same in an unstable and vulnerable environment. Media provides a forum for mediated communication between all interests, identity groups and points-of-view and offers an important contribution to the level of coherence within a community or nation. Recognising this, a comprehensive network of local and community media does not substitute a common national media platform, but might be a valuable add on.[8]

If we summarize the characteristics of media according to the above discussion of media accountability versus media independence and focus on the factors which might contribute to de-escalation of conflicts, we can point to *diversity* and *impartiality* as being crucial. An other factor, which in reality determines the possibility for diversity and impartiality is editorial independence.

---

[8] The parallel system of federal and state public broadcasters across almost all Nigerian states is an example of the conflict between a system of common media forums encompassing diverse identity groups, local interests and points-of-views and an elaborate system of diverse local media. On one side, the federal broadcasters in each state distribute national programmes combined with local programmes of a limited duration. Carried out in a professional manner, this would normally add to building a national identity with respect for the regional belonging. The state broadcasters, which in many cases are closely linked to the individual state governments, should ideally reflect the diverse interests of their own societies, but is as structure not contributing to the nation building. Some managers of state broadcasters expressed to the undersigned the view that it is their right and duty to represent through their media the opposition to the federal government and the federal broadcasting system. The vision of each political grouping owning its own medium to promote its views is, however, not unproblematic in a vulnerable society with numerous communal conflicts. It is hardly realistic either to imagine a federally run system of local and community broadcasters reflecting and allowing for participation of the existing multitude of ethnic and political interests in Nigeria.

With these terms I have characterised the nature of different media in the following ways:

4.4.1 Public Media

In one group, we have the *public media* abiding by the obligation to social responsibility to the greatest extent, but also with the most delicate balance of editorial independence. Traditional media in this group often combine their activities with net media – either as pure public relations, as deepening of broadcast information and news, or as two-ways communication among citizens or between audience and experts in the media. When we arrange the formal independence into three categories, namely government, state and public service broadcasters, we can base it on general experience, particularly the experience described in Chapter 3, to see if each category complies with standards of diversity and impartiality in news and other programming. Normally standards in the use of net media are equivalent to the standards for the broadcast media. This information is presented below:

Public Media categories/ Editorial Standards	Primary Organisational Control	Editorial Control	Impartiality news	Diversity news	Diversity/ Impartiality in Education/ Cultural Programmes
Government	Government	Government	No	No	Maybe
State	Government/ Parliament/ Public	Indirect Government and Parliament	Hardly	Yes but unbalanced	Maybe
Public Service	Public/ Parliament	Independent	In principle Yes	Yes	Yes
Net Media	As above	As above	As above	As above	As above

Table 8: Government, State and Public Service Media

When we look at government media, there are not many obvious entry points for media intervention to be carried out without a mandate from the UNSC, because the media is designed to be a controllable mouthpiece for the government, whether this might be in favour of a violent conflict or not. re For the same reasons, the government media is the only media reaching the whole population and consequently very influential indeed. It might be possible however, to support programmes favouring dialogue or pointing to common values if the country is not in an eminent crisis or conflict. Particularly in regional contexts, there can be openings to cooperation on programmes dealing with domestic issues, particularly when they are not prime time news or programmes.[9]

For state media, the possibilities are numerous. A transition from being state media to public service media should be supported. First of all, the fact that there is a parliament with some influence in the organisation does, as we saw it with Radio Rwanda, change it from being government into state media. The multiparty elections allowed all political sides to fight for control and ultimately at the right time and with a power balance, to work towards the status of independent public service broadcaster.[10] Secondly, editorial independence can be defended not only at the political level, but also by editors and journalists as professionals. We saw that in Serbia and Croatia during the wars, where journalists formed alternative journalist associations albeit unsuccessfully, which defended the individuals and tried to influence media policy to allow

---

[9] One example is: The Danish Wider Arab Initiative in which notably Syrian TV, Jordan TV and Denmark's Radio TV co-produces children's programmes based on public service criteria. This programme both involves capacity building of the Arab producers, joint development of formats and exchange of professionals.
[10] The Lithuania story.

public service media.[11] Thirdly, local human rights organisations and international networks can be important change agents in their claims on editorially independent, diverse and impartial media.

It has proven feasible to support the capacity building of journalists, editors, managers and even regulatory bodies and legislators as well, as it is often possible to support the production of programmes outside the news and eventually to cooperate regionally on current affairs issues (Appendix B). We shall return to this in Chapter 5, dealing with the state broadcasters of former Yugoslavia.

4.4.2 Commercial, Political and Religious Media

In a second group we have media, which is run primarily by commercial, political or religious forces. What they usually have in common is that none of them acknowledge a social responsibility to society as such and believe that decisions on the editorial aims of the media are based on the owners' interests, be they commercial, non-profit, political or religious. Particularly among the commercial media, but also among religious media, some seek to restrict the direct influence from owners on individual stories by turning to internal structures and editorial codes. Consequently, they are generally able to maintain standards of impartiality and diversity. These standards are, as we shall see in Chapter 5, often appreciated by larger groups of the population and the market. In

---

[11] In 2001, a strike by journalists, editors and over ten thousand demonstrators protested outside Czech TV. This led to a change from a politically appointed Director General to a new leader appointed in accordance with what the journalists saw as professional criteria (IFJ, 2001).

other cases like the mainstream media coverage of the latest Iraq war, Chapter 5 also illustrates how a patriotic approach ignoring standards of impartiality and diversity can be commercially viable.

Political media, whether it promotes the owner's personal ambitions, political party ambitions or ulterior political goals, is often itself biased and separated from standards of impartiality and diversity. The net media will normally have the same functions as described above in the group of public media but will particularly for the print media also serve as quick updates of news. Nevertheless, a multitude of political media contributes to a diversity of forums for presenting different views.

Media Categories/ Editorial Standards	Owner	Editorial Control	Impartiality News	Diversity News	Impartiality and Diversity in Cultural or Educational Programmes
Commercial	Local/ National/ Multinational businessmen	Economic considerations	Maybe	Maybe	Maybe
Political	Politicians or Political Parties	Politicians or Political Parties	No	Hardly	Hardly
Religious	Religious Communities	Religious Community	Maybe	Maybe	Hardly
Net media	As above	As above	As above	As above	As above

Table 9: Commercial, Political and Religious Media

When we look at commercial, political and religious media, there is still the possibility for international organisations to support them in taking on a role in promoting peace and democracy. Possible entry points are support for capacity building, association building, programme production and exchange. Local or poorer national commercial media generally do not have many principles for or against international support provided to strengthen peace and democracy. Support can be given not only to association building,

but also to individualised capacity building, concrete programmes, articles, management advice, development of business plans, etc. (Appendix C). However, there are long term economic considerations for commercial media, which might override the benefits from programme support.[12] For political and religious media, they will only be willing to be involved in a process aiming for peace if it does not conflict with their primary goals – to strengthen a certain political or religious agenda.

4.4.3 Non-Profit and Community Media

In a third group we have professionally-managed media, which are owned by non-profit foundations, public trusts, individual or groups of journalists, community, alternative or grassroots media run by local and small communities. What they usually have in common is the shared acknowledgment of social responsibility to society or the local community. The professional non-profit media, which is independent from the state, often feels obliged to assume the same social responsibilities as the public service broadcasters. One obvious difference is that these media only have commercial income to rely on and consequently are more dependent on their market share than the public service media is. Still, they give priority to impartiality, diversity and social responsibility. Examples of such media are Le Monde in France, the French-German Arte TV, the Danish Politiken, and the American New York Times, to name a few. Also these media use internet media very much the same way

---

[12] One example is Radio 21 in Kosovo, which in the aftermath of the American bombings was asked several times if they, in parallel with the revitalised public broadcaster, would broadcast programmes in both the majority Albanian language and in the minority Serb language. Radio 21 was in many ways a professional radio service, accepting its social responsibility and standards of impartiality and diversity. In interviews with me, the station refused to broadcast programmes in the Serb language, arguing that it would weaken Radio 21's position in the Albanian-speaking market in Kosovo.

as the public service media do – namely to provide additional public relations, to deepen and quickly update the published information and news, or as two-ways communication among citizens or between audience and experts of the media.

Community and grassroots media are often understood as anything but mainstream (Downing, 2001, p. 44), though other definitions also apply. One is radical media, as suggested by John D. Downing (2001): "By *radical media*, I refer to media, generally small-scale and in many different forms that express an alternative vision to hegemonic policies, priorities and perspectives" (p. 44). Dr. Clemencia Rodriquez sees citizens' media as tools to establish or re-establish a 'social fabric', "made of responsible and empowered citizens that value the public good, demand transparency, participate in collective decision-making processes and cultivate local cultures" (Rodriguez, 2005). The professionalism meant as the impartial, critical and objective media is not important, while the active access and involvement of citizens in the media for Rodriquez is an important step towards a coherent and empowered community. Whichever definition is used, one should be aware that the use of the specific media – community, radical or alternative media – does not in itself guarantee that it will be used for the better in relation to conflict and peace.

Net media is, as we saw it in chapter 3 an increasing factor in shaping agendas and influencing political decisions. Coupled with global and local civil society movements, community, radical or alternative media net media becomes stronger actors – even in relation to non-wired societies. However, the diversity of these actors still makes it difficult to predict whether net initiatives will contribute to conflict de-escalation.

Media categories/ editorial standards	Owner	Editorial Control	Impartiality in news	Diversity in news	Impartiality and diversity in Educational /Cultural content
Non-profit professional media	Non-profit foundations, individual and groups of professional media people	Professional publishers, editors and journalists	Yes	Yes, usually	Yes
Community	Public/local authorities, members, minority communities	Indirect control from the members/ owners	Hardly	Maybe	Maybe
Net media	As above	As above	As above	As above	As above

Table 10: Non-Profit and Community Media

Both non-profit professional media and community media acknowledge their social responsibility. However, the non-profit professional media do not necessarily support peace or oppose military interventions carried out by their respective governments. They would most likely be open to international support for building their journalistic capacity to stay impartial, diverse and fact-based. In this way it might be possible for them to avoid conflict escalation in their articles or programmes. It is less likely that support to concrete programmes or articles will be accepted.

One strength of community media is that their owners do not expect a profitable outcome, but their editorial independence consequently also balances up against the interest of their donors – be they members, local and national authorities, interest groups or international actors. When community media is as diverse as all other media, it is also difficult to tell how interested they will be in contributing to peace or democracy. There is, however a strong tradition for using community media to empower local populations against totalitarian regimes, like Asociación Latinoamericana de

Educación Radiofónica (ALER) and La Asociación Mundial de Radios Comunitarias (AMARCC) have done it in Latin America. Rodriguez uses examples of community radios, which have declared themselves "territories for peace" in Colombia and, with governmental support, are working to re-establish the 'social fabric' (Rodriquez, 2005, p. 2).

Net media leaves numerous entry points because it is cheap, easy to operate, almost uncontrollable and open to new initiatives.[13]

---

[13] One interesting example is the Young Peoples Media Network, started by UNICEF, available at www.UNICEF.org/Magic/bank. The Network assists, connects and recognizes youth media organizations and young people working in and with the media. The goal is to strengthen the rights, role and voice of children and adolescents in the opinion-making process in Europe and Central Asia through the media. Though the network does not explicitly promote peace, it does provide a method to link together young people and civil society organisations across Europe and Central Asia.

5. Media Content – formats, ethics and functions

In Chapter 4 we identified the phases, which I find adequate to take into consideration when providing international assistance to media. I also discussed and systematized the conflict de-escalating characteristics of various forms of media to enable us prioritise the media assistance. Finally, we identified the potential areas for media assistance, of which we in this chapter will focus on support to content and ethics.

The knowledge we gained in Chapter 2 from conflict resolution and social psychological theories and research indicates that to obtain a genuine reconciliation and sustainable peace the broader population has to change gradually its perception and attitudes to evolve a common identity, which is more resilient than the differences in identities behind the conflicts. We have also reasons to believe that to remove the root causes for conflict and build a common vision for a future sustainable peace is a process, which does not happen immediately but involves several steps.

As a starting point, we shall look at using Maire Dugan's Nested Paradigm of Conflict Foci as a way to understand the development from conflict to common visions and transformation of conflict, as it concerns the populations. I believe that Maire Dugan's nested paradigm of conflict foci offers a model, which adapted to media is very tempting to use when we prioritise the international support to content along the timeline of post conflict phases. Through qualitative focus groups analyses we shall test, how representatives for the broader population appropriate media content targeted towards different phases of conflict transformation. Focus groups discuss television programmes co-produced between public broadcasters

in Southeast Europe. In addition, an analysis based on qualitative questionnaires reflects the attitudes of the involved broadcast producers and managers to shed light on the institutional openings and restrictions for cooperation across conflict boundaries.

While several genres of programmes and articles could be useful tools in building a sustainable peace, I have chosen to focus on journalism, whether in news, features or factual programmes and just point to the potentials within other genres. In Chapter 4, we discussed and defined what I saw as the most relevant characteristics to media for having a de-escalating nature rather than escalating conflict. In this chapter, we shall further discuss the ethics of journalists when dealing with violent conflicts and define what I see as an important distinction between peace journalism and professional code of conduct for journalists.

However, this is not only important questions for journalists working in a conflict environment. These questions are also important for developing the principles of multilateral organisations, donors and media NGOs supporting media content as part of their efforts to bring about sustainable peace. It is my belief that international support to content can be given without compromising the editorial integrity of the journalists and media, who receive the support.

Finally, the chapter draws up an integrated and coherent approach for the international support to content.

5.1 The Nested Paradigm and Its Relation to Print and Broadcast Media

Before analysing the support to content as part of preventive action and a tool towards sustainable peace, it is useful to revisit the peace-building models described in Chapter 2. This time, the models will be directly related to media content and the latter's role in a peace-building process. The adapted models will be held up against focus group analyses from a cross-boundary television programme cooperation for peace and stability in Southeast Europe.

We identified three models of particular relevance to the scope of research for this thesis in Chapter 2.

One model - *Actors and Approaches to Peacebuilding* – developed by John Paul Lederach, divides society into three levels, which each has its role and interest in a peace-building process (Lederach, 1997, p. 39). I discussed this model in chapter 4.

The other model which seems useful, is developed by Maire Dugan as *The Nested Paradigm of Conflict Foci* (1996, p. 9-20). Dugan focuses on integrative power versus disintegrative power. Intractable conflicts are seen as a result of the loss of integrative power and holding together only through defining the others as the enemy – a disintegrative power (2003). In her model *The Nested Paradigm of Conflict Foci,* she accepts that the immediate trigger of a conflict might be "micro-issues", but that in order build a sustainable peace, it is necessary also to seek a systemic or structural change. However, Dugan accepts that it is difficult for the

population to realize and understand the need for a systemic change.

Therefore there is a need first to seek to resolve the **issue** of conflict. But as the issue, particularly in protracted conflicts, is often embedded within a bad relationship over time, the **relationship** has to be reconciled. In practical terms, this might be through prejudice reduction, bias-awareness and confidence-building.

While the conflict as we discussed it in Chapter 2 was mired in deep-lying structural and systemic inequities, the re-establishment of the relationship should be followed by efforts to change the general system. As this seems easier to suggest than to implement, Dugan adds a third, intermediate level – the **subsystem,** connecting both the levels of issue, relationship and overall system. The subsystem consequently becomes a middle-range locus of activity connecting all other levels in the system. With the starting point in the issues of conflict and the actors directly involved, this level might attempt to remove the root causes for those directly involved and in parallel seeking to find solutions for changing the **system** level.

As much as this approach might seem logical for a conflict resolution practitioner working with a protracted conflict, as much do the 'levels' from issue to system level also reflect a journalist's audience considerations when producing programmes about complex issues. In order to make complex problems understandable to a broader audience, the journalist often has to use concrete cases as starting points and gradually broaden the perspective at least to a sub-system level.

Figure 2: The Nested Paradigm of Conflict Foci
Source: Maire Dugan, "A Nested Theory of Conflict", *Women in Leadership* **1, no. 1, (Summer 1996)**

If we seek to adapt the conflict resolution model to one dealing with programmes produced and broadcasted across conflict lines, an attempt to use them in a post conflict radio or television programmes in prevention of continuous protracted conflicts, could look as follows:

Issue:

> *Conflict Resolution goal:*
> To find a solution to the issue, which triggers the conflict.
> *Genres:*

News and current affairs should ideally report on the triggering issue by seeing it from both sides and consulting them on possible solutions.

Debate programmes involving leadership, middle-range leaders or grassroots leaders from both sides discussing issues of concern and possible solutions. The leaders from both sides might also be held accountable to studio audiences or through phone-ins.

Relationship:

Conflict Resolution goal:

The goal is to re-establish the relationship and take the first steps towards reconciliation through the reduction of stereotypes, prejudices and fear as well as the building of mutual confidence.

Genres:

Almost all genres ranging from magazines, documentaries, fiction, or entertainment to sports programmes can be used. In documentaries or magazine programmes, the key is probably to reflect the people behind the mirrored enemy pictures, to deal with differences or common characteristics in everyday life or culture. By capturing and presenting humanity behind the disintegrated identities, it might reduce prejudices and stereotypes. The same could be done through the use of irony and humour in soap operas and other fiction programmes. Another way of humanizing the de-humanized enemy could be through sports competitions or game shows.

Subsystem:

Conflict Resolution goal:

By connecting the levels of issue, relationship and system, the goal is to remove the root causes for those directly involved and to point to potentials for change at the system level.

Genres:

Magazines and documentaries can be used to look at the broader picture of structural, economic, social or political inadequacies, which would need to be addressed as a step towards ultimately removing the root factors for conflict. As part of this process, it might also be feasible to produce content, which takes a larger perspective on each party's interests, motives and the societal context behind the conflict. This would enable the broader population to discuss the causes and triggers of a conflict as well as to call/demand for changes in the system.

System:

Conflict Resolution goal:

Through a broader transformation of the society and its structure, the goal is to remove the roots for future conflicts and establish a joint vision across conflicting population groups.

Genres:

Besides investigative, historic or thematic programmes pointing to systemic weaknesses in society, documentaries and news programmes can discuss possible visions for the development of society. However, such discussions of the

possible transformation of society are often   lengthy processes lasting many years, the outcome of which would depend on the media's ability to question existing structures and exploration of new ones in society.

The third model – *Nested Paradigm: The Time Dimension in Peacebuilding* – developed by Lederach (1997, p. 77), was already examined in Chapter 4, but shall only be used to add a time dimension to the above two models in this context. Lederach believes in progression through peace building. In other words, his thesis is that by dealing with a given violent conflict through a comprehensive peace building approach, it is possible not only to settle the issue of the conflict, but also to restore the mutual relationship and transform society into a more peaceful and developmentally sustainable one. In many protracted conflicts, a comprehensive peace building process will also prevent future violence, since it seeks to transform and address the root causes of the conflict.

In order to test if the above models present viable guidelines for international support for content in a post-conflict situation, we shall in the following part look at a focus group analysis of television programmes from a regional documentary co-production project in Southeast Europe. We shall also analyse the degree to which the involved broadcasting organisations – in this case the state broadcasters – are open to programme collaboration across the boundaries of conflict.

5.2   Exploring Audience Reception in Bosnia and Serbia

5.2.1 Background

The programme *Peace and Stability Through Cross-Boundary Civil Society Collaboration* was developed and designed for the then Danish Programme for Peace and Stability (FRESTA), in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FRESTA, 2000). The title reflects the aim of re-establishing relations between the disintegrated countries, republics and provinces of the former Yugoslavia through facilitating the creation of regional civil society networks after the 1999 bombings in Kosovo. The themes identified and chosen for these networks were human rights, youth, refugees and media. Through an intense stakeholders' process, a regional network for national or provincial associations of private broadcasters and a regional network for national or provincial state broadcasters was established in early 2000. I was at the time the managing director of the Baltic Media Centre (BMC), being personally responsible for the identification, facilitation and implementation of both of these networks from 1999 to early 2002. In this context, we shall discuss the role of the Network of Public Broadcasters in South East Europe (TELESEE).

The entry point for establishing this network had been what Lederach would call the Middle-Range Leadership (1997, p. 39) , the director generals of the national or provincial broadcasters in Slovenia, Bosnia-i-Herzegovina, Republic Srpska, Croatia, Serbia-

Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia as well as countries which had not been directly involved in the wars following the dissolution of Yugoslavia – namely Greece, Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria. The director generals signed an agreement initiating a regional co-operation in *Media Policy, Programme Co-operation and Training with the aim of promoting peace, democracy and stability in the South Eastern Europe.* In the field of media policy, the objective was, "to ensure well-functioning independent public service broadcasting" and a "media legislation in SEE brought in line with European Standards for public service media" (FRESTA, 2000, p.137-138). The training field should strengthen the "professional standards" and "good ethical working standards within public broadcasters in the SEE especially within the areas of minority coverage and promoting conflict prevention programming" (FRESTA, 2000, p.137-138). Furthermore, the objective was "to enhance the already existing programme collaboration between the public broadcasters in SEE" (FRESTA, 2000, p.137-138).

As part of the programme collaboration, it was agreed to establish a daily regional television news exchange with the distribution of pictures, sound and story outline between the participating stations, increasing the coverage of events in all countries of the region[14]. But this did not imply that editorial collaboration occurred on individual stories. Besides the exchange, a genuine co-production of news features and documentaries across the borders was initiated. We shall look at the latter and most prominent element of editorial collaboration that is the co-production of documentary programmes.

---

[14] The ERNO news exchange took place via EBU's regional satellite network, was initiated by BMC and later supported by the Finnish Broadcasting Company and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had the long term vision for the overall regional programme through developing and strengthening regional civil society collaboration to embark on a route towards conflict transformation., The short term vision for the media programme was in the first five years to stimulate the general population's openness and willingness to communicate and collaborate with neighbours (FRESTA, 2000, p. 135). In other words, the aim of the programme collaboration was to re-establish the relationship between the populations of the region, with a view to assist in the development towards democracy through a regional approach.

The collaboration on the production of documentaries started in 2000 and the possible impact of these programmes on the countries of the former Yugoslavia had to be measured in 2004. By that time, I had left the BMC and was only involved from the sidelines, advising on the feasibility of such a measurement.

5.2.2 Methodological considerations

The impact of a given intervention on conflict resolution is in itself difficult to measure, because numerous intended and unintended factors outside the intervention affect the outcome (Lewis, 2003, p. 3). In a project like TELESEE's documentary co-productions, where fifteen to twenty documentaries every year are co-produced and broadcast in five to ten countries across the region, it is unlikely that the impact on popular attitudes or political development is so significant that it easily can be measured as a direct result of the intervention. To measure such impact, a complicated and

comprehensive process of developing clear indicators would have to be developed.

The target group for the TELESEE programme was civil society or the broader populations of the region, with the aim of enhancing their openness to communicate and collaborate with populations in the neighbouring countries, which were previously embroiled in conflict. In theory, one might be able to measure variations in the number of cross-border travels, trade and telecommunications, but the factors which could have contributed to an increase in these numbers would range from economic progress, cessation of border restrictions, better infrastructure, cheaper telephones, changes in taxes and numerous other developments in the countries of concern.

Another measurement might be the regional viewership for a given TELESEE television programme, but this would not in itself tell us anything about the viewers' perception of the programmes, not to mention the high expenditure and logistics that would be involved. Furthermore, the number of co-produced documentaries broadcast in each country would in themselves hardly cause significant and measurable changes in popular attitudes. Again, one can make the case that the impact of the co-productions might lie in the spill-over effects which would increase the professional standards in the other programmes at participating television stations.

My advice – and the conclusion that BMC reached – was, through focus group analyses, to assess the ways in which the television documentary programmes could serve as facilitators of peace and stability through their influence on sentiments and opinion-making.

More information about this would allow us to adjust future interventions and it is evident that the results and impact would depend very much on the scope of programme collaboration, local contexts and stages towards conflict resolution in other places.

If I approach this research task from a discursive realist perspective, I am as Schrøder refers Deacon (Schroder 2003, p.48) "interested in illuminating the whole communicative process from senders to receivers, and beyond also in the larger socio-cultural structures that circumscribe this process" (Schroder, 2003, p. 48).

As discussed in Chapter 2, the individuals of an audience, while not isolated, are still relatively autonomous in their sense making and appropriation of programmes they have watched. However, as social beings they also have their meanings constrained by what the authors call powerful social forces such as media institutions that have been constituted by the aggregate collective actions of previous generations through history.

To assess potential influence on sentiments and opinion-making, which is highly dependent on the social context of the viewer, on-going events and the decisions made at the leadership level, it was decided to carry out focus group analyses of selected programmes. Reception research through a focus group analysis

> intervenes moderately in the subject's everyday life by setting up the qualitative research interview as a speech event for the mediation of the media experience, but leaving ample room for informants to express their

> lifeworld-derived meanings and attitudes in their own
> discursive terms (Schroder, 2003, p. 51).

The strength of this approach is that the results primarily reflect the qualities and potential of a given programme, while only including the social context as it has formed the individual before and up to the focus group interview, and through the moderate interaction between the group members. It does not register the impact of the participants' regular social network, only within the selected group and through guided interviews. Nor does it produce any quantitative data, only an analysis based on qualitative statements.

The obvious approach would be what Edward F. Fern, American PhD in Marketing, in his distinction between focus group tasks would call exploratory focus group tasks, as opposed to clinical or experiential tasks (2001, p. 5). The exploratory tasks can, as in our case, uncover beliefs, likes and dislikes, opinions and attitudes about policies and programs.

However, the focus group test would, with an exploratory approach, also be the best way to verify if the above models present any guidance for international support to content in a post-conflict situation.

The BMC hired an independent audience researcher from Denmark Radio's Research Department, Kirstine Vinderskov, to carry out the focus group test with the Sarajevo-based research institute Poenta being responsible for setting up the groups and ensuring that the data gathered was of the desired quality and detail. I was invited to provide inputs for the test design. The ultimate authority for the

focus group interviews remained with the researcher and BMC. It was agreed with BMC that I could use the results of the interviews freely. Having said that, after the interviews were carried out, it was stressed by the manager of BMC that if the findings were too negative to the programmes supported by BMC, the centre would reserve its right to not hand out the interviews to me. I later obtained the uncensored interview transcripts and report written by Kirstine Vinderskov (2004).

I participated in a meeting discussing the layout of the focus group test and delivered my input for the research in writing as agreed (Appendix D). Thereafter the Research Design (Appendix E) and Interview Guide (Appendix F) were developed and written by an independent researcher. As it could be read, the focus group analysis was expected to include four elements:

1. Quantitative analysis of media consumption for the members of each focus group (questionnaire outlined by me and adapted by researcher).

2. Interview based on the documentary programmes. Participants were expected to have watched it before the meeting.

3. Interview about one documentary shown during the meeting.

4. Qualitative questionnaire-based analysis of the national TELESEE coordinators about the intentions and reactions from their organisations, editorial possibilities and external

reactions to the TELESEE programmes (designed and analysed by me. The questionnaire was distributed and collected by BMC).

What was also interesting about the design of this analysis was that it gave inputs within the holistic audience research as adapted from the critical discourse analyst Norman Fairclough's three dialectically related dimensions. They are:

1. *Communication Product* being the documentary,

2. *Discursive Practices* being partly the economic, political, social and cultural forces structuring the media production and distribution, and partly the economic, political, social and cultural resources of the audiences to engage with what the media is offering,

3. The *sociocultural processes* of globalization, democratization, commercialization, etc, which *enable and constrain* the media audiences at the same time.

While we sought to reflect the discursive practices of distributing and production through simple questionnaires, we also got an overview of media consumption, the core interest was on the focus group interviews. As already suggested in Lederach and Dugan's models, the appropriation of the individual documentary should be seen in the light of the larger socio-cultural picture for the post-conflict building of relationship, reconciliation and systemic transformation.

Focus groups interviews were carried out in Sarajevo (the Muslim/Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and capital of Bosnia-i-Herzegovina), Banja Luka (Republik Srpska, BIH), Belgrade (Serbia), and Novi Sad (Vojvodina Province, Serbia). It was originally planned for focus group interviews to be conducted in Pristina (Kosovo), but because of the March events (described earlier in this chapter), the research team decided to go to Novi Sad instead. For the purpose of the analysis, it had been more interesting to assess the sentiments towards the programmes and conflict from a Kosovo perspective, since the relations were and still during the focus group interviews significantly tenser than between Vojvodina and the Serbian capitol.

In the research design, the four focus groups were planned to comprise:

- 12 people;
- Equal sex ratio;
- Diverse educational backgrounds and occupations;
- Regular television viewers; and
- Have access to a video recorder in their home.

According to the local knowledge, Poenta was asked to secure more nuances by mixing ethnicity, religious beliefs and political views, as well as to include members from both urban and rural areas.

The age range for two of the focus groups was 20-40 years and for the other two, 40-60 years. While it is interesting to look at results across different ages, it reduces the possibility of making equally-

based comparisons between them, though this is hardly of significance.

The criteria that *all participants should have access to a video-recorder in their home* turned out to be problematic, with a significant impact on the interviews, as described by Vinderskov:

> Unfortunately it was not practically possible to facilitate the intended evaluation of a broader sample of TELESEE documentaries in this study. For the focus group participants to have watched the programmes in advance several copies would have had to be sent out and the participants would have had to be recruited according to whether they had a VCR-player at home or not. This was not practically possible and would make the complicated recruiting process even more difficult to conduct. Thus one typical and future-oriented type of programme was selected and a selection of other titles representing the range of documentaries were included as questions in the questionnaire" (Interview, 10th March 2005).

My interest in testing Maire Dugan's Nested Paradigm for Conflict Foci as part of John Paul Lederach's Integrated Framework for Peacebuilding to a variety of documentary programmes reflecting the different stages in the peace-building process turned out to be complicated. However, I still believe that the results from the focus group analyses will give important indications for the validity of my hypothetical model on support to media content in post conflict situations.

5.2.3 Media Consumption of the Focus Group members

The questionnaires completed by participants in each of the four focus groups do not give any general picture of the audiences in the four places at all and can only be held as a background for the answers in the focus group interviews.

The statistical analyses of the questionnaires (Appendix G) offer us some interesting results. Among these are that even in places where programming by commercial broadcasters has been consumed more frequently, the public broadcasters are regarded as must trustworthy by all four groups:

Two-thirds of the 12 Sarajevo group (8/12) members watch public television primarily for the Federal entity, while rest of the members mention four different stations including the newly established national public broadcaster. Two-thirds also mention the Federal public television as having the most trustworthy news and factual programmes, while the newly established national public service channel BHT1 is judged to be most trustworthy by one sixth (2/12), Hayat TV by a twelfth (1/12) and None by a twelfth (1/12).

In Banja Luka, one third (4/11) primarily watches the public TV of the entity Republik Srpska, while one third (4/11) watches the Bosnian branch of the entertainment channel, originally established by Slobodan Milosevic's wife in Serbia. Interestingly, almost a third (3/11) find the national public television the most trustworthy and more than a third (4/11) find the public television for Republic

Srpska most trustworthy. The commercial channels are seen as being less trustworthy.

In Belgrade, the public television RTS and the two commercial channels, TV Pink and BK TV, are each the primary choice of one fourth of the members of the Belgrade focus group. TV Politika, Palma TV and TV B92 are each mentioned by one person. The most trustworthy broadcasters are the national public broadcaster RTS (4/12), BK TV (2/12), TV Pink (2/12) and TV Politika (1/12), while one fourth (3/12) responded None, indicating a disillusioned focus group.

In Novi Sad, priority was given to the national and provincial public broadcasters RTS and TV Novi Sad, the commercial channels TV Pink and TV Kanal 9 – all four with two out of the ten members. TV BK is most watched by one member of the focus group. The most trusted news and factual programmes are at RTS (4/10), TV Novi Sad (3/10), TV Pink (2/10) and TV BK (1/10).

All four focus groups answered that the public broadcasters are more trusted than the commercial broadcasters when it comes to their informative programmes or news and factual programmes. This is interesting if we recall the role of these broadcasters in the time before and during the Yugoslav wars described in Chapter 2. However, one should not ignore that the programmes tested on the focus groups were produced by the public broadcasters and that the homogenised answers might to a certain degree reflect a tendency to please the organisers of the focus group interviews. The questionnaires were filled out prior to the interview.

The unanimous answer from all four groups that "the overall atmosphere on TV stations included into TELESEE Project is more for the benefit to the peaceful relations" than to hostile relations "with the neighbours". This answer was given by all 45 participants and leaves very little room for questioning that the members of the four focus groups regard it as fact. As we shall see in the results from the focus group interviews, there are indications that the general programming of the involved broadcasters might have some degree of bias.

Of particular interest to the TELESEE documentaries is that 20% (9/45) of the focus group members have watched and identified some of the documentaries produced and broadcast through TELESEE. An additional 16% have watched similar programmes, but were unable to identify them as being from TELESEE.

This also reflects that the most popular kinds of shows are movies and news, each with 14/45. 9 out of 45 mostly watch sport, while 6 out of 45 mostly watch documentaries. These figures do only express the most watched shows, while it is expected that everybody in the groups frequently watch all other formats, but this has not been purposefully tested.

Finally, one interesting result is that when the members of the focus groups were asked to "grade the representation of the shows made in the countries in the region at the TV station you most often watch," 25 out of 45 found that there were enough of them, while 20 out of 45 found that they were insufficient. Significantly, 9/12 in Sarajevo found there are enough of them, while the other three

groups in total have a slight majority wanting more programmes about neighbouring countries.

5.2.4 Focus Group Results

The focus group interviews did provide a number of significant findings, which are useful in our search for models to support content.

Situational differences

The differences between the interviews in Bosnia-i-Herzegovina and in Serbia are striking. In BiH, there is notable scepticism against watching programmes about the neighbouring countries. In Serbia, there is enthusiasm about this phenomenon. To interpret that, it is necessary to understand that Serbia and Bosnia-i-Herzegovina have each watched the 1990s unfold from their separate points-of-view. In Serbia, the wars have to a large degree been seen as battles for independence from the other republics and a loss for the Yugoslav state, to which the Serbs had the strongest sense of ownership. For BiH, the Bosnian Serbs, supported by the Serbian-led Yugoslav government, were seen as causing the violence and war in Bosnia. The Serbs, who feel that they have been blamed by many sides for causing the wars, can through watching TELESEE programmes like Brain Drain, see that nobody won from their independence and might unconsciously support the re-establishment of the old personal relationships which existed inside Yugoslavia.

In BiH, there is resistance to television programmes showing the bad sides of social development, which are common for all the

countries, while there is a cry for good examples and solutions. It is obvious that the reasons for this are the overwhelming social problems in Bosnia and slow economic development since the war, in spite of substantial foreign assistance. Another reason might be that the specific programme, 'Brain Drain', has no report from Bosnia included in it. In Serbia, the fact that all countries have suffered economically and socially is seen as an important lesson showing that war destroys and does not help anything. In BiH, particularly in the federation, most interest is shown in the public channels and there is relatively little criticism of the existing television channels. In Serbia, there is a stated scepticism against all television channels, which are seen to propagate the views of different political parties, and journalists, who are seen to promote their own political interests. The difference in opinion about the television channels in the two countries must necessarily be seen as a healthy sign of the benefit from the huge international assistance to Bosnian media. Not that the media – private or public – are perfect, but they are undoubtedly in better shape than in Serbia.

Let us look a bit closer at the different themes for the interviews:

A common problem
The programme watched by all focus groups before the interviews was about brain drain – young people leaving their country as a result of unemployment or other socially bad conditions and with a hope to live a better life in the West.

The reactions to the documentary *Brain Drain* differed from person to person. In Serbia, where the focus groups told that only very few

shows about the neighbouring countries were shown, one reaction was the following:

> I didn't know that the young people from all of these states wish to go abroad. I thought that the situation in Serbia was the worst, but this shows that the situation everywhere is pretty much the same.
> (Aleksandar Cvetkovic, Law Student, 20, Belgrade)

> We all know this, as well as we do about the problems with the corruption, nationalism, great unemployment, barriers between the states of this region. We were together in the conflicts, now we are together in the troubles.
> (Mira Parac, Shop Assistant, 45, Novi Sad)

Particularly in Serbia, the documentary appeared to be an eye-opener, though the demand for solutions is also stressed:

> We are witnessing the process of globalization. It would be dumb if in this region we have the process that is quite opposite, like it was until now – the process of separation. I wish I could see similar shows done in all of the countries in the region where every country would show at least one positive example; how a young person has found a job and a future in his own country.
> (Nada Pani, Housewife, 38, Belgrade)

As mentioned, the desire for programmes pointing to constructive solutions is widespread:

> I think that the message of this movie should go into a
> different direction. So, give me the movies that will, in a
> way, provide hope for people that there is a perspective
> and a possibility for a better life there.
> (Izet Bajramovic, Lawyer, 40, Sarajevo)

It was broadly acknowledged that the programme, by highlighting the brain drain phenomena, is dealing with an issue of common experience. It was also said that this does not bring anybody further. Generally, there is an outspoken interest in learning about the other countries, but to learn about ways which these countries use to solve their problems. In other words, very few deny the relationship with neighbouring countries. Others point to the links created through past family patterns, refugee experiences and trade.

Requests for solutions

While it is also mentioned that hatred and tensions still exist, the interviews show that the consciousness and will to deal with the others is widespread. But as the following quotes show, it is time to find solutions together:

> I do believe that it would be better that those who run the
> states are the ones who saw this show, and not we, who
> are common citizens. Then maybe they would reach the
> conclusions that certain problems should be solved
> together with some other states.
> (Borislav Popovic, Construction Worker, 29, Belgrade)

> What is important is that those who make decisions about
> our destiny, those who deal with politics in our country are
> watching such shows to see how the other countries are
> dealing with the problems.
> (Almir Sehic, Mechanical Technician, 30, Sarajevo)

Placed in the Nested Paradigm for Conflict Foci, the programme *Brain Drain* seems to be relevant in the re-establishment of relationships, while the members of the focus groups tended to feel that relationships – though not necessarily a forgiving reconciliation – had been re-established and that it was time to look at the sub-system level for solutions to remove the root causes. The brain drain phenomenon is, without hesitation, seen as a result of bad economic and social conditions, and they in turn stem from meaningless wars. It is now time to focus on the root causes and on the possibilities to change one's own life conditions.

Some of the focus group members pointed to the need for looking at the past:

> We need shows that will speak about the triggers of the
> confrontations until today and the wars we lead amongst
> ourselves. The people are still very much poisoned by
> nationalism, and many no longer wish to have any kind of
> cooperation. We must not forget that during the war,
> thousands of people died in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo.
> For their parents and relatives it is hard to think abut
> reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.
> (Miran Brzic, Shop Owner, 42, Novi Sad)

Several participants, however, requested for programmes which explored possible solutions at the level of the individual - what we would call the sub-system level.

It is safe to say that the one programme, which was tested through a focus group interview fits into the Nested Paradigm for Conflict Foci model adapted to the media field and to the timeline in Lederach's Integrated Peacebuidling Framework. This does not prove that my suggested model applies in all cases, or that all programmes which fit into one element of the model also fit into all others. It gives, however, a clear indication that issues like brain drain not only lead to reflections about lost relationships, discussions about both national and regional solutions to the sub-system problem of youth leaving the country, but also raise questions about the transformation of the entire system.

This has obviously happened in the closed environment of a focus group with a guided interview. We don't know how these issues would have been discussed in the more proximate environment of neighbours, friends and families, but the programme that was shown has at least placed these points on the agenda.

Ethical standards

Some statements indicated that the programme *Brain Drain* was not very entertaining or of a high professional level, but again and again the professional ethics were praised and interestingly, this was particularly the case in the Serbian focus groups:

> This show is fair and objective, but such shows are very
> rare. I believe that in the neighbouring countries people are

making shows about Serbs, where Serbia is portrayed as the devil. This show is different from many of the foreign shows I have seen before, and that relate to this region. This show does not deepen the hatred, unlike most others where Serbia is mentioned in negative ways and other countries in positive ways.
(Zdengo Varga, Retired Military Employee, 51, Novi Sad)

This show is made very professionally. The most useful thing would be if the journalists saw it so that can be a role model for themselves in this kind of journalism. We need fact based shows on every topic with data collected from different kinds of sources with well meaning and objective conclusions.
(Laslo Sebeszi, Driver, 51, Novi Sad)

For a long time, media have had a negative influence. Now, when the political confrontation has reduced, I think there is a need to help renew the contacts with the neighbouring countries. They need to be objectively informed about us as it is important for us to be objectively informed of them.
(Suzana Becejic, Lawyer, 42, Novi Sad)

This show lacks the opinion of the government, of those who are supposed to solve these problems. You can tell that the authors tried to be as objective as possible, but I think they failed in finding the aim of this show.
(Olga Karamarkovic, Housewife, 58, Banja Luka)

> This show speaks objectively about the problems in Serbia
> and in the neighbouring countries. But, it is an exception.
> In similar television shows everyone will say all the good
> things about their state and all the bad things about all the
> others. I there were such shows before the war and before
> the collapse of Yugoslavia I think that the entire
> confrontation could have been avoided.
> (Donka Arezina, Unemployed, 28, Belgrade)

It seems convincingly validated that the objective and fact-based programmes which used sources from all sides of a given conflict are appreciated by the viewers and seem to contribute to trust in the programme content, paving the way for enhanced mutual understanding. In other words, our definitions from the previous part of this chapter – impartiality, fact-based and looking at every issue from all sides of the conflict – are highly valued by the citizens.

5.2.5 Analysis of Organizational Attitudes to Regional Cooperation

With the results from the focus group interviews, it is interesting to analyse how the broadcasting organisations have responded to the international assistance provided for regional programme cooperation. As the TELESEE cooperation probably is among the first of its kind linking the state or public broadcasters to at least seven entities who have been at war with each other, we shall look at the reactions to this collaboration from the colleagues and managers within the organisations.

To analyse this, I developed a questionnaire targeting each of the key persons in the roughly ten participating broadcasters. The key persons were those who participated in the TELESEE network meetings on behalf of their broadcasters the most often. They were also those who usually discussed the topics and content for each individual or series of documentaries as well as had daily contact with the actual producers and access to the top management within their organisations. The key persons have been actively involved with TELESEE for one to four years and are either leading staff within the international departments or leading producers.

Out of the ten questionnaires distributed, five were returned fully answered. The candidates were promised anonymity; the questionnaires were distributed and collected by the BMC.

Asked about the reaction from their managers (TV-directors or director generals) to the TELESEE cooperation, they replied that:

- "They support it."
- "The management in my television are happy that we can have a lot of programs within TELESEE."
- "Positive… but I truly believe that THEY think that there are more important things to care for."
- "Affirmative."
- "Generally we have positive reaction of the cooperation with TELESEE."

Most of the feedback on their journalist colleagues appeared equally positive:

- "They are satisfied with the exchange of ideas with their colleagues."
- "The reaction of my colleagues is good."
- "Those who know about it, they are very positive and they take part whenever they are asked and can."
- "Variable: some support it, some fear 'returning to the old statehood' and therefore unacceptable, because renewing the ties between the former Yugoslav republics (and some other states) can only lead to this."
- "They support it."

Professional Relationship

Another interesting issue is whether the TELESEE cooperation actually contributes to better professional relationships or member television-to-member television relations in Southeast Europe:

- "ABSOLUTELY."
- "Yes it did. Now I know the address where to call if I want to make a story in Hungary, Serbia, Slovenia, etc. So I can call the TELESEE members in Croatia and ask them to help me with something like camera crew, translator, archive pictures etc."
- "Yes certainly."
- "Do not know."
- "Not really, because by far most of the programmes we broadcast, are produced by our own journalists."

Those who had been personally involved in the cooperation for the longest time were also those who valued it the highest. The

newcomers were still taking the 'wait and see' approach, so to speak.

Editorial restraints

Besides the countries of the former Yugoslavia, the TELESEE cooperation also includes Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania. The interviewees were asked about the editorial limits placed on the programmes they were taking part in, for example, they were allowed to be part of programmes about ordinary people's lives and problems in countries or regions which their country has been at war with:

- "There are not many cases to film or report about ordinary people from other countries of former Yugoslavia. So far, there were no special editorial limits."
- "We take part in all programs of interest in the region (Art joins people, Olympic spirit…)"
- "For example in my country it is difficult to make stories with Serbian people. If I want to make a story about Serbs my Serb journalist colleagues go and speak with the people for me. And I make the same things for Serbian journalists, so we exchange tapes."
- "There are only some limits, especially when it comes to corruption matters, where I believe we must be extremely careful, but generally there is freedom."
- "I think that we have overcome the problem of dealing with programmes that have to do with the countries we have been in conflict with, although it may represent 'the problem' in some heads. The actual and real problem rises when it comes to producing the professionally and

> editorially acceptable programmes. On our public TV-station's programme there is a significantly greater number of frictions from the previous period of a common state."

As to whether they were allowed to be involved in co-productions featuring common problems like trafficking, corruption, poverty or crime:

- "We are allowed – regarding 'editorial interference'. The countries arising from former Yugoslavia are new. I'm not sure that either the editors (not the journalists) or the government are really ready to disclose the problems."
- "Yes, we took part in these programmes (Trafficking), we will take part in the Anti-corruption program."
- "My country is a transit country for trafficking. I think we have to do something as a media to stop this. So, I am happy to be part of programmes which look at common problems in Balkans and Europe."
- "Certainly we are allowed. We took part in the programme (Coming back Refugees)."
- "We have already been an active part in producing such programmes (trafficking, crime) and are about to produce the series on corruption in the regions in SEE."
- "We are in most cases, but I don't think that there is any impact of those programmes to the viewers. I prefer lighter and more enjoyable topics."

Regarding programmes which look back on the wars in former Yugoslavia and whether they are allowed participate in the programmes, and to explain why and how it happened:

- "I think this is possible, but, no one, to my knowledge has shown the real interest in producing such a comprehensive programme; I have seen some similar trials on Serbian and Montenegrine TV stations (mostly commercial ones!)."
- "I'm sorry, but that's an issue that generally is of low interest in my country."
- "Personally – I haven't taken part in any similar project. But, talking in the name of my colleagues who have and according to my knowledge – there shouldn't be real problems."
- "Within the TELESEE production we didn't produce these programmes, we try to look into the future."
- "Even though it is painful for us I think we can collaborate in those programmes. We have 3000 missing people in my country and people, when they see a programme about the wars, will start thinking again about what has happened. But, the people want to know why it has happened. This is what we can tell them."

The answers indicate that in all the broadcasters represented in this survey, there have not been any significant problems in working together with the others – neither on topics about ordinary people, nor about common problems. The only hesitation – and only from one representative – was on corruption.

It is clear that the key persons from the former Yugoslavia who worked together in TELESEE feel that it is possible to produce programmes on the background of their internal wars. However, it could hardly have taken place before. This also marks the start of

requests for this kind of programming from participants in the focus group interviews.

Programme slots

The relative openness from all represented broadcasters would perhaps have been surprising if they were speaking about prime time programmes. However, this did not appear to be the case for most of the TELESEE programmes. Asked about the reception of the programmes, viewer ratings, television reviews and other reactions, the responses were:

- "Cannot say. The ratings of the programme *Feast*, which recently has been broadcast on the regional frequency showed the programme starting at 9PM, sharing the same rating as the rest of regional late afternoon programme, which talking nationally is low."

- "We are new members in TELESEE, so we don't have exact figures about the ratings of TELESEE programmes."

- "Generally they have a positive reaction, usual ratings are like other of our programmes."

- "Not so good received, I'm afraid. One of the reasons was the inappropriate time of broadcasting and the lack of advertising them to the Mass Media."

- "I am afraid there is no real rating system at our disposal; further, not too many of such programmes have been on our screen. The only, really announced and publicly assessed programme was *The Golden Dream of Mankind* on the remainings of the old socialist symbols. This programme had a fair rating of 11% and no critics

mentioned the fact of interregional cooperation in a negative sense."

A crucial factor for the success of such a regional collaboration is that the quality of the co-produced programmes satisfies everybody. This is not easy because of the very different quality levels within the members of TELESEE. As can be expected, this is reflected in the answers to the issue:

- "Most of them are of high quality standards."
- "Frankly, they are of less good quality, but not to the extent of making cooperation impossible, but we must work together to get the overall quality better."
- "Some of the programmes are of better quality, some are under our standards."
- "Depends but I think there has been an improvement in quality."
- "The programmes in TELESEE are on the same level of quality that we produce usually."

Personal motives

So what drives the key people behind the TELESEE network? There does not seem to be any reward system or particular internal prestige at the broadcasters to engage in regional collaboration. For those who have been involved for a long time, there seems to be enthusiasm about the improved relationship between participating colleagues, but are there other motives? Asked whether they would describe their role as journalists and producers in this cooperation as neutral, professional, solution- oriented, peace journalists or other possibilities, they replied:

- "Everything but neutral."

- "Professional."

- "Sometimes neutral, sometimes solution oriented. It depends on the case."

- "Neutral, professional and peace journalist/producer."

- "Professional (to improve cooperation between colleagues in the region)."

Interestingly, they all appear driven by ulterior motives, but produce programmes according to professional standards according to terms of impartiality, factuality, truth-seeking and balance in reflecting all sides. Concerned professionals might be an appropriate term to describe them.

Lederach's model *Actors and Approaches to Peace Building* seems to be applicable in this case. The entry point for the whole project was through the director generals or middle-range leadership, who initiated and blessed the cooperation, while those who actually contributed to prejudiced reaction and psycho-social work were the lower ranking staff. At the grassroots leader level, they were the ones accountable to the broader audience and who actively facilitated the cooperation.

5.3 The Support for Content by Professional Journalism, Norms and Standards

The issue of support to content in violent conflict raises important questions about the journalists' role before, during and after conflicts. While on one side, it would be ideal if journalists act as

mediators of peace-seeking to facilitate a sustainable peace this also poses questions to trustworthiness and role of the journalists in a later democracy. In other words, if a journalist in one situation pursues one goal as peace, however important it is, she might be seen to pursue other interests in the political life of a democracy. On the other side, the risk is rather, that journalists take side for one of the parties in a conflict and adds to the escalation. I believe that it is necessary to establish clear definitions for the role of journalists in relation to conflicts and that international support to media must avoid compromising these.

As we realised in Chapters 3 and 4, there are certain characteristics for different types of media, which give us an indication of the potential for each type to work with de-escalating journalism based on diversity, impartiality and editorial independence. Journalists are, as we shall see not isolated actors, who freely can choose how to perform their journalism but are pawns in a larger game. To help us understand this issue, we shall analyze cases from the USA and Kosovo, where journalists have indirectly supported violence or war as a means to solve issues of conflict.

Based on this comparison, we seek to identify possible roles for the journalists during phases of conflict prevention and peace-building. Attempts to link peace and journalism have been made since the 1960s. Among the theoreticians are Johan Galtung (1998), Kirsten Schwarz Sparre (1998), Wilhelm Kempf (2003) and others. They have, however been marginalized to some degree because they were seen as violating the unrestricted media freedom or as being politically biased, almost as with the concept of Agitprop. (Downing, 2002, p. 68).

The first case we shall study is the media coverage of the Iraq war in 2003 and how particularly the mainstream American media reported on it. In this case, there was no direct governmental control of the media content, but the conduct of the media was a mixture of commercial market considerations, as well as journalists' and editors' personal identities.

The USA decided to go to war without a majority in the UNSC and just a few months before the time, which the UN's weapon inspectors needed to conclude, whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. The main reasons for going to war were later proven to be groundless, as neither weapons of mass destruction nor signs of operational collaboration with international terrorism were found. Consequently, the declared war against Iraq was already from the beginning a disputed decision both internationally and internally in the USA.

The reporting from the war in Iraq shows a troublesome bias among established media in the well developed democracies. In a survey carried out for the American National Media Watch Group Fair by Rendall, Steve and Broughel, Tara (Rendall et al., 2003) of six television networks and news channels during the first three weeks of the Iraq War, they found that 64% of all sources were pro-war. 10% were anti-war voices, but only 3% of all American sources were anti-war. Among the British news sources used by the American media, 95% were government or military officials and 5% were journalists. Though more than 25% of the Americans opposed the war, only around 3% of the sources expressed opposition to the war and only in one-sentence sound bites from the streets. Not a

single show conducted a sit-down interview with a person identified as being against the war. The six networks included NBC, CNN, ABC, PBS (American equivalent to Public Service Broadcasting), FOX and CBS, with CBS being remarkably low with less than half a percentage point of its American sources opposed to the war.

The then-Director General of the BBC, Greg Dyke, said that when he was in the US watching broadcast news during the war, "If Iraq proved anything, it was that the BBC cannot afford to mix patriotism and journalism. This is happening in the United States and if it continues will undermine the credibility of the American electronic news media." (Martin 2003, May 2) Ted Turner, the main shareholder of AOL Time Warner, explains that in America "There's really five companies that control 90% of what we read, see and hear. It's not healthy". (Martin 2003, May 2)

Fox TV, which after 9/11, before and during the Iraq war was known for its "opinionated news with an America-first flair " (Rutenberg 2003, April 16) giving the American flag prominence in the studio, talking about 'our troops' as 'liberators' against the enemy. When the first statue of Saddam Hussein fell in Baghdad, an anchor delivered a message to those "who opposed the liberation of Iraq": "You were sickening then, you are sickening now." Fox TV News has since September 11th, 2001, gained a position as the premier network in the American market seemingly because of a strong use of patriotic symbols and a Pro-American journalism (Rutenberg, 2003, April 16).

What is interesting is that the American case and particularly Fox News shows that journalists in well established democracies take side and seem to break their own professional codes of conduct.

The Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct for the international *Radio-Television News Directors Association* mentions as several other codes of ethics the common values of Truth, Fairness, Integrity, Independence, and Accountability. The code stresses that the journalists' first obligation is to the public and that they should

- Understand that any commitment other than service to the public undermines trust and credibility.
- Recognize that service in the public interest creates an obligation to reflect the diversity of the community and guard against oversimplification of issues or events.
- Provide a full range of information to enable the public to make enlightened decisions.
- Fight to ensure that the public's business is conducted in public.

(International Journalists Network, 2005)

No matter how one looks at the American television news coverage during the first three weeks of the Iraq war, several principles in numerous journalistic codes of ethics were broken. One could simplify that by saying many journalists and editors were patriots first and professional journalists second. Mia Doornaert, in her capacity as President of UNESCO's Advisory Group on Press Freedom, made it very clear that:

> Nothing is more difficult for them (journalists – ed.) than to report on a conflict involving their own country, nation or group. National or cultural identification may often be a largely unconscious drive, it is nonetheless a powerful one …they themselves are so much a part of one of the sides (Doornaert, 2000).

Obviously there are good reasons to believe but no certainty that market considerations have been behind the decisions of the management to change the style and priorities of the Fox News Channel after 9/11. It proved successful in market terms and other channels were tempted to follow. The president of CBS News put it this way:

> I certainly think that all news people are watching the success of Fox … there is a long-standing tradition in the mainstream press of middle-of-the-road journalism that is objective and fair. I would hate to see that fall victim to a panic about the Fox effect (Rutenberg, interview, 16th April 2003).

The American journalist and adjunct professor at Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, Tom Lansner, is clearly against governmental dictates, but also warns against increasing commercialism:

> For-profit media worldwide largely operate on the lowest-common denominator principle, seeking broad commercial appeal to maximize profit. The trend towards sensationalism and exploitive coverage is clear. It is essential to acknowledge that the marketplace's demands may in effect be no less insidious than a government's dictates. Bottom-line considerations, especially in an era of rapid concentration of media ownership, can reduce the pluralism that is a key to an open media by making content no more than a servant to ratings" (Lansner, 2003, p. 12).

The indication of market considerations weighing higher than professional codes of conduct underlines, what I stated in Chapter 4, that it is very uncertain, whether commercial media have a de-escalating role in violent conflicts. It also illustrates that commercial media's market considerations seem to predispose the roles of journalists[15].

Feshbach and Kosterman are, by Daniel Druckman (1994, p. 46) credited for their research on group loyalties and their distinction between *patriotism* and *nationalism. Patriotism* is having positive and emotional feelings about one's country, while *nationalism* involves "feelings of national superiority and a need for national power and dominance." While Feshbach suggests that patriotism or nationalism are deeply rooted in personalities, Duckitt (Druckman 1994, p. 47) indicates in his research that people with secure group identities tend to be patriots, while those with insecure group identities tend to be ethnocentric patriots or nationalists. Druckman

---

[15] A similar analysis was carried out in Denmark, a coalition partner. The two main television stations, both public service broadcasters two of five larger national newspapers and one niche newspaper a la *Le Monde* were analysed. The conclusions show that before the war there was a balanced representation of opposition and support for the war in Iraq, among the politicians and citizens. However, during the war Danish military experts together with American and British experts exceeded the number of Iraqi military sources by far. The same was the case for politicians, who were the most frequently used sources.

While it was commonly acknowledged, that the available sources on the situation in Iraq might be biased and reports about propaganda versus information were produced, in the general reporting there was a tendency to neglect mention of this problem. As in the US, there was an unbalanced use of sources in the reporting on the Iraq war. Another Danish study (Gullev & Hansen 2005) shows that in the four days preceding the Iraq war, the main Danish public service television news programme had an overbalance among political and military leaders with 56% in favour of the war and 23% against. In the equivalent Swedish programme, the balance was exactly 39% to 39%. In both countries, the leading public service broadcasters tended towards the attitude of their respective governments. However, only the newspapers could explicitly be seen to take sides – in their editorials, in their editing of readers' letters and in their presentation of front page news – while this by definition could not and was not the case for the public service broadcasters (Hjarvard 2004, p. 100-111).

suggests that nationalism might be just a more complex form of patriotism. Consequently, the patriotism is commitment – readiness to sacrifice for the nation, while nationalism is the commitment to sacrifice plus exclusion and hostility to others.

Whichever way we choose to look at it, some of the American mainstream journalists seemed indeed to walk the line as patriots, stressing the good case of America and stereotyping the Iraq leadership and its armed forces.

What we can learn from the American reporting on the war in Iraq is that even in well established democracies, the bare situation of one's country being involved in a war tends to, at least in the initial phases, make journalists and editors neglect their professional principles for their national identity.

Another example of journalistic behaviour in crisis and conflict situations is the Kosovo-Albanian reporting on the so-called March events.

In March 2004, three Kosovo Albanian boys drowned in the Kosovo River Iber. The main province-wide television broadcasters, the privately owned RTV 21, KTV and the public service broadcaster RTK described the death of the three boys as a result of their fleeing from two Serbs chasing them with a dog. During the riots which broke out in the subsequent days, nineteen people died, hundreds were injured and several hundred Serbian homes and those of other minorities were burned or looted (Gillette, 2004, p. 2). Peaceful demonstrations against the international rule in Kosovo had already taken place for some days. In reports from the OSCE and the

Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) in Kosovo respectively, the role of the media was described as follows:

> Without the reckless and sensationalist reporting on 16 and 17 March, events could have taken different turn. They might not have reached the intensity and level of brutality that was witnessed or even might not have taken place at all (Gashi, 2004, p. 3).

While the TMC mentions that other means like mobile phones and other media reports might also have fuelled the violence, he adds that

> The factual accuracy, tone and context of reports touching on any aspect of ethnicity are particularly crucial to prevent broadcasts from becoming immediate catalysts for violence" (Gillette, 2004, p. 4).

Both reports stress that the RTK, as the public service broadcaster, was most prominent in its failure to live up to professional standards. It was the first to give a tragic event an ethnic dimension, first to cancel all normal programming and to a sort of emergency programme, and still a degree more patriotic than the others. However, all three province-wide broadcasters based their stories primarily on one source, misinterpreted the source, ignored or misrepresented statements from the authorities and police and first of all presented it as a fact that the Kosovo Albanian boys were drowned because they were chased by ethnic Serbs with a dog.

In a situation where the conflict between the Albanian majority and the Serb minority escalates, the perceptual process involving the two sides is very interesting. One element is what Kelman (1997, p. 223) and earlier Bronfenbrenner (1961, p. 45-56) and White (1965) call the *Formation of Mirrored Images*. In general terms, one group or nation sees itself as peaceful, well-intentioned and defending itself against the enemy, which is aggressive, evil and only responsive to the language of force. The images of the others are mirrored in one's own self perception, so to speak. While the Albanians see the Serbs as evil bastards chasing Albanian boys in one of the few Serbian majority areas, the Serbs see themselves for a tragic drowning event. While the Kosovo media took the side of the Kosovo Albanians, the media in Serbia rallied to the Serbian side and as usual distributed it to the Serb local media in Kosovo. The images of the others were enforced through two separate media systems, aimed at each ethnic group and their respective languages.

Interestingly, none of the reports find any indication that the bias of RTK and the other broadcasters was a result of political interference from the Kosovo Albanian government. It was a tense atmosphere which might have tempted journalists and editors to take sides. None of the reports, however, have analysed the internal organisational processed in detail. The criticism of the TMC concludes that:

> RTK management has displayed a disturbing unwillingness or inability to understand that editorial independence from state control – which no one challenges – is associated with certain responsibilities, especially in conflict situations.

> These responsibilities include minimizing the inflammatory
> emotional content of broadcasting. Management's
> resistance to this ethical principle is especially surprising as
> it is clearly set out in RTK's own code of conduct (Gillette,
> 2004, p. 19).

We shall in chapter 6 discuss the code of conduct developed by the international authorities governing Kosovo. However, Kosovo illustrates that journalists in the post conflict phase still are tempted to take sides and consequently contribute to conflict escalating journalism. The American example shows that this is also the case in conflict situations touching well-established democracies.

5.3.1 The Journalists' Role

The cases we have looked at lead us to discuss two key terms of particular relevance for media in areas of violent conflict. One is the discussion of journalism. We have seen that journalists in mainstream media of both weak democracies and in democracies with a strong tradition of free and independent media, breach most professional codes of conduct in favour of their own group or nation in a conflict. In these cases, most professional journalists actively support their own side - not only through their reports, but also by mixing personal attitudes with factual reporting. The professional codes of conduct generally stress the impartiality, factual reporting and truthfulness of professional journalism. These demands do not imply that reporting does not reflect personal choices – first in selecting the stories, and secondly in framing them through choice of interview persons, point-of-view and premises for the story.

Individual journalists and editors make these choices, and often do it in line with the editorial policy of their given media.

However, where it becomes problematic is if all stories and reports from a given broadcaster or print publication were to reflect identical choices and only one part of reality, the same interviewees, points-of-view or premises are produced. Most media avoid this by claiming a balance of views, implicit attitudes and stories over time.

To ensure diversity and impartiality is important for journalists in a democratic political landscape, but as we saw it in chapter four even more necessary as a mean of de-escalation reporting in times of violent conflict. It is a challenging task for journalists to work professionally before, during and after a violent conflict or war. As a part of a social or ethnic group, they face severe pressure from their fellow citizens and the political leadership. This makes it difficult to maintain just a neutral, professional and balanced role while a crisis in one's own country escalates. This was clearly the case in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, as illustrated in Chapter 3, and it is as we have seen in this chapter also the case in the USA and Kosovo. Conversely, the international community often wants the journalists to stay neutral and take responsibility for working to prevent or solve the conflict.

We shall discuss in the following the very normative choices, which the media, journalists and international actors have to make during a crisis or conflict. To what degree is it possible to practice journalism without encouraging a discourse of conflict and maybe even develop a discourse of peace, which does not violate professional standards nor is obstructed by the local authorities?

In a thorough analysis of the development of the UK's print and broadcast media, Kirsten Schwarz Sparre (1998) shows how the journalistic understanding of impartiality as a key characteristic of the journalist's role has emerged over time as a result of economic, social and political developments.

In her study on journalists as peacemakers, Sparre seeks not to violate the values of professional mainstream journalism. She rejects the identification of peace-making roles for journalists by looking for the effects of their programmes on public opinion, hereby opposing John D. Downing's (2001, p. 69) belief in the Agitprop model. Instead, Sparre chooses to see communication as a collaborative-constructive process, as a tool to build a shared understanding. She suggests a number of

> peacemaking functions which will allow journalists to stay neutral on parties and outcomes of conflicts, appreciated that peacemaking will always be subordinate to the main task of news production, and understands that journalists can make contributions to peacemaking processes in society but are not solely responsible for bringing about peace (Sparre, 1998, p. 323).

It seems logical, but is problematic that journalists should deliberately contribute to peace-making, or that they would deliberately support one political party or person because the election of one of the political opponents is seen as a way to secure media freedom and democracy. In both cases, the journalists choose not to present the events or facts for the judgement of the audience, but instead interpret the stories into a given framework, which is obviously more constructive than incitement to violence or support to totalitarian rulers.

The British journalists Annabel McGoldrick and Jake Lynch question the belief that journalists "just report the facts", the problem being that many people and governments know how to create and tailor facts for journalists to report. They argue that

> All journalism is an intervention between the story originator – in this case the government – and the audience – the public. And journalists make choices about the ethics of each intervention (2001).

Their suggestion is to make use of Peace Journalism in conflict areas, in which the basic question to ask before crafting any story would be, "What can I do with my intervention to enhance the prospects for peace?"

The arguments put forward, firstly that journalism affects the events and secondly, and that an industry of spin doctors provides the selection of facts which tend to bias the journalism in favour of the government or the best spins, are perfectly tenable.

However, in a crisis situation, the accountability of all media is questioned by their audiences and a personal choice to draft stories for the enhancement of the prospects for peace is questionable, and for good reason. In a later development towards democracy, the principles of independent media and journalism are much easier to defend if these principles have also been maintained in times of crises and conflicts.

Howard Ross (2003), Research Coordinator for IMPAC's Media and Peace-building Framework, has written a handbook on *Conflict Sensitive Journalism* following a conference for reporters and editors, co-organised with International Media Support (IMC). His

point is that reliable reporting during violent conflicts requires journalists to understand more about causes, development and ends of conflicts. By providing this information, journalism makes the public far better informed about the conflict beneath the violence, and can assist in resolving it. In the IMPACS/IMS handbook, Howard Ross gives the following definition:

> A conflict sensitive journalist applies conflict analysis and searches for new voices and new ideas about the conflict. He or she reports on who is trying to resolve the conflict, looks closely at all sides, and reports on how other conflicts were resolved. A conflict sensitive journalist takes no sides, but is engaged in the search for solutions (2003, p. 15).

Practicing conflict sensitive or de-escalating journalism might be accepted within media organisations and society in a distant pre-conflict phase, but hardly in non-democratic countries during the immediate pre-conflict and conflict phases. In a post-conflict scenario, international assistance given to media practicing de-escalating news journalism might very well be accepted. It all depends on the concrete conflict situation, political context as well as the actual possibilities within the individual media.

The Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung takes quite a different starting-point in his attempt to define peace journalism. Galtung distinguishes between *war journalism* and *peace journalism*. In war journalism, the conflicting parties are viewed as combatants struggling to impose their goals. The reporting model is that of a military command: who advances, who capitulates short of their goals and what are their losses. For him, war journalism is seen as having sports and court journalism as models.

> Peace journalism stands for truth as opposed to propaganda and lies. It is not 'investigative journalism' in the sense of only uncovering lies on 'our' side. The truth aspect in peace journalism holds for all sides, just like exploration of the conflict formation and giving voice (*glasnost*) to all. Peace journalism is a 'journalism of attachment' to all actual and potential victims; war journalism only attaches to 'our' side.

> Peace journalism tries to depolarize by showing the black and white of all sides, and to de-escalate by highlighting peace and conflict resolution as much as violence (Galtung, 1998, Ch. 5).

Galtung stresses the professional standards of impartiality and truth, an approach that is very similar to Sparre's, in which news journalists should remain impartial and not promote specific outcomes of the conflict.

The key question is whether peace journalism as defined by Johan Galtung in practise is anything but journalism according to professional standards. I do not think that they as defined above are different. Peace journalism seeks the truth; it is impartial between the two conflicting sides, balances between stories on conflict resolution as well as violence and looks to the formation of conflict and to the potential victims from both sides. That is pure, professional journalism. Only one can question whether journalists should be attached – whether the attachment is to all actual and potential victims or only to 'our' side.

However, support to this kind of journalism will still prove difficult to implement in the immediate pre-conflict, during conflict and even

post-conflict phases as an option cultivated and promoted through international support. Substantial assistance, including professional training for journalists and editors, has been given to both private and public media in Kosovo since 1999. Yet, like the failure during the first three weeks of the Iraq war by professional American journalists from a long tradition of independent media, also the Kosovo journalists and media more or less failed in March 2004.

Kirsten Schwartz Sparre, however, points to another aspect – namely the norm of social responsibility, which was laid down on the British media in the aftermath of the Second World War.

> To keep citizens sufficiently informed about events to be able to carry out their civil duties through the provision of full and up-to-date information with explanation and comment, accuracy and the clear separation of fact from comment (Sparre, 1998, p. 54).

While impartiality has for decades bestowed legitimacy on to journalistic enterprises and prevented government intervention in news production, Sparre believes that a real possibility for change in the way impartiality is understood lies in the social contract between the media and society. While acknowledging that journalists have an impact on conflict processes, they could and should make certain that their impact is positive while keeping the spirit of the social responsibility theory.

Consequently, a move away from war discourse must include professional standards of impartiality, truth, fairness and independence from vested interests. Through an enhanced diversity in reporting and a balanced approach, it will be of a de-escalating nature.

In a pre-conflict situation, these professional standards might be very difficult to uphold under political pressure. Nevertheless, it is the only standard, which can arguably be used and monitored by external and internal actors. While this in my mind should be and realistically is the only measurement for journalism, which can be used before, during and after conflict, there are additional measures, which through support to content can be used starting from the operational peacemaking and peacekeeping to the process leading towards peace building and conflict transformation.

5.4 Towards an Integrated Model for Post-Conflict Support to Content

To develop a model for support to content across a post conflict situation, it is necessary to consider socio-psychological, conflict resolution and communication theories, like the nature of media and professional ethics are crucial for successful interventions.

Already in the previous chapter, I have integrated the social-psychological and conflict resolution theories into the aims and goals for a continuum of phases before, during and after violent conflicts. I have further discussed the nature of media and identified editorial independence, diversity and impartiality as important characteristics for de-escalating media content. In this chapter, I have further discussed the ethics of journalists and concluded that when journalists conduct impartial and diverse reporting, based on truth,

fairness and independence, there are the best chances for contributing to de-escalation.

When moving towards an integrated model for post conflict support to content related to a timeline of phases, there are four elements that I have chosen to focus on:

- What is the overall aim of the intervention related to conflict?
- What is the focus of the content?
- Which programme genres are suitable in the various phases?
- What media are relevant to use?

As I in the next chapter will look closer on support to existing and new media structures, legislation, institution and capacity building, I do not distinguish in the table below between the different types of media as analysed in Chapter 4. Instead, I only work with categories of mainstream, niche, local or community media, and the existing media in each conflict has to be analysed separately.

In the focus group based reception research, it was necessary to include our understanding of the individual's mindset as we have learned it from psychosocial theories. It was further necessary to take a realistic approach to the phenomenon of distributing messages related to the potential impact of media as setting the agenda for interpersonal discussions and the whole process of appropriating messages.

Possible intervent-ions/ Period	Distant Pre-Conflict	Pre-Conflict	Immediate Pre-Conflict	During Conflict	Immediate Post-Conflict	Post-Conflict Peace-building	Transform-ation of Conflict Society
Aim	Removal of root causes of the conflict.	Mediation between adversaries and solution of conflict issues.	High level negotiations, monitoring, protection of diverse identity groups	High level negotiations, humanitarian assistance	Humanitarian assistance, re-establishment of relationship and state structures	Reconciliation, social change, civil networking between adversaries	Involve society in the development of joint values, visions and systems.
Focus of Content	Debating existing systemic weaknesses and visions for the future	Debating conflicting issues of concern to the adversaries and allowing access for all identity groups	Strengthening relationship between identity groups, discuss solutions to issues of conflict, and reduce stereotyping in media	Providing neutral humanitarian information and news about political and international development	Providing neutral humanitarian information and news about post-conflict and discuss solutions to the triggers of conflict	Re-establishing relationship through dealing with human life of enemies, providing common platforms for interaction, communication and cultures	Analyzing and debating economic, social, structural and political inadequacies, search for solutions and common visions for future society.
Genres	News, Documentaries, Debates, Investigative journalism,	News, Current Affairs, Debates with phone-ins Documentaries	News, Current Affairs,	News, Public Service Announcements	News, Current Affairs Public Service Announcements	News, Current Affairs, Documentaries, Public Debates, Fiction, Sports,	News, Current Affairs, Documentaries, Public and Political Debates
Media	Existing main stream, New local, Net media.	Existing main stream, Community, Net media	Existing main stream, Community media	Existing niche, Main stream UN, International media	Existing main stream, UN, New local media	Existing main stream, Niche, Local, Community media	Existing main stream, Niche, Local and Community media

Table 11: Integrated model for scope and timing of support to content as part of conflict prevention and peace building

As the focus group interviews as well as the questionnaire-based analysis of both the participants' media consumption and the producers' answers highlight, documentaries are only one of many genres. As they often are broadcast outside the prime time slots, it is worth considering if other genres could also play into the hands of peace building or reconciliation specialists.

News programmes are certainly among the most popular programmes. As we have already discussed news and journalism, I shall not go into details. Support should be given to strengthen professionalism, including the will to look at every conflict from all sides and cautiously reflect the victims' as well as the positive steps taken towards solution of the conflict. Besides support to capacity-building, it might also be necessary to compensate for the lack of feasible infrastructure to allow reporting from all sides of a conflict and all parts of a country or community. There is an obvious need to establish tests for different models of support to news programmes in the cycles of conflicts.

As the news programmes are also the politically most controversial, we shall discuss what instruments might be available to protect balanced reporting even in the difficult phases of immediate pre-conflict and conflict, in Chapter 6.

While I have chosen to deal with journalism, also fiction has several strengths in a peace building process. It promotes identification with the audience. The dramaturgic story-telling appeals through its curve of excitement, while the use of actors as helpers, resistance, etc., all lead to or at least allow a solution to the main character's

problems. It is possible to reflect several different difficulties and several different persons with each their identification for the audience. Fiction allows complexity, but makes it easy to comprehend. Furthermore, the fact that it is fiction makes it difficult for the leadership or individuals to feel attacked, making it less likely that the drama will be censored.

From the perspective of re-establishing relationships, reducing stereotypes or removing prejudices, fiction allows for humour, irony or satire to touch the untouchable issues. Often fiction will base its story on very concrete issues of a personal character, but would ideally point to both the sub-system and system levels.

The Danish researcher in international Health Communication, Thomas Tufte, analysed the use of Telenovas in Brasil (Tufte, Thomas, *Living with the Rubbish Queeen – Telenovas, Culture and Modernity in Brasil*, p. 227-31, 2000, University of Luton Press, UK) and concludes that even commercially exploited fiction "constitutes a space for different social groups to be recognized and to feel recognized, thereby contributing to the articulation of a citizen identity among subordinate groups in society."(p.228)

Tufte also argues that

> …with the increased participation of the media in the public sphere, the television flow becomes an important agent in articulating citizenship, and television fiction is able to address a broad variety of issues – often better and more frequently than news programmes – in a form that is relevant and recognizable by its public.(p.229)

Amongst some of the successful projects, are the radio drama projects *Our Neighbours, Ourselves* from Studio Ljambo in Burundi (Rolt, 2001, p. 158) and BBC's *New Home New Life* in Afghanistan (Hieber, 2001, p. 159). Another attempt is *Nashe Maalo*, a television drama produced by Search for Common Ground in Macedonia (Hieber, 2001, p. 160).

In mainstream television, sport might be a way to change the enemy's image from being deeply rooted hostility to more equal sportsmanship-based relationships. However, one should be aware that sport could also trigger strong community or national identities. It is not in itself a safe relationship builder.

In Chapter 7, we will discuss the UN's mandates to promote dialogue between conflicting parties and the option of making use of the media in this respect.

Dialogue and debate in mainstream media is not always an easy task. As a member of the focus groups put it:

> In TV-shows, more problems get created than solved. For instance, I have never seen that after a vigorous discussion that there ever comes a solution or alignment of attitudes of those who participated in the discussion.
> (Nada Pani, housewife, Belgrade)

There is, however a wide range of possibilities to frame such political discussions in a fair and balanced way, whilst also seeking solutions or at least to illustrate what and who blocks the solutions. A way to

ensure that the conflicting leaders are accountable to their populations is by involving them as studio audiences or through phone-ins. Under many circumstances, the bare exchange of different views can be an eye opener to the grassroots marching behind their leaders in conflicts.

In much localised internal conflicts community media might prove an alternative. Clemencia Rodriguez distinguishes between the "epidemiology" approach to human change, and the "social fabric". The "epidemiology" approach refers to a controllable, individual process, in which an individual changes behaviour in the direction you want because of a message you have "injected" changes behaviour in the direction you want. In the "social fabric" approach Rodriguez uses a Colombian example, where community radio leaders declared their stations as "territories for peace", using them as cultural, social and political spaces for peace building.

Rodriguez explains that

> Instead of addressing audiences as individuals, the "social fabric" approach addresses individuals as members of a collective; and instead of persuading audiences to believe or behave in a certain way, these projects attempt to introduce into the public sphere alternative ways of being and relating to each other. (The Drum Beat 278 – Communication for Peace: Contrasting Approaches, page 3, 2005)

Rodriguez acknowledges that this approach have to emerge from the ground up, are difficult to replicate, not evaluated in a credible

way and are built on elusive notions of social reality and communication for change. This approach is, however, in my view worth evaluating closer as an instrument for peace building in local societies marked by communal conflicts.

6. Media Landscape, Legislation and Institution-Building

The post-conflict situation is crucial for the development of a sustainable peace without recurring conflicts. The pre-conflict phase, as analysed in Chapter 3, is a situation in which the political pressure on the media and citizens becomes increasingly apparent and strong the closer one gets to the outbreak of violence. In that situation, international efforts are forced to focus on the short-term revitalisation of a positive relationship between the adversaries or on practical solutions to the conflicts of interests, instead of the long term perspective. We learned in Chapter 3, how the liberalisation of media legislation in the immediate pre-conflict phase of the conflicts in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia never was implemented before the outbreak of respectively genocide and war in the two countries. Only if the escalation towards open conflict has slowed down and turned towards a de-escalating process would it be possible to think of medium and long-term support to the media.

In Chapter 5 we analysed support to content, but did it with focus on the post-conflict situation. This chapter continues focusing on the post-conflict situation but analyses the international efforts to develop media structure, legislation and institutional practises, which can facilitate a societal process towards peace and the systemic transformation of the conflict.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the distant pre-conflict phase by and large demands the same kind of long term interventions as the post-conflict phases. The main difference is however, that the conditions for facilitating the desired changes in the media

structure are often much better following a conflict than they are in the midst of a period with a consolidated leadership, even when the root causes of future conflicts are present and strong. While claiming that the same type of interventions is relevant for distant pre-conflict and post-conflict phases, one can equally argue that post-conflict interventions in reality are adding to the prevention of recurring conflicts as prioritised by the UNSG Kofi Annan (2001).

In Chapter 4, we identified the relevant fields for media interventions:

- Media structure
- Media legislation
- Ethical standards
- Journalists' capacity
- Media content

We have in Chapter 5 dealt with international support to content and the ethical standards of journalism. Capacity building of journalists, whether through their basic education or through thematic mid-career training is an important supportive mean to all other interventions and support for media. However, I shall not further analyse the possible approaches and methods for capacity building but leave this area for others to develop.

In this chapter, I deal with issues of a long term character – namely the development of the media landscape with its equivalent media legislation and institution-building. By media landscape, I mean the actual mass media, its production and distribution structure. The media structure is dynamic, developing under the influence from market forces, dominance of certain technologies for

a period of time, social and economic changes in society, and various political and policy goals (McQuail, 2000, p. 204).

The primary goal for my analysis of this field is to discover ways of developing them as efficient tools in building peaceful societies, but it is also apparent that support to development of media landscapes occurs under the influence of several national and international interests.

In the first section, I shall analyse the external interests and motives behind the support for the development of media landscapes - whether they take place in collaboration with local governments, are the result of peace treaties, occupation or UN mandates.

In the second section, we shall categorise the types of post-conflict situations and relate them to the development of a media landscape, as it can best be seen to serve the goal of sustained peace from an anthropological point of view. Post-conflict circumstances are different whether we deal with regional, centralised, communal or revolutionary conflicts, and whether they take place in a weak or non-existent state, after the change of power or in a revolutionary situation. As was the case for conflict escalation, the structural causes behind the conflict are still present post-conflict and have to be considered when designing international interventions. Among these structural causes are the ethnic patterns, relations between minorities and majorities, as well as differences in access to resources.

Based on cases of international experience from past post-conflict interventions and the choice of media landscape strategies, the

third section will discuss and develop feasible methods and models for enhancing media legislation, and institution-building. As in the previous chapters, the integration with the timeline of phases will be an important aspect – linking emergency interventions with a long-term media development strategy. Linking intergovernmental levels of cooperation with civil society will be another. Discussions of sustainability, accountability and independence of the media as covered in Chapters 4 and 5 will be developed to suggest practical models for implementation in this section.

6.1   International Standards for Media Landscapes

When analysing media landscapes it is possible to do it from an economic/industrial, a political-economic, a media professional or a public interest perspective (McQuail, 2000, p.191). As in the previous chapters, I choose to look at media structures from the latter perspective focusing on their potentials to facilitate a societal process towards peace and the systemic transformation of the conflict.

Previous and existing international support for the development of media landscapes in post-conflict countries or countries in transition to democracy is not in itself clear-cut, objective or altruistic. There are no set international standards for media landscapes, strengthening peace or democracy. However, it might be possible to outline strategies for a media landscape, which from a purely localised point of view are better suited to build peace in a concrete country than other strategies. International donors might not necessarily accept these strategies, and they might not fall into the interests of existing local governments either.

Monroe E. Price offers a useful theoretical framework to analyse public interest strategies for development of media structures – the *market for loyalties*. Price identifies the market for loyalties, as a market "in which large-scale competitors for power, in a shuffle for allegiances, use the regulation of communications to organize a cartel of imagery and identity among themselves. Government is usually the mechanism that allows the cartel to operate and is often part of the cartel itself" (Price, 2002, p. 1-2). However, "External identities (corporations, states, and diasporic groups) also participate in the market for loyalties when they advocate the use of technology or international norms to force a state to enlarge the membership of a local cartel" (p.3).

In other words, besides establishing community or national identities the international donors often seek to strengthen a common identity between the society in conflict and their own interests.

In his fascinating analysis of the motives behind international support for the development of media landscapes in transitional countries and vague democracies. Monroe E. Price (2002) argues that

> During the Cold War the West used human rights doctrine to justify international broadcasting that violated state borders by saying that these transmissions were fulfilling the right of individuals to receive information. In a changed world, where stability is increasingly important, attitudes toward the privileging of shortwave or

> clandestine radios, and condemning jamming may change
> (p. 238).

"International broadcasting", defined as state-sponsored news directed to a population outside the sponsoring state's boundaries, has changed its role since the end of the Cold War and 9/11. Since the 1960s, radios like Voice of America (VOA), and the surrogate radios Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberation (RL) which according to Price, were virtually funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), were used as tools intended to overthrow communism (Price, 2002, p. 202). By broadcasting otherwise unavailable news and information about ongoing events in the East, the radios were seen as important instruments for change by their political supporters. However, formally the VOA had, like other international radios, a commitment to serve as "a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive." In its charter it had an obligation to "present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will also present responsible discussions and opinion on these policies" (p. 220). Attempts by the Soviet bloc to jam international radios from reaching populations inside its borders were by USA and Western Europe seen as violation of both specific radio conventions and the rights of free expression, while the state sovereignty by the USSR was precluding these transmissions.

A number of international broadcasters including the VOA, BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio France International and several others were, after the end of the Cold War, losing much of the rationale behind governmental financing. Several cuts in resources took place, the radios tended to focus on provision of information to

populations deprived from such by totalitarian governments and "to compensating for the limitations of domestic media and setting a standard by which emerging free media could judge themselves" (Price, 2002, p. 206). Several of the international broadcasters became instrumental to the processes of change in transitional countries.

Following the events of 11th September 2001, US politicians and the State Department began questioning the classic commitment to international broadcasting out of a sense of necessity that propaganda goals were vital to national security (Price, 2002, p. 219). During the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the state department put editorial pressure on the VOA and breached the independence between the US government and the VOA. For example, due to the lack of other transmitters apart from short wave ones, the VOA accepted the offer to broadcast from a US Defence Department aircraft, circling over Afghanistan. Later, the post-Taliban government agreed, while I worked in Afghanistan (2002) to let the VOA install a US paid medium wave transmitter for Radio Afghanistan as a substitute for the Russian transmitter, which the bombings during the war against the Taliban regime had destroyed. In return, however, the Afghan government had to accept that the VOA had procured its own medium wave transmitter for terrestrial broadcasting within the country. In addition, the BBC World Service established its own FM transmitters in Afghanistan while having its BBC World Service Trust assist the Afghan public broadcaster, in a parallel effort. In his book *Voice of America*, Alan L. Heil, Jr. complains that the greatest threat to the VOA was the administration's interference and reduction of budgets as well as the establishment of a number of new "US voices" around the World (Fachot, 2004).

As discussed in Chapter 4 based in McQuail's historical perspective, Price finds that there is a current transformation of rights language in the zone of media:

> Since the 1990s the assertion of speech rights has been tightly linked to the rising influence of private media corporations. Companies seeking to minimize government regulation of media enterprises, marshalled speech rights most effectively (2002, p. 237).

Arguing for free and equal speech rights, the commercial media industry in the US managed to restrain public service television channels from cable networks through 'must carry' obligations, resulting in the limited power of the legislature to force an access right in newspapers, broadcast satellites or other media. In the USA, Monroe finds that human rights principles are used to clear a global space for commercial media.

In Europe, human rights principles successfully advanced to force states to alter the way in which they licensed radio frequencies to the private sector. Free speech norms have become effective rallying points for urging change in societies that assert the most control over their speech environments. As a result, to some extent, freedom from constraint for the media means enhancement of the right of people to receive and impart information. That is not always the case. Regulations may also increase the zone of speech, enlarge the flow of information to citizens and enhance their right to communication (2002, p. 237).

The discussion, whether the freedom of speech focuses on the freedom to establish and run media, or on personal expression and

access to information is a discussion, which has been waged by media assistance programmers who operate in transition or conflict over the last decade. Very simply, it is a discussion about whether media freedom should be seen from an economic or cultural perspective. It is also an issue about in which cartel on the market for loyalties that the international donors want to include the target country.

From several donor and stability pact meetings between 2000 and 2002 which discussed and attempted to coordinate the support for media development in post-conflict Southeast Europe, I observed an almost devastating divide between the American and European strategies[16].

The experience from Bosnia since 1995 had undoubtedly left deep wounds in the cooperation between the Americans and Europeans. Mark Thompson and the American director of media development in the Office of the High Representative, Dan de Luce, conclude that:

The two principal donors, the USA and EU, and numerous smaller donors, have failed to co-ordinate their efforts, sometimes funding competing stations and publications. Further, the USA has a tendency to fund 'commercial' broadcasters in opposition to the EU's preference for supporting public service systems, a difference

---

[16] That gap between representatives for governments and larger media NGOs was primarily on the role of private or public media. The European representatives generally supported a two-track media landscape, with both the development of public service media and of private media independent from the state, while the American representatives were against support to the public media and focused on private commercial and non-profit media. The different priorities resulted in several clashes between the international partners – both in the legislative and institution-building activities for Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as in the other newly independent countries of the region, where the international support had to be carried out in accordance with the local governments.

that could have negative effects for the development of PBS (Price and Thompson, 2002, p. 226).

Behind the American resistance to supporting public media was partly the fact that the state media in the Yugoslav republics were largely responsible for inciting to conflicts, as we saw in Chapter 3. There was partly a strong belief that the American media system as worth implementing in other countries, and partly – I believe - a deep-seated trust in commercial media as having the biggest long-term potential for collaboration with the American media industry. In America, media is seen from more of an economic than cultural perspective.

In the EU, the policy in Southeast Europe was to support a two-track solution in which the national state broadcasters should be transformed from state to public service organisations, in which licenses and support should be given to private media in line with professional standards. However, there is today an ongoing movement within the EU, in which the political level in 1997 adopted the Amsterdam Protocol on public broadcasting, stating, "the system of public broadcasting in the Member States is directly related to the democratic, social and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve media pluralism." It also states that it shall be within the competence of the Member States

> to provide for the funding of public service broadcasting insofar as such funding is granted to broadcasting organisations for the fulfilment of the public service remit as conferred, defined and organised by each Member State, and insofar that such funding does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to

an extent which would be contrary to the common interest" (*Official Journal of the European Commission,* 1997, C340/109).

The policies of the Commission in the competition issues are building on an industrial and economic perspective from which the big commercial actors within media are exercising heavy pressure on the EC to restrict the economic basis for and development of public service media from a strict competition perspective. The process has not been concluded, but illustrates very well the background for the different attitudes among international actors who support media development in conflict or transitional countries.

The issue of supporting media landscapes based on commercial or public service values might divide donors, while they in societies of conflict like Bosnia have the common objectives

> to undermine the harsh, conflict-prone nationalist parties and promote civil-minded opposition parties. Although support for democratization and journalistic inquiry were mentioned as policy goals as well, donor governments approved large expenditures with the hope of creating a new political reality in Bosnia (Price, 2002, p. 52-53).

While attempts to create independent commercially viable organisations like OBN and FERN in Bosnia failed because of the audience loyalty to the state media representing the Muslim, Croat and Serb population groups respectively, the different priorities for American and European donors proved crucial for the path to achieving the common objectives. The American side prioritised the

establishment and support for new private broadcasters linked in networks and based on commercial values, while the Europeans prioritised reforming the state broadcasters into public service broadcasters. From both perspectives, the hope was to undermine the harsh nationalist discourse through the media.

While the desire to undermine the nationalist political discourse raises the question of leaving the political landscape fully to a democratic process within the country itself, it also illustrates the dilemma for international peace-making efforts, as to the extent of interference into domestic political processes. In Chapter 5, I discussed the issue of support to content and concluded that the support to journalism must be given within the standards of impartiality, diversity and factuality in the coverage of conflict. By adhering to these standards, I believe that we can avoid a conflict-escalating media discourse.

It is clear that in defining international strategies for support to the development of a post-conflict media landscape, it may not and should not be an issue of developing new markets, transferring our own models or being bound to our own ideologies. The ambition for this thesis is to explore strategies for media support, which can help facilitating sustainable peace and conflict transformation without compromising media's role in a future democratic development. While the challenges and solutions differ from country to country, it is the interests of the populations in war-torn areas and the possibility of a peaceful future, which the strategies still must measure against.

What we will discuss in the following paragraphs is not the political and media policy environment in individual countries, nor the

possible design of a future media landscape. By looking at the nature of media as defined in chapter four, stressing the standards of impartiality and diversity, which are important for facilitating dialogue between adversaries and adding to a stable democratic development, we can identify the media, which has the biggest potential for constructive impact on the post-conflict situation, from a functional point of view. Impartiality is together with truth and factuality part of the principle of objective performance, which "helps to increase public credence and trust in the information and opinions which the media offer." (McQuail, 2000, p. 173). By pointing to some media as being more suitable than others for constructing a media landscape which enables peace and democracy, it also provides a viable guiding tool for multilateral media interventions. This does not exclude other kinds of media from participating in the future landscape and can even receive support from other donors.

Obviously, the UN and its regional partners, as the organisations instrumental to their member states, are in field missions as in Kosovo (Price and Thompson, p. 262-263), under influence or pressure from the different approaches behind its media interventions. While it is hardly legitimate for the UN to argue for or against any particular media based on its economic foundation, it is possible from the analysis made on the nature of different media in Chapter 4, to prioritise the international media support in countries of conflict and transformation.

When I attempt to design suitable strategies for multilateral and international media interventions, I fully acknowledge that in most post-conflict scenarios, local governments have the authority to decide on this matter. The UN peacekeeping missions might and

should have the authority to deal with the media to ensure platforms for public information and to restrict the incitement to violence and hate speech. The immediate post-conflict phase is also the period in which the foundation for and planning of the future media landscape is laid, through support to institution-building and legislative initiatives. If already at this point the UN and major international donors and agencies agree on visions for the general and overall development of the media, it is much easier to influence the political decision-makers in the political morass of any post-conflict situation. In other words, I am not advocating that the UN and international donors should bring ready-made packages of media legislation and development tools to be implemented through coercion. However, it is a fact that the financial and political pressure exerted by international donors in a post-conflict situation has a strong influence and if it is coordinated, offers a golden opportunity for laying the foundation for a future media landscape that would enable peace, democracy and conflict transformation rather than facilitate violence.

In chapter four I distinguished from a public interest perspective between different categories of media, depending on their conflict de-escalating characteristics. Based on these categories we shall now discuss the priorities for structural and legislative support to media.

Looking first at *government, state* and *public service media,* there is very little reason to work with government media in providing support for media landscape development, since it might only be possible to have some degree of diversity and impartiality. State media is not impartial in its reporting, but reflects political power balances and has some degree of diversity in and outside of the

news. The perspective for support to the government and state media from a media development point-of-view is to support them in the development of a genuine public service broadcaster. As the public media in most countries of conflict has the majority of the audience, optimal distribution systems and good potential for long-term sustainability even in meagre markets, support for their transformation should be one priority.

For *commercial, political* and *religious media,* it is as we have seen in Chapter 4, very difficult to predict what standards they will develop on impartiality and diversity. Commercial media by nature may have long-term economic considerations, which are more important than the initial support from donors. If they do not have that perspective, there is good reason to believe that they will be unable to deliver sustained professional quality journalism in dismal post-conflict markets. As the media owned by political and religious interests only participate in a peace-building process as long as it does not conflict with their primary political or religious agenda, direct support for such media should stay ad hoc and short term. There is, however, possibility to raise the awareness of journalistic ethics and establish internal mechanisms safeguarding editorial practice from direct owner influence. This could be supported through training of journalists and editors, involving the media in professional associations and development of codes of conduct. One should not forget that in most democracies the early media structures were based on media belonging to political parties and churches. Still, however, they developed into largely diverse and impartial media.

Non-profit professional media and *community media* might serve important purposes in peace and democracy-building. *Non-profit*

professional media in particular, which by my definition are obligated to be socially responsible and which defend their editorial independence while adhering to professional standards of impartiality and diversity, could be an important part of a future media landscape. A condition for this is that they also develop sustainable business plans. The role of community media in building peace and democracy is as uncertain as the case for commercial, political and religious media. While community media can play a vital role in local processes of dialogue, development and empowerment, the benefits of supporting community media vary between organisations, depending on ownership, goals and local circumstances.

Net media holds great potential for communication, networking, mobilisation and in some cases are better to ensure the involvement of youths. Unfortunately, it has like all other media the potential to either positively enhance or to harm vulnerable societies. As with community media, it varies from one initiative to the next, from one provider of net media to another, depending on goals and ownership, whether it makes sense to support it.

In conclusion, it is feasible for the UN to insist that a genuine common policy towards the development of the media landscape in a post-conflict situation should, on the one hand, include support for the transition of state media into public service media. On the other hand, it should include support for the development of trust-based, non-profit professional mainstream media which adhere to professional standards and are bound by responsibility to the society as a whole.

A common policy should further state that regulatory provisions for setting up commercial, political, religious, community and net media should be developed, allowing representation of a diverse society.

Besides the motives of the international actors and the nature of the different media, we must also consider that the local governments or leadership of the conflicting parties have their own interests to pursue. As we saw in Chapter 3, their interests can be to promote their case to the populace during conflict escalation, which is definitely also the case during peace negotiations and in the post-conflict construction of societal institutions and the building of power relations. Attempts to use the media to promote one party's point-of-view continue endlessly. In developed democracies, attempts to influence the agenda set by the media occur through efficient spin. In post-conflict and transitional countries, the tools are often more coercive than spin and pose a challenge to international media assistance.

There are also other reasons for conflicts between the local leadership and international donors. Cultural or moral values, which might differ substantially between Western actors and the various post-conflict countries. In Afghanistan for example, there is a large disparity between the moral values of residents in the countryside, the middle class in Kabul and the international donors and media. In a country where twenty-three years of civil war is rooted in the disproportionate share of resources between urban and rural areas, triggered by power struggles and fuelled through religious incitement, sensitivity is crucial. If, for instance, the director of TV Afghanistan were to prohibit women from singing on the screen and mandate a fixed amount of reporting on religious

events in order to avoid upsetting the rural contingents of fundamentalist Muslims, it would run counter to Western ideals of gender equality and the freedom of expression. In the future Afghan media landscape with international broadcasters within and beyond the country, a greater internationally-supported diversity of voices and an easily accessible Internet in the big cities, such restrictions would be fruitless propositions.

With new technology allowing the identification and filtering of information, Price believes that, "national restrictive responses shift from control of gatekeepers to control of users" (Price, 2002, p. 241). Earlier and even till today in some cases, the control of users is exerted through restrictions on people's right to possess satellite receivers, purchase international papers and magazines. For international actors in media support, Price suggests that a way to evaluate, predict or understand national responses, "is to assign them to one of four categories: adopting law, entering into negotiations, implementing technology, or engaging in the use of force" (Price, 2002, p. 242).

6.2 Media Landscapes and Types of Conflict

To evaluate the efforts and direction of the development of the post-conflict media landscape requires an intimate knowledge of the type of conflict, identity groups the local media landscape and the political interests of potential actors. The design of a media landscape strategy for a multilateral actor like the UN is highly dependent on the concrete situation in a given country. However, I believe that it is possible to develop a few rules of thumb, which

take some of the general problems of post-conflict situations into consideration.

It is possible to categorise types of conflicts in several ways. However, as the purpose here is to distinguish between different strategies for support to developing the media landscapes, I would suggest the following classification of intra-state conflicts:

6.2.1 Centrifugal Nationality and Regional Conflicts

A centrifugal nationality conflict comprises one state with two or more ethnic and social identities within its boundaries, each wanting to build their own nation. One example given by Spyros A. Sofos is the background for the centrifugal wars in former Yugoslavia, where

> nationalist movements in all republics and provinces of former Yugoslavia have attempted, apparently successfully, to construct nationalist histories and cultures, testifying to the long and continuous existence of their respective nations in the territory of former Yugoslavia, and hence, their rightful sovereignty over contested territories and identities. This is not unusual, as ethnicity and nation, as well as their cultural and historical markers, are the product of social *imagination* (Sofos & Jenkins, 1996, p. 251)*.*

Another example is the Igbo people's civil war for independence from Nigeria, from 1967 to 1970, which in contrast to the

nationalist independence movements in Yugoslavia, failed to achieve their goal and lost the war (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2005).

In the Yugoslav situation, the conflicts resulted in the birth of a number of independent nations, albeit with significant ethnic minorities overlapping their respective boundaries. There are compelling reasons for international actors to support the establishment of genuine media landscape structures within each state, offering media space for ethnic minorities as well as common media platforms assuring common references for the entire population. The international actors should also have a regional perspective on the post-conflict situation, in which international assistance would include support for association-building and regional programme collaboration.

In Nigeria, where the result was a temporary respite to the nationalist aspirations of the Igbo people, the media structure ended with a combination of locally-based media and national media as common platform for the Igbo people and rest of the Nigerian population.

6.2.2 Oppressed minority's conflict

Unfortunately, the countries, which were established by the Yugoslav wars are examples of other types of post-conflict conflicts post-conflict unrest/strife. After independence in 1991, Macedonia, with its Macedonian majority and 25% Albanian minority, was the scene of several violent episodes and minor conflicts in 2001. Following the Framework Agreement signed on the 13th of August

2001, it was agreed by representatives for the two population groups that paragraph 6.1 be included in Appendix C, stating:

> The parties invite the international community, including the OSCE, to increase its assistance for projects in the area of media in order to further strengthen radio, TV and print media, including Albanian language and multiethnic media. The parties also invite the international community to increase professional media training programs for members of communities not in the majority in Macedonia. The parties also invite the OSCE to continue its efforts on projects designed to improve inter-ethnic relations.

While it is tempting to focus on the strengthening of the Albanian-speaking media to ensure the voice of the minority, the risk of dividing Macedonia into two parallel ethnic societies must also be seriously deliberated. This development will clearly be strengthened if the news, background, culture, and entertainment all are different, depending on whether they are carried in media directed at the Albanian minority or the Macedonian majority. In other words, an optimal approach would strive to enable diversity and strengthen national coherence through a combination of minority media and mainstream media, where the programming is done in both languages.

6.2.3 Centralised Power Struggles

A conflict because of centralised power struggles does not base itself on ethnic identity conflicts to any significant degree, but

rather on power aspirations from different social or economic segments within the population. As we saw in Chapter 3, Rwanda was to a certain degree a society in which a totalitarian regime fought its opponents, whether they were Hutu or Tutsi. The Yugoslav wars had many causes, but one of the central reasons for Serbia's escalation of the conflicts were the political ambitions of Slobodan Milosevic. By creating images of his opponents as people who persecuted the Serb population, Milosevic managed to rally popular support to buttress his political ambitions.

During the conflict and post-conflict phases, international donors gave substantial support to alternative media, such as B92 and the association of local media, ANEM. From a democratic standpoint, it was clearly an international interference casting support to one end of the political spectrum. However, the governmental side was controlling the state media and harassing professional media, which invited criticism and consequently served to justify the external intervention.[17]

In a situation such as post-conflict Serbia, it is crucial that international donors and organisations act quickly and flexibly with timely support in order to facilitate changes in the media landscape. As a rule of thumb, I believe that efficient support, advice and pressure in the post-conflict period immediately after political change should focus on media reform, which had

---

[17] After elections and a popular uprising in 2000 removed Milosevic and installed another nationalist, Kostunica, as president, the strategy for media support was unfocused. Donors and media NGOs, which through the difficult times had supported the alternative media, were not eager to increase their efforts towards reforming the state broadcaster or changing commercial mainstream media. Before the post-Milosevic 'honeymoon' ended, the political commitment to media independence had ceased and the reform of state media had become a long-term perspective, while Radio TV Serbia, together with mainstream commercial media like Pink, which was owned by Milosevic's wife, still enjoyed pre-eminence amongst viewers.

dominance and a loyal audience during the conflict. From both behavioural and logical perspectives, a population, which to a large degree watched and appropriated the agenda, attitudes and framed messages of one national media will not, because of a change in government, begin watching alternative media.

6.2.4 Conflict in a weak and dissolving state

Conflict in a weak and dissolving state like Afghanistan, where twenty-three years of war between various geographical, religious or ethnic-based groups of warlords has plagued the country, is where post-conflict media support is crucial but difficult. With thirty provinces and centuries of traditional styles of communication, leadership, culture and bureaucracy centred on the capital city, Kabul, and only a little of which has had any influence in the countryside where local leaders rule, it is important to recognise the need for strengthening national coherence and identity. At the same time, the movement towards a centralised political power cannot neglect the ethnic, geographical and religious identities across the country.

The USA supported the establishment of local and community media across the country, as well as the terrestrial broadcasting of programmes from Voice of America. The EU supported the broadcasting of public service programming and reform of Afghanistan Radio and TV, while the UN did not appear to have a clear strategy for the country. Having said that, the UN had facilitated a consensus amongst international media NGOs representing both the USA and Europe to agree on pursuing a two-track strategy.

In a country with low literacy, a very weak centre and a history of rebellious and restive provinces, it is important to strengthen national identity and coherence, which can be done through strengthening national broadcasting. It is also necessary for the rural population to feel included and involved in the national discourse by presenting issues of concern to them in the national media. At the same time, there should be a conscious effort made to guard against the rural provinces feeling forced to suppress their local and ethnic identity. To address this, windows of regional broadcasting should be established. A suitable model might be to include it in the schedule of the national broadcaster.

Afghanistan, even more than most other post-conflict countries, is without any economic potential to the market-sustained media, which are dependent on commercial income. In a medium-term perspective, this will indicate that only public media will be sustainable after the withdrawal of international donors.

6.2.5 Local communal conflicts

Local communal conflicts, where different identity groups within a local community engage in violent conflicts, are widespread. Though the conflicts are often rooted in unequal access to resources, the groups are mostly rallied through the members' religious or ethnic identities.

These kinds of conflicts are widespread in India, Nigeria and several other countries with mixed populations[18]. While both India and Nigeria have relatively sound media environments for dealing with communal conflicts, it seems obvious to focus more on the root causes for the tensions. From a media landscape perspective, support for the development of a system of community media involving local population groups in empowered processes of developing relationships, discussing and removing local root causes.

6.3 Media Legislation in war-torn societies

When discussing the introduction of new media legislation in a post-conflict society, it is worth considering what Price describes as a constitutional approach (2002, p. 50) which, based on free press and free speech for example, might set an aspirational climate and

> may mean providing a building block for the future stable set of democratic institutions. Even if the press does not perform effective watchdog, information providing and

[18] In India, in one of the many communal conflict areas – Gujarat – young Hindi activists attacked a Muslim minority, showed an interesting mixture of the role of local and national media. Some of the local commercial media had incited hostility towards the Muslim population through numerous inflammatory articles, apparently with the support from the Hindi political leadership (Varadarajan, 2002, p. 279-285 and Dayal, Ed., 2002, p. 705-752). At the same time, the professional national media, in adhering to established codes of conduct and accepting their responsibility to society (Appendix G), began carrying impartial reports about what was described by many as genocide in Gujarat, which killing 800 people. This put pressure on the government and the local leadership to stop the conflict efficiently. One of the national commercial broadcasters, Star News, reported openly and critically on the events. However, in an interview that I did with the Editor-in-Chief in 2002, he revealed that both politicians from the governmental BJP party and owners had put pressure on Star News to be less critical.

value-transmitting functions in the early days, that may
be because of lack of experience (Price, 2002, p. 51).

Many of the countries where governments exercise a strong control over the media and have severely restricted its freedom, the governments have actually committed to the freedom of speech, media freedom and other human rights in their constitutions or through binding international treaties. This was the case in former Yugoslavia and still is in as totalitarian a country as Belarus (Hamelink, 1999, p. 41).

To achieve genuine freedom of speech in a post-conflict or transitional country demands that not only the constitution, but also the media legislation, rules and regulations, as well as their practical implementation, take place accordingly. Acknowledging that it is not always in the interest of the local leadership to ensure independence for the media and freedom of speech, an important role remains for local and international media and human rights NGOs, professional associations, multilateral organisations and national donors to engage in public and diplomatic efforts targeted at the government.

The other way to introduce new media legislation is what Price calls the instrumental approach:

> An instrumental approach asks what kind of society, at what stage in development, produces more newspapers or more radio and television stations in dependent of government or more users of the Internet within the target society. A different, and equally important question

> is the instrumental analysis of presumed benefits to the
> intervening or donor society.(p.49)

In our strategy for the development of the media landscape in a post-conflict situation, there are some core regulatory arrangements, which must be in place earlier than others must after the establishment of peace. There are different ways to approach a post-conflict situation in terms of changing the media laws. One way is through an engaged civil society effort, combined with substantial assistance from international legal experts. This happened in Serbia after the fall of the Milosevic government and very comprehensive proposals for media legislation were the concrete outputs from this process. However, in spite of local and international pressure, the Serbian government and parliament hesitated in its approval of the proposals, with very little progress made since then[19] (Radosavljevic, 2004).

A different approach was used in Afghanistan, where the Minister of Information and Culture first committed to the international standards of public service broadcasting at a joint UNESCO-EU-BMC-BBC conference in April 2002. This was followed by a strategy for the media landscape and its regulatory set up, developed by the Minister of Information and Culture in cooperation with a BBC employee in June 2002, issued as a *Policy Declaration by the Afghan Interim Authority*. Freedom of Expression and of the Press has been included in Afghanistan's new 2004 Constitution, with an amendment to the 2004 Press Law prohibition of censorship and the right for the population to obtain information from the

---

[19] Having been involved in the process in post conflict Serbia, I believe that it might have proven more efficient if agreement on a joint media policy statement between the government at the time and media representatives. Instead, many months were spent honing the draft legislation, in parallel to seeking the political support and commitment for this process. By the end of it, the "transformative" situation had settled down and the politicians focused on maintaining their power

government (*Freedom of the Press 2005, April 2005)*. However, the official policy statement gave a basis for multilateral and international organisations to support not only public and new private media but also the development of media legislation and regulation, following international and public service broadcasting standards. Unfortunately, the situation in Afghanistan three years after has not developed faster than the one in Serbia.

The areas in which it is important to set up regulatory mechanisms, rules and legislations are:

- Regulation of content in print and broadcast media;
- Licensing mechanisms for broadcast media; and
- Regulatory and organisational framework for public service broadcasting.

Regulation of Content

We know that many media in conflict situations incite the adversaries to violence. It is also clear from Chapters 3 and 5 that many journalists and editors have identified with their own identity group during the conflict. On this basis, there is good reason to be cautious that the local media will continue to be biased, even after the violence has stopped and an arrangement for peace is made.

Price suggests that to prevent renewed incitements,

> Some form of content supervision and regulation is necessary in post-conflict zones and, further, that such action will be effective only if there is in place a body of generally applicable norms: that is, a formal system of law rather than an ad hoc approach (2002, p. 151).

In Kosovo, which has been a UN protectorate since 1999, lessons from the Bosnian experience have been used when dealing with the media. In the early phase, self-regulation was in place, but after inciting media reports started to appear, codes of conducts were put into place and are now grounded in public safety rationale. Krüg and Price interpret this change as:

> journalists have a responsibility, where a democratic state is not fully functioning and where violence is a regular means by which differences are resolved, not to infringe the physical rights of individuals or to increase social tension; where those duties are violated, the authority has the right to discipline (in Price and Thompson, Eds., 2002, p. 155).

This shift shows that the normative base is not absolute and can be changed according to concrete needs in a post-conflict situation. In other words, the freedom to incite conflicts was smaller in both Kosovo and Bosnia than in established democracies. From a conflict resolution perspective, this is a logical approach to the very volatile post-conflict situation. In Kosovo, however:

> the vision of media responsibility articulated in Kosovo gives wide latitude to news reporting and commentary that does not violate the public interest goals of protecting individuals and groups against incitement to violence and expressions of interest (Krüg and Price in Price and Thompson, Eds., 2002, p. 156).

In protectorates such as Bosnia and Kosovo, there are several questions which should be posed, for instance to the latter's TMC, concerning the set up of the regulating mechanism for media. The regulator acts as public advocate for media responsibility, monitor of mass media conduct and investigator of complaints and formal prosecutor:

> Throughout, questions of accountability and independence loom over this process. Is there sufficient sharing and diffusion of power to guard adequately against abuses by the authorities? Is the Regulator sufficiently independent from the legislator/executive SRSG (Special Representative for the UN Secretary General – ed.)? Is the Regulator accountable only to the law? By what mechanisms are the Regulator's acts reviewed to determine their compliance with these principles? (Krüg and Price in Price and Thompson, 2002, p. 162).

In Chapter 5, the description of the March events in Kosovo and the Code of Conduct for the Media show that journalists and editors do not always appropriate such codes of conduct. While involvement and ownership in the drafting of codes of conduct are important, Price questions self-regulatory codes as a mean to media responsibility in a post-conflict situation:

Self-regulation is, at times, a privatizing of the institutions of law. The ideas involved in self-regulation allow a society that is comfortable about its commitment to a rule of law to find and develop space where private institutions or associations are charged with the formation, implementation and enforcement of norms. Where corruption or nepotism have been a hallmark and

where tools for testing and enforcing compliance are lacking, the very idea of self-regulation may be premature. Transitions are marked by a search for a legal framework in order to guarantee rights, including property rights, and that may mean specially sanctifying the use of law, and only the use of law, to legitimate the process of change (Price, 2002, p. 101).

Licensing Mechanisms for Broadcast Media

A second essential element to the set up in the immediate post-conflict phase, is a transparent regulation of license issuing for electronic media. Objective criteria must be developed, a body independent of political control must be established and a limitation on the number of local broadcasters set to avoid poor, unprofessional and irresponsible media.

In Bosnia-i-Herzegovina, an Independent Media Commission (IMC) was set up to oversee licensing procedures and develop a regulatory framework. Through the requirements on license holders, renewed licence procedures, the promulgation of a Broadcasting Code of Practice, guidelines for pre-election coverage and help to a press code of self-regulation, the IMC attempted to deal with this issue. It was criticized by freedom of speech organisations, the USA and others for over-regulating the media. Thompson and De Luce however, found that

> The IMC's regulations were modelled on best international practice and placed requirements on license holders that fell within the bounds of democratic norms (in Price and Thompson, Eds., 2002, p. 213).

A lack of regulation allowing approximately 280 local media to broadcast resulted in numerous cases of poor, low quality, biased and inciting outlets. Through renewed calls for licenses requiring higher professional and ethic standards and copyright obligations, the number of broadcasters was roughly halved.

From simple institutional considerations, there are imperatives for limiting the number of broadcasters in meagre markets, which are often the case in post-conflict countries. Clearly when the media is barely able to sustain itself economically, it is difficult to attract and pay professional journalists. Even with good journalists, it is difficult for them to find the time and resources to cover stories from all sides, rendering them open to the looming pitfalls of political interests and ambitions. Many small and less endowed media would destabilize a country more easily than fewer and better-off media.

<u>Regulative and organisational framework for public service broadcasting</u>

A third element is to provide the legislative basis for the transformation of government and state broadcasters into genuine public service broadcasters as an important media tool for building sustainable peace and conflict transformation.

When we look back to the requests for the media landscape as related to different types of conflicts, the media is generally expected to provide for diversity in access and delivery of communication to all groups of the population. It is further expected to deliver common communications platforms upon which conflicting population groups can establish meeting points of joint

references and it is expected to be organised to strengthen the social cohesion.

Whether the regulation of *public service media* is expressed through a law on public broadcasting, or a general broadcasting law, these issues must be addressed in the legislative layout.

We have also discussed the interaction between leadership and population as well as the interdependence of leaders and the population in their attitudes to the conflict. As discussed in Chapter 3 and elaborated on in subsequent chapters, it is important to ensure the independence of the media from political interference in its programming. As public broadcasters in post-conflict transitional countries normally base their financing on the state budget, fees on electricity bills, a minimum of revenue from commercials or in few cases on politically approved license fees, the dependence on political leadership is very real.

The legislative challenges lie in the formation of the managing board, its programming mandate and the development of safeguard mechanisms to prevent external interference. A truly independent public broadcaster would be insulated from the influence of economic interests and political parties - either opposition or government - on its editorial policy or reports.

There are different ways of designing a public service broadcaster to fulfil these goals. One option is to build a public service radio with four layers of authority – the board, director, editors, journalists - and equally different areas of responsibility to ensure difficulty in influencing the editorial line:

Board

The members of the board should be neither active politicians nor appointed by the government, and preferably not be proportional representatives for the parties in the parliament. More importantly in a post-conflict situation, the members should give fair representation and not be bound to different identity groups of the country. Ideally, the board members should be appointed according to their personal, cultural, economic and other expertise.

The board's responsibility must be defined and limited by law. Its key responsibilities are to appoint and dismiss the director, approve the overall budget, generate accounting and programme policy.

In a post-conflict situation, it is important to provide capacity-building support to the board in order to keep the balance between political dialogue (parliament and government) to ensuring the long term financing of the broadcaster. On the other hand, the ability to protect the director, editors and journalists from political influence.

Director

The director should be appointed for a fixed term, not following the election periods and should be a media professional, capable of handling the overall responsibility for programmes and budgets.

The director hires editors and staff, delegates responsibility and ensures that they too work professionally and produce programmes which are impartial, factual and accurate.

Structure

While public service media might include the distribution of content on many platforms, such as the Internet, mobile phones, satellite television, etc., by far the most important ones in post-conflict countries are radio and television. As most public service broadcasters provide both national and regional programming, there are some issues which should be considered in the design of the legislation.

Three principal models can be chosen for the network between national and regional broadcasters – in this case with ten regional inputs and outlets (adapted from Bonde and Salaam, 2002).

| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |

Regional

National

Figure 3: Regional Broadcasting – Diversity and Coherence

Model 1 – Regional windows:

In model 1, the majority of programme hours are for national broadcasting and all ten regional stations broadcast in their provinces at exactly the same time. While the regional stations are

broadcasting, there are no national programmes on this channel. The regional windows can last from five to thirty minutes, for example.

This model underlines the national coherence by prioritizing the national programming, but it also reflects diverse regional identities through relatively small windows of local programmes.

Model 2 – National windows:
Resources and broadcasting hours lie with each of the ten regional channels. The national programme is only broadcasted once or twice a day, for example, with national and international news. The rest of the regional stations broadcast as much as their resources will allow.

This model builds on a society, which is de-centralized or federal in structure and where the regional identities are set above the national.

Model 3 De-centralized diversity:
In this model, the centre produces a national programme and broadcasts it throughout the day to and through the ten regional stations. Depending on their interest and resources to produce themselves, the regional programs take over when they want and in a duration varying from station to station.

This model still builds on national identity but allows for un-balanced decentralization, in which some regional identities have more prominence than in other regions.

From a peace-building perspective, the three models cater to a particular characteristic. Model 1 is a structure, which builds on or seeks to build a

national identity, whilst still keeping window periods of regional radio or television reflecting the diversity in a country. Model 2 bases itself on the existence and preservation of very strong regional identities, but with a regular input of national news, for instance, providing a common platform of reference across the population. Model 3 builds on national identity, but by allowing regional stations to broadcast as much as they want and are able to, might be the option for countries in which one or a few regions have obtained some degree of autonomy in the post-conflict phase.

Independent of these models is input from the regions into national programming, which must ensure that all segments of the population see themselves reflected to the whole nation.

Public service criteria:

In regulating the public service broadcaster, it is important to consider the post-conflict situation in the respective country when defining its mission. Besides quality, independence, standards of diversity, factuality, possible educational, informative and cultural obligations should be kept in mind. The balance between delivering niche programmes, serving and reflecting all parts of the population in turn and delivering programmes of interest to all, can be touched up on. Public service broadcasting usually has special duties to serve ethnic, religious or other minorities, which should be mentioned in the mission statement. Furthermore, duties of serving as a platform for communication and dialogue across the populace and other similarly general duties might contribute to the development of sustainable peace and conflict transformation.

Conclusion:

In this chapter, we have analysed support to development of media landscapes in post conflict situations – not from an economic/industrial, a political-economic, or a media professional but from a public interest perspective.

International donors and actors supporting media in post-conflict phases don't work it alone from an altruistic perspective but also follow their own interests in developing new markets, transferring own models and ideologies as described in what Price calls the Market for Loyalties.

My approach, however, is to explore international strategies, which may not and should not be an issue of developing new markets, transferring Western models or ideologies, but help facilitating sustainable peace and conflict transformation. To do this I have from a public interest perspective and based on the media categories reflecting the de-escalating characteristics discussed the priorities for structural and legislative support to media.

Knowing that international support to peace building and conflict transformation must be based on an intimate knowledge of the concrete conflict, its identity groups and interests of political actors it is obvious that different conflicts demand different strategies. Based on a classification of intrastate conflicts, which put particular emphasis on potential target identity groups for media, I developed a few rules of thumb for each type of conflict, be it:

- Centrifugal nationality conflict;
- Oppressed minority's conflict;
- Centralised power struggle conflict;

- Weak and dissolving state's conflict; or
- Local, communal conflict.

From suggesting the optimal media structure in each type of conflict, I did from an instrumental perspective and with the help of Price identify the primary target areas for post-conflict regulatory mechanisms, rules and legislations as:

- Regulation of content in print and broadcast media;
- Licensing mechanisms for broadcast media; and
- Regulatory and organisational framework for public service broadcasting.

Acknowledging that also other areas like e.g. access to information are important, the above should be the focus in the immediate post conflict and planning phase for peace building and conflict transformation efforts.

7. The United Nations – Mandate, Experiences and Strategies

While the two previous chapters have focused on post-conflict media interventions, this chapter turns to the operational conflict management and the potential for the UN to guide international support to preventive action and conflict transformation in the field of media support.

In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 I have systematised media according to their conflict de-escalating characteristics, discussed and tested the potential in providing support to content and dealing with the ethics of journalism in a post-conflict situation. Also post-conflict I have explored strategies for developing media structures, legislation and institution building as an integral part of long term conflict transformation.

Based on the discussion in Chapter 4 of functional phases for media interventions in conflicts I will discuss in this chapter the UN's legitimacy, capability and structure for carrying out media interventions, playing into the dynamics of conflict. To analyse the legitimacy I examine the international legislative framework for external interventions towards local media in pre-, during and post-conflict situations. Legitimacy can be obtained under very different circumstances – be it through Security Council decisions or agreements with the governments concerned. The possible inclusion of public information and media in the mandates passed by the Security Council will be discussed. The critical phases – Pre-Conflict, Immediate Pre-Conflict, During Conflict and Immediate Post-Conflict – pose the most challenging situations in legal and political terms. This will be analysed through Stephanie Farrior's conceptualisation

of hate propaganda in relation to International Human Rights Law (Farrior, 2002, p. 69-96), as well as through Erik Blinderman's search for the boundaries of Information Intervention (Blinderman, 2002, p. 104-144) set by International Law (UN, 1947, E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1).

From an institutional perspective, I further analyse the UN's strategies, hindrances or openings for including media interventions into its other Track I and II conflict management efforts – both on its legal basis and in its practical implementation. To illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the UN I look back at cases where the UN, with or without the UNSC mandate has intervened in the media field, as well as I interview representatives employed by the UN.

One explicit aim of this thesis is, however, to highlight areas where coherence between the developed models and strategies for operational and structural conflict prevention by multilateral organisations can be identified or suggested, such as to the UN, OSCE, African Union (AU) or the European Union. Regional organisations increasingly deal with peace, security and conflict prevention within their member states.

However, as the UNSC and various departments within the UN Secretariat have the prime task of dealing with the prevention of violent conflict and supporting efforts towards peace, I have chosen the UN as the focus for this chapter. While the starting point will be the UN's Secretariat, it is clear that several other actors within the UN family have important roles to play in the longer term perspective for the pre- and post-conflict periods of violent conflicts. It is also necessary to take into account the potential roles for other

stakeholders like national donors, regional organisations and international media NGOs.

7.1 Legal Conditions and Mandates for Media Interventions

The legal and political basis for international media interventions in crises and violent conflicts varies, depending on circumstances.

A situation, where regulation of the media is intended to restrict them from inciting violence is one thing. The establishment of alternative voices or providing assistance to the parties involved in a conflict to use media, with the provision of humanitarian information, dialogue, reconciliation or transformation of the conflict into a sustainable peace is another.

The legal basis also varies depending on whether we include local leadership, third-party countries, the UN, NGOs or other organisations. Finally, it is important to distinguish between media interventions, which are carried out at the invitation or acquiescence of the parties, and those, which are forced upon the government, according to respectively Chapters 6 and 7 of the UN Charter.

If we as a starting point consider the option of restricting one or more media outlets, which are seen to incite violence, the first fundamental question to ask is whether the international provisions for the freedom of expression as described in *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and later conventions allow for such restrictions.

Article 19 of *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* states:

> Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
> expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
> without interference and to seek, receive and impart
> information and ideas through any media and regardless
> frontiers *(United Nations, 1948).*

This is followed by the *United Nations' International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR), which in Article 20, prohibits the following:

> (1) Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.

> (2) Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
> constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
> violence shall be prohibited by law.

> (United Nations, 1966)

In the *United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination* (CERD), Article 4 spells out restrictions obliging the undersigned states to take measures to stop certain abuses of the freedom of expression:

> *States Parties condemn all propaganda* and all
> organizations which are *based on ideas or theories of
> superiority* of one race or group of persons of one colour or
> ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or *promote racial
> hatred and discrimination in any form*, and undertake to
> adopt immediate and positive measures designed to
> eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination

and, to this end, with due regard to the principles
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention,
inter alia:

(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all
*dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred,
incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of
violence or incitement to such acts against any race or
group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin*, and
also the provision of *any assistance* to racist activities,
including the *financing* thereof;

(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also
organized and all other propaganda activities, which
promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize
participation in such organizations or activities as an
offence punishable by law;

(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions,
national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination."

(United Nations, 1965)

Consequently, the Convention not only provides for states to ban or
punish incitement to violence or racial hatred, but also obliges them
to take proper action against such activities. Article 4 prevents
groups, organisations or public authorities and institutions from
promoting racial discrimination.

Karl Josef Partsch (1992) points in his analysis of Article 4 to the
introductory paragraph, which stresses the will of the undersigned
countries to undertake immediate measures to eradicate

discrimination "with due regard to" the principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The so-called "with due regard" clause has been interpreted differently from country to country.

The interpretations range from not in any way to "limit or impair the relevant human rights", to encouraging states parties to "strike a balance between fundamental freedoms and the duties under the Convention" and further to state parties which "may not invoke the protection of civil rights as a reason to avoid enacting legislation to implement the Convention." The USA employs the first interpretation.

The difference in interpretation of Article 4 in CERD was illustrated during the genocide in Rwanda (see Chapter 3). The government defended RTLM against complaints from human rights organizations, by claiming that it could not stop the radio as their freedom of speech was protected (Kimenyi, 2002, p. 3). In an article in the New York Times, this is defended by the American defence lawyer to Hassan Ngeze, who was tried by the International Criminal Tribunal to Rwanda (Case No. ICTR-99-52-T) for incitement to genocide. The lawyer, John Floyd, is quoted for the following:

> What's really on trial here is freedom of the press and intellectual freedom… these people should never have been indicted. They've already been locked up for five years. Just with these indictments, the UN is already defending press censorship (New York Times, 2002).

Interestingly, the international advocacy organisation Article 19[20] recognizes that laws resulting from the CERD Convention can and

---

[20] In order to distinguish between the organization and the article, Article 19 will be underlined (as such) where it refers to the advocacy group.

are used by governments to discriminate against minorities (Article 19, 1992). Article 19 protests any unjustifiable violations of the right to freedom of expression, "democratic discussion including hate speech (which may involve insult, invective and deeply offensive racial slurs) necessarily involves trampling on the ideas and beliefs held precious by others." However, the organisation, which is based on Article 19 of the ICCPR, fully accepts the hate speech restrictions founded in Article 20.

Article 19 concludes that any legislation in the area of anti-hate speech and anti-racism "highlights problems of definition and interpretation; concepts such as "ridicule", "hostility" and even "hate" are open-ended, necessarily subjective and potentially dangerous in the exercise of power" (Article 19, 1992).

In other words, Article 19 finds that restrictions on hate-speech and dissemination of racism run the risk of being abused by states or governments to suppress the freedom of speech for opposition groups and minorities. Therefore, the organisation would, beyond Article 10 in the ICCPR, prefer the full and unlimited freedom of speech and the racism and hate-speech counterbalanced through a democratic and free debate.

In the world of violent conflict, however, the risks at stake are often higher than for ultimate media freedom.

Stephanie Farrior, who made an analysis of both the above and of European and American conventions, concludes that

> It is because of the demonstrated dire consequences of a failure to suppress hate propaganda, however, that several

of the treaties include a duty to intervene, in the national context. There is a strong argument that this duty exists *a fortiori* when necessary to ensure protection of the most fundamental rights in these instruments – including the right to life (2002, p. 96).

The ultimate freedom of speech should be pursued as an integral part of a stable democracy. But, it is impossible to neglect the fact that during crises in vague democracies or non-democratic states, unrestricted freedom is often subject to abuse. One example where abuse of the media has taken place was as we analysed it in Chapter 3 during the genocide in Rwanda. In the case of genocide, the legal basis is generally clear:

*The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide***,** adopted in 1948 and enforced in 1951, has long been the framework by which politicians, commanders and committers of genocide have been brought to court, while it has been disputed for years on to the extent to which the media, editors and journalists can be held responsible for genocide. The Convention itself states that the following acts must be punished:

> (a) Genocide;
>
> (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
>
> (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
>
> (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
>
> (e) Complicity in genocide.

> (Article III, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948)

Recently, in March and May 2004, the ICTR contributed significantly to a clarification of the media's responsibility in relation to genocide. The Tribunal has its own statutes annexed to the Security Council Resolution 955 and in a case against Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze (Case No. ICTR-99-52-T), the Trial Chamber 1 of the Tribunal describes the importance of this case in the introduction to its verdict:

> This case raises important principles concerning the role of the media, which have not been addressed at the level of international criminal justice since Nuremberg. The power of the media to create and destroy fundamental human values comes with great responsibility. Those who control such media are accountable for its consequences (Introduction, paragraph 8 in Case No. ICTR-99-52-T).

Among the points that have been clarified through this verdict are: The Trial Chamber 1 finds that "RTLM broadcasts the names of Tutsi individuals and their families, as well as Hutu political opponents (…) to varying degrees their deaths were causally linked to the broadcast of their names" (Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, point 28, p. 7). The Chamber, however, stresses that "the international jurisprudence does not include any specific causation requirement linking the expression at issue with the demonstration of a direct effect" (Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, point 89, p. 21). Furthermore, the Chamber "recalls that incitement is a crime regardless of whether it has the effect it intends to have" (Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, point 98, p. 23).

Another point is that the individuals who represented RTLM externally (in an official capacity) and internally (controlling the

financial operations holding supervisory responsibility for all activities) had *de facto* control, but failed to exercise it (Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, point 31-32, p. 8). RTLM was, according to the Tribunal, inciting to genocide.

All three people charged with genocide were found guilty in this case. The abovementioned cases are still on appeal, but from the verdicts we can conclude that the international conventions not only permit, but also oblige governments to take appropriate measures to stop dissemination of racism, hatred and incitement to violence. If the governments had reacted properly, there would have been very good reasons to demand a change in editorial policy for both private and public media in Rwanda and probably the former Yugoslavia. At the very last, if this were not obeyed, to close down the media.

However, the problem was that the governments themselves were driving forces behind the dissemination of hatred and incitement to violence. In Rwanda, the proclaimed media freedom on one hand allowed alternative voices, but on the other let the popular RTLM encourage and virtually organise killings as part of the genocide. Coupled with a tightly-controlled state media spreading similar messages, the free media scene was dominated by voices encouraging violence and genocide. In Yugoslavia, we saw that the Serbian government also deliberately hampered the Freedom of Expression through obstructing media and journalists who were critical towards the Milosevic government and its conflict escalation.

7.2 Prevention of Incitement to Genocide and War

If media outlets in a given country distribute messages, which are seen as inciting to commit genocide, as in the light of the recent verdicts of the Rwanda tribunal, then there is an obligation to the Genocide Convention to prevent the expected genocide.

The Genocide Convention imposes this as a mandatory duty to the signatory states. Interestingly, this has also been agreed to by the AU.

However, in Article VIII, the states "may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such actions under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts enumerated in Article III".

Blinderman reads this article as stipulating a possible difference between a non-UN supported intervention and a UN intervention. Consequently, the Genocide Convention avails additional sources of information or humanitarian assistance to media in countries or groups of countries without UNSC mandates, but does not provide for tools, such as the jamming of media outlets. In other words, it is possible for third parties to establish and support media to provide alternative voices without support from the UNSC if existing media outlets engage in the promotion of genocide. It is, however, impossible for third parties to close down or jam such media without UNSC support. As mentioned in Chapter 6 this understanding, the USSR contested strongly during the Cold War, when Western

international media were broadcasting cross border to the countries of the Eastern Bloc.

In cases where the media within a state's territory "incite systematic and widespread human rights violations" (Blinderman, 2002, p. 116), the state should take actions to ensure that these violations stop. This did not occur in Rwanda. More recently, the killings in the Darfur region of Sudan have been judged by the US government as genocide. In February 2005, a United Nations Commission found that the Sudanese Government had not pursued a policy of genocide, but like the Janjaweed militia, was responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes. While the UNSC has not judged the situation as genocide but still as crimes against humanity individuals can now be handed over to a prosecutor by the International Criminal Court (ICC) (UN News Service, 2005). In such cases, the options for media intervention would be to support alternative or existing media, which do not violate universal human rights and not to support only one side's media outlets.

Blinderman claims that if information intervention should be seen as humanitarian assistance, it is not enough that the country's media is perceived as biased or is distributing hate speech. There must be an immediate goal of preventing human suffering. Following his line of argument, it should be legal for humanitarian organisations working without a UN mandate, like the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), or other non-governmental humanitarian organisations, to help build alternative voices with the immediate goal of preventing human suffering.

However, the UN can, by the decision of the UNSC, use or sanction the use of all measures. As mentioned, it is particularly important

that the Rwanda Tribunal has clarified that incitement to genocide through media outlets does not require that the incitement is first proven by the effect, in terms of killings. With the decisions made by the Rwanda Tribunal, the judicial basis for the UN's options has been widened. If mandated by the UNSC, it is possible to stop media from spreading hate speech and incitement to genocide already before the intended effect has been achieved. The fact that editors in the media can be held responsible has already proven valuable in other situations of possible war crimes.

In Côte d'Ivoire, the UNSG made a speech in November 2004 that individuals would be prosecuted for war crimes if the national radio did not cease inciting to violence. Within twenty-four hours of the statement, the broadcasts became clearly less inflammatory (Griffitt, 8th December 2004, interview). The possible use of the ICC against editors and other media representatives can become a very valuable conflict prevention tool.

As most governments in countries of conflict are direct parties in the conflict and often do not observe the aforementioned conventions, we shall now discuss what options besides the ICC are open to the international community - the UN, regional organisations, or individual and groups of third party countries - in order to intervene in such situations.

The following will summarise the judicial and political legitimacy for the UN and its regional partners to intervene under different circumstances – be they through Chapter 7 decisions by the UNSC or through Chapter 6 mandates covering agreements with the governments and conflicting parties concerned. If relevant, the

thesis should point to cases where new policies and mandates are desirable.

The critical phases – Pre-Conflict, Immediate Pre-Conflict, During Conflict and Immediate Post-Conflict – pose the most challenging situations in legal and political terms.

While there might be sound reasons to intervene because a country has not prevented the media from distributing propaganda for war, national, racial or religious hatred, they do not provide a legal basis in themselves for external interventions. Essential to the legality of interventions is also the non-intervention norm, as described in the UN Charter Article 2, Paragraph 7 and in the Friendly Relations Declaration.

The Friendly Relations Declaration proclaims that no "State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any state…" (General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXXV) 25 GAOR, Supp. (no. 28) 121).

The UN can, if it determines that a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" exists, use the powers given in the Charter's Chapter VII to either use measures excluding armed force (Article 41) or if necessary, armed force (as described in Article 42) to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 41 in Charter describes the measures not involving the use of armed force, which could be used:

These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

This leaves no doubt that the UN, with a UNSC decision, can carry out or delegate to one or more member countries or regional organisations to carry out media interventions and other non-military measures or if necessary, armed force to prevent a conflict or restore peace.

On the restrictive interventions, Blinderman says:

if the United Nations Security Council concludes that a particular state's media outlets are creating a situation that threatens peace and security or if a particular state's media outlets threaten to impede the effect of prior Security Council resolutions, the Council may authorize member states (…)to interrupt transmissions from these media outlets (2002, p. 111).

Clearly, the UNSC's conclusion on the threat to peace and security must be reasonable to make such intervention legally evident according to UN's charter.

7.3 Public Information, Media, and the Mandate

The UN has become increasingly aware of the importance of media and public information in its peace-making and peacekeeping missions, as well as in the post-conflict peace-building process and preventive action. The Public Information experts from the Department of Public Information (DPI) or Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) do, in few cases, embark on pre-mandate missions in countries before a SC mandate is given. Usually, however, they come with the peacekeeping operations and depart at the same time. How directly and thoroughly the responsibility for Public Information and media is incorporated into the mandate depends very much on the context, but this awareness has been growing (Birnback, 8th December 2004, interview).

There have earlier been problems with the inclusion of media in the mandates given by the UNSC. In Cote d'Ivoire however, the mandate did in its brief include monitoring of the media (SC Resolution, 2003). The OCHA had initially and before any mandate outlined a strategy for media development (Manuel et al, 6th December 2004, interviews).

The UN's humanitarian branches like OCHA send missions to countries, which are struck by conflicts or disasters and work without any UNSC mandate. In situations, where governments request for UN assistance to prevent or settle a conflict, the UN can send a Chapter 6 mission without a UNSC mandate, but only in agreement with the respective government.

With mandated missions, governments must formally accept the mandates the UNSC gives, but it does not mean that they always do it:

> We have seen in many cases that what the Security Council says must take place does not always happen. It depends on the actors on the ground and on the political will of the international community. The governments often try to obstruct the Public Information activities. They forbid us to use state run radio, but they cannot deny us access to the already existing channels. They can take critical actions against us and as it is rare that there is something in the SC mandate authorizing us to take action directly with Public Information we have to find out what then to do (Birnback, 8th December 2004, interview).

East Timor presented a case in which the Indonesian authorities, together with a militia supporting the integration of East Timor, made it very difficult for the United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) to work. Following a written agreement between the UN and the foreign ministers of Portugal and Indonesia, the DPKO was to run a comprehensive information campaign leading up to a referendum in collaboration with the DPI, on whether East Timor should remain an autonomous entity within or apart from Indonesia. There were only three months from the deployment of UN staff to the day of the referendum and the DPKO spokesman, David Wimhurst, stresses the need for a rapid deployment mechanism in order to move more quickly and smoothly (2002, p. 287-309). While the written agreement was relatively detailed on all aspects of the public information efforts, intimidations and violence hampered the

job and following widespread riots after the referendum, which had
shown strong popular support to separation from Indonesia, the UN
mission had to leave the country. The obstacles to information
campaign leading up to the referendum had, however, proven how
important detailed mandates and agreements with the government
in concern are.

There is also a difference between the potential operations of the
parts of the UN under a UNSC mandate and other parts like the
OCHA or UNESCO. The American senior associate at the Stimson
Center in Washington, Dr. William Durch, is one of the leading
experts on peacekeeping doctrines and operations as well as a
former project director of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, which
reviewed and made recommendations to the UN's peacekeeping
operations which was chaired by the Algerian Ambassador to the
UN, Lakhdar Brahimi.

His judgement of the difference between going with or without a
mandate is as follows:

> If the Public Information interest is to maintain public order
> and to control hate speech broadcasters like in Rwanda or
> Bosnia, it seems to me easier doing it working under the
> authority of a mission's Special Representative to the
> Secretary General (SRSG) with a mandate directly from the
> Security Council. I would have the authority to implement
> the agreement on the agreed terms and say that this is
> what is going to happen, and if it does not happen, here is
> what else is going to happen.

> I could perhaps more easily build up alternative media if I
> was OCHA or a NGO contracted by some other entity to
> build up free media, and the problem was that all existing
> media were government controlled. It might be an
> advantage for someone like OCHA or a NGO running it
> more independent vis-à-vis being integrated into a Security
> Council mandated mission that they can go out and speak
> with the opposition. It is not always that the mission freely
> can do that (Brahimi, interview, 9th December 2004).

As we have seen, the UN has a solid legal basis when it exercises its
authority to restrict media through mandates from the UNSC,
prohibiting propagating war, advocating national, racial or religious
hatred, inciting to discrimination, hostility or violence and it can
ultimately decide to interrupt or close such media. These are also
the rights and duties of local governments and the UN in cases of
genocide.

The American Director of Studies at the Center on International
Cooperation at New York University, Dr. Barnett Rubin, stresses the
potential for working with the media in preventing the re-emergence
of conflict after a peace agreement:

> There it is easier because you have some kind of mandate
> for international presence. In situations when there is not
> an agreement and therefore the international presence is
> going to be operating basically with the consent of the
> government and a consequently much more limited
> mandate not comprising all parties as it would do after a
> peace agreement (Rubin, interview, 13th December 2004).

Unless it has been written into the agreement and consequently has the UNSC's mandate, it can be very difficult to restrict the media, which are supported or protected by the government. It is therefore crucial whether public information, media monitoring and other media activities are included in the formulation of such agreements.

In situations where the mandate is not sufficiently explicit about the UN's role in media and public information, it might prove easier for non-mandated missions like the OCHA and various international NGOs to work with indigenous media as part of their humanitarian tasks. The advantage that humanitarian UN organisations have is their breadth to execute public information and media activities without having to agree with the government, which allows it to deal with media across both governmental and opposition interests. This is usually also the case with international NGOs.

The British human rights activist and researcher Helen Darbishire, describes the situation in Yugoslavia, where the humanitarian aid did not include support to the media:

> Lobbying by UNESCO in co-ordination with NGOs to change this policy began in early 1993; By June 1994, assistance to the media was exempted from the sanctions (2002, p. 337).

One example was the Sarajevo-based newspaper *Oslobodenje*, which with its staff of Bosnians, Croats and Serbs continued to publish through the entire siege of Sarajevo. The UN decided to fly in print paper with its humanitarian assistance, because the newspaper was complying with the basic human rights principles

and was almost the only source of information for the inhabitants during the siege (Silva, interview, Spring 2002).

Depending on the mandate given to the UN following a peace treaty, it is not only possible to deal with local abuses of the media, but also to deal constructively with the support to new sources of information across enemy lines. As in the UNSC mandate for Congo, it is possible to include the facilitation of national dialogue and reconciliation, which should by all means be strengthened through the use of existing and new media.

The UN mission can consequently deal with abuses taking place in existing media during its mission, as well as be a sender itself - through its Public Information. We will now review the concept of public information. It is clear that Public Information has undergone tremendous development over the years, as has the UN's concept of public information as a support to its peacekeeping efforts.

The American professor at the Ralph J. Bunche Center, Dr. Mark D. Alleyne, points to the ambiguous use of propaganda in the UN's resolutions since 1947, when the General Assembly condemned "all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" (General Assembly Resolution, 1947).

However, the resolution also stated that governments should use "all means of publicity and propaganda" to promote the UN Charter and international peace. The same distinction was made in the *1948 Final Act of the UN Conference on Freedom of Information*, noting that some countries used media to "disseminate racial and national

hatred" and at the same time that ideas promoting friendship between races and nations should be propagated within the liberal democratic framework of a free and open marketplace of ideas.

Today we know that the mechanisms of communications do not guarantee that the recipients appropriate information the same way as intended by the distributors of messages. As we have seen in Chapter Two, this is highly dependent on the context and social network with whom the information is discussed (Thompson, 1995, p. 42).

The lack of mechanical efficiency between sender to receiver is not the only reason for debunking the old concepts of propaganda and information dissemination, both in striving for peace and propagating war. New global actors based on the power of information in terms of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and individuals have, because of the wired Internet revolution and the new 24/7 news media, created a new and demanding public. The directors of the Virtual Diplomacy Initiative at United States Institute of Peace, Drs. Sheryl J. Brown and Margarita S. Studemeister phrase it as follows:

Transparency necessarily governs not only official relationships but also relationships between public and private sectors and among individuals. Because each state's public has expanded far beyond its traditional borders and collective values, access to it via its own citizen's information network has forced every national government to become or at least appear transparent, and thus accountable, to global publics (2002).

Undoubtedly this is the reality in the developed and connected parts of the world, but is increasingly so in developing countries. In the recent *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, it is stressed repeatedly that transparency, credibility and accurate unbiased information are vital to a successful public information strategy (DPKO, 2003, p. 47-48).

The *Handbook* describes the six public information objectives for the UN's peacekeeping operations, to:

- Ensure the peacekeeping operation's mandate and responsibilities are fully and widely understood;
- Promote all aspects of the work of the peacekeeping operation to the national and international community;
- Implement a communications strategy that actively supports the peacekeeping operation's objectives;
- Advance the peace process through the creation of timely and relevant information products;
- Defend and protect the peacekeeping operation from unjustified criticism and misinformation; and
- Counter propaganda, false information and hate messages that are harmful to the objectives of the UN and the peace process (DPKO, 2003, p. 48).

Public Information is a multi-faceted creature. It is necessary to give the populations concerned factual and concrete information about where and how to obtain humanitarian assistance, where and why soldiers under the UN's auspices will be deployed. Factual information will, as discussed in Chapter 2, not be appropriated by everyone, but certainly remembered by most people who need humanitarian assistance, or who are met by foreign soldiers, for

instance. In the media, it might take the shape of public service announcements.

However, it might also be necessary to provide a larger picture of peace-making and later peace-building efforts including the political negotiations between the parties to the population. Public information usually conveys its messages and media activities according to planned strategies and objectives. It should, however never fall into the trap of propagating a message, which does not reflect the reality experienced on the receivers' end. As an illustration, while the Coalition in Iraq through the media praised the progress being made towards a more humane, stable and peaceful democracy the reality experienced by large segments of the population ran contrary, an indication that the communication strategy is bound to fail.

> Iraq shows both the possibilities and limitations to public information andthe media. If you can't physically protect the population you want to protect no amount of aspirational news and propaganda to the contrary is going to convince people that they are protected. They know what they know and they are told by friends. If what you say is not what they experience then it is worse than nothing (Durch, interview, 9th December 2004).

The UN's Public Information should be part of a communications strategywhich actively supports and strengthens the objectives of the peacekeeping strategy. The *DPKO Handbook* describes the efforts that civil officers should undertake to build confidence and dialogue between the conflicting parties (DPKO, 2003, p. 40). This can include building the first post-conflict economic ties, conducting

elections or bringing citizen groups together no matter what their ethnic, religious or other backgrounds are.

If we re-visit Lederach's Integrated Framework (1997, p. 75) combined with Maire Dugan's Nested Paradigm (1996, p. 9-20), the process of re-establishing relationships across conflict lines is indeed what the civil officers in the *DPKO's Handbook* are recommended to engage in. In this process, it should be equally important to make use of the media to reach out to a broader population and pave the way for confidence-building by increasing balanced and unprejudiced dialogue between the parties.

While it is often predicted that political negotiations on the issues of conflict take place without direct public involvement, the positive outcome of such negotiations can sometimes be furthered if broader parts of the conflicting groups are were involved in confidence-building dialogues independent from the political negotiations. As described by Herbert C. Kelman, political leaders rely heavily on popular support and try to shape a supportive public opinion during conflict escalation (1997, p. 200). The population's attitude is equally important in the process following the armed conflict and the suffering, which ensues. During and after peace negotiations, the appearance of the political leaders in domestic and international media fortifies their positions, both in relation to their counterparts in the conflicting camp, as well as to their own standing within the group they represent (Lederach, 1997, p. 138-140). The short term strategy for Public Information in this phase should consequently be twofold:

1. The rules of the game for publicity and press appearances during peace negotiations should be refined to avoid the

2. negotiating positions being steepened against each other as a result of press coverage and media appearances. This could be done through agreed terms between the UN and local parties for when and how to use media during the negotiations, and could involve the training of spokesmen and politicians in dealing with the media.

3. The peace agreement with its definition of the UN 's future role should be negotiated between the parties to include a right and responsibility for the UN to not only monitor the situation, but also be given airtime on national media. This could be for public service announcements on humanitarian and peace process issues, as well as for programmes facilitating dialogue and confidence-building between all sides of a conflict. In most cases, this would mean airtime on national radio or in countries like the former Yugoslavia on national TV. In other cases, it might mean the right to establish the UN's own radio services.

7.4 Public Information from a Media Development Perspective

The wars in the former Yugoslavia have brought the media's role in strengthening internal conflicts to the attention of international organisations. Unfortunately, they also turned out to be showcases for both the lack of coordination and clear strategies for post-conflict media development.

Yugoslavia had a rather well developed media landscape in the early 1990s, with a very dominant state media across all republics of the

federation, and a relative growth of print and local broadcast media. During the deployment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia from 1992 to 1996, numerous private local media were established, supported by various donors and international media NGOs – totalling up to 92 radio stations, 29 TV-stations and 145 news publications by 1996 (Thompson, 2002, p. 205) when the Dayton Peace Agreement was enacted.

With that Agreement, which almost ignored the provisions for the regulation of the media, amongst numerous other important issues, the international authority in this field was also split between the Office of the High Representative (OHR), NATO peacekeeping forces (IFOR and later SFOR), the OSCE and the political leaders of the Republic Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

An apparent lack of mandate to deal with the indigenous media and to regulate, reform or demand professional standards from the state media in particular, left the setting of the agenda to the political leadership, which had earlier abused the media to encourage conflict and war. An often repeated experience (Bosnia, Serbia and the Baltic States) showed that if the political independence of the media is not secured in the immediate post-conflict or transitional situation the political leadership will increasingly oppose letting it happen.

Though at least the IFOR and SFOR were given the provisions to "utilise such means and services as required to ensure its full ability to communicate and shall have the right to the unrestricted use of all of the electromagnetic spectrum for this purpose" (Thompson and De Luce, 2002, p. 206), the state media was generally ignored till the late 1990s. The strength and importance the state media had

gained over the years by first conveying the common imagination of
the Yugoslav state and later the symbols of conflicting ethnic and
republic identities within different parts of the country, might have
provided a useful platform for public information. No matter how
many new media were established by international donors – locally
or across Bosnia – they did not gain the audience levels or status of
common ownership as the much-abused state media had.

Only after scandalous fights between American and European
interests did a strategy for a media development evolve, in 1998.
Based on a comprehensive regulatory framework and independent
regulatory authorities, a public service system was established and
supported, along with a parallel system of private independent
media. As argued in Chapter 4 and concluded in Chapter 6, there
are reasons to believe that a public information strategy employing
both media systems in the already fairly sophisticated media
environment from 1992 and certainly from 1996, might have yielded
better results. One measure of this could have been the electorate's
choice of leaders -those with a greater will to collaborate peacefully
and assuage the tension between Serbs, Muslims and Croats in BiH.
Ignoring all the specific problems and clashes of interest between
the UN, OSCE and large nations in Kosovo, the UN gave priority to a
reform of the state broadcaster in 1999, in parallel with its support
to private, independent media. In the immediate post-conflict
phase, a collaboration between the UN mission and the media NGO
Media Action International (MAI) provided humanitarian information
relatively efficiently for a short period.

A public information initiatives in a developing country, which is
described by the DPI and DPKO as a success is Radio Okapi in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. As there had not been a national

broadcaster in Congo for a decade prior to February 2002, the
United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(MONUC) and the Swiss NGO *Hindorelle* jointly established *Radio
Ocapi*, with backing from a UNSC mandate for the mission to
facilitate national dialogue. The radio broadcasts in five languages
and reaches 70% of the population. Besides broadcasting news and
informative programmes, it produces everyday programmes
focusing on dialogues between people across the conflict lines.
According to the *DPKO Handbook*, the radio said to have set new
standards for accuracy and independence in other Congolese media
(DPKO, 2003, p. 47). What is left, however, is to buttress the long
term sustainability of the service. Business plans have to be
developed for a post-donor phase, whether as a commercially viable
broadcaster or as a public service broadcaster, partly or fully
financed through licenses, fees on electricity bills or funding from
the state budget.

Another example of a rapidly deployed post conflict initiative was
the Good Morning Afghanistan programme at Radio Afghanistan,
carried out by the European Commission jointly with the Danish
NGO Baltic Media Centre (BMC) in Afghanistan[21].

---

[21] At a meeting called and chaired by the UNDPI in London for four key actors in
Afghanistan – BBC World Service Trust, Internews, IWPR, and BMC - they agreed
to collaborate with a minimum of joint media policy principles, in order to avoid
the devastating conflicts which had transpired in the Balkans between European
and American donors. The meeting also agreed on inputs for a Consolidated
Appeals Process through the UNDP. Six weeks later, the EC/BMC entered an
agreement with the Afghan Interim Authorities and the Radio and Television
Afghanistan, that the EC/BMC with Afghan employees should develop a daily
prime time news programme – Good Morning Afghanistan - providing both
humanitarian information and impartial news across the country. Shortly after,
the EC/BMC was asked to develop an hour's evening programme, to include
news, social and family topics, as well as (serials promoting the) healing of war
traumas (DPKO, 2003, p. 46).

In countries where the UN has been given the mandate to control and develop the indigenous media, similar strategies could be used.

The UN can contribute to a strengthening of professional standards for programmes and support impartial reporting, which balances between the interests of both sides, deals with both conflict and peace building initiatives, as well as allows direct debate and dialogue between opposing parties. By so doing, the UN can create better conditions for a comprehensive public information strategy, as well as initiate a healthy media development which in the medium and long term perspectives will contribute to peace. As discussed in Chapter 5, this could and should be done within the boundaries of professional journalism. In practical terms, it might imply that the UN will use its mandate to demand new standards for the state broadcasters and secure a change towards genuine public service programming through capacity building of local journalists, managerial guidance and monitoring of the programmes. The UN should, on its part, also acknowledge that its own mission and activities can be scrutinised through independent journalism and that the prominence of UN-related issues in the media will ultimately depend on its capacity to compete with other local actors in 'selling' its agenda to the media. Alternatively, when necessary, concrete UN information should be given airtime as explicit public service announcements.

Both in Congo and Afghanistan, the projects did build the capacity of local journalists to produce impartial quality programmes with the local circumstances taken into consideration and with independence from political and economic interests. This is one of the by-products of Public Information activities suggested by the *DPKO Handbook*. Another is "to encourage donors, NGOs and other entities of the UN

system to provide funding, training or other assistance to strengthen independent, local media and build local capacity for accurate reportage" (DPKO, 2003, p. 46).

While it has never been the formal responsibility of the UN DPKO and DPI to design the media landscape or build a country's media capacity, the two cases illustrate that the DPKO, backed by the DPI, as part of its peacekeeping efforts created an entirely new national media landscape in Congo, and in Afghanistan, was a catalyst for the development of a joint international vision for the media in Afghanistan. The implementation of the joint vision was dependent on the interim authorities in Afghanistan and turned out to be rather individualised and according to the policies of the European Commission, US Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development (DfID), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and other donors.

While it is necessary to acknowledge that the UN does not have its own independent policy but rather coordinates and reflects the policies of its member states, it should also be said that there is a potentially important role for a coordinated approach to the implementation of media development initiatives. Consequently, the transfer from short term to long term responsibility in this field within the UN family and possible strategies with external partners will be discussed.

The following part will evaluate the capacity of the UN and of other potential governmental or non-governmental organisations already in the immediate post-conflict situation to be involved in rapid deployment initiatives and lay the first building blocks for longer

term efforts to strengthen dialogue and reconciliation, develop the capacity of local media and contribute to a sustainable independent media.

7.5 Capacity to and Responsibility for Rapid Deployment

The need for effective public information and communication strategies in all peacekeeping operations was already stressed in the *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects,* written in 2001 by a high-level panel chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi (Brahimi, 2001).

As part of the Brahimi report's attempts to point to possible ways of making the UN's peacekeeping operations more efficient, it recommends that additional resources for public information be devoted to the mission budgets and a rapidly deployable capacity built by the DPI headquarters.

William Durch states that "DPI and DPKO never agreed who should have the responsibility for the Public Information rapid deployment and the recommendations for having some high level entity in DPI does not seem to go anywhere" (interview, 9th December 2004).

In cases of rapid deployment, the DPKO has procured several sets of emergency radio production and broadcast equipment to be based among the strategic deployment stocks in Brindisi. Incidentally, one radio studio and other communication equipment were already available for the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003. This was an

advantage compared to earlier missions, but as the *Lessons Learned Study* on the start-up phase of the UNMIL concluded:

> the public information staff of UNMIL did not have the technical or logistical expertise to assemble and operationalise the equipment, and because of competing demands, the support required was not readily available. Thus, although the equipment had arrived and the mission was able to broadcast on the first day, which had not been the case in previous missions, the radio station, broadcast studio and communications system were not operational for at least a month after reaching Liberia. Moreover, due to the slow rate of recruitment referred to above, new staff were not recruited and departing staff were not replaced in a timely manner, despite the urgent need for an expanded public information capacity to support critical political activities (DPKO, 2004).

The recruitment of civil personnel for peacekeeping missions in particular, is a shortcoming which has not been solved yet. In William J. Durch's presentation to the Copenhagen Conference on *Strengthening the UN's Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management* in June 2004, he describes the problems of the civilian deployments and the "Rapid Deployment Team" set up following the Brahimi report (2004). The principle is that experienced permanent staff should be earmarked for rapid deployment within the Headquarters and field missions for the first ninety days. After that initial period, new staff, which has been recruited in the meantime, should replace the permanent staff, who can then return to their regular jobs.

There are four problems with this proposition: firstly, it is difficult to ensure that the permanent staff deployed through the Rapid Deployment Team system has sufficient knowledge about the destination country. Secondly, the staff from the Headquarters has an in-built hesitation about leaving home and going to the conflict area. Thirdly, the process of recruiting qualified staff often takes longer than the expected benchmark of ninety days and finally if the Rapid Deployment Team, due to the lack of incoming staff, has to prolong its stay, the Headquarter managers will hesitate to dispatch key staff for subsequent conflicts.

The importance of having qualified and experienced Public Information staff on the ground and from the initial phase of the UN's presence was one of the lessons learnt during the UN's mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In *Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone,* one of the hard-earned experiences was:

> During the planning phase of UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL, public information was not given adequate consideration as a key component of the mission and was not sufficiently resourced. The absence of a functioning and adequately staffed public information component to raise awareness and sensitize local and international public opinion about the UN and the mission's mandate and its activities resulted in a lack of understanding of the mandate and the role of the UN. During the crisis of May 2000, the lack of a strong public information component proved near fatal to the credibility of the mission (DPKO, 2003).

From the examples given and the interviews conducted within the UN Secretariat, there seems to be a need for a Rapid Deployment Facility which can secure efficient public information from day one and distribute public information through media platforms, which can be the first step towards future media securing peace, transparency and democracy. This demands that the Rapid Deployment Facility is familiarised with the media landscapes in the relevant countries, can easily recruit qualified staff and has a genuine methodology for public information and media development. The latter is becoming more important with the increased focus on preventive action.

As described in Chapter 4, the introduction by the UNSG and approval from the General Assembly of strengthening the UN's focus on the prevention of armed conflict sets higher demands for the operational UN offices to also link their efforts to the long-term structural prevention.

It is evident that media and the use of media in the different phases, tracks of external intervention in conflicts, as well as different approaches are best taken care of with an optimal coordination between the various actors.

Within the UN Secretariat, OCHA functions without a UNSC mandate, almost always under rapid deployment, with the crisis-oriented coordination of humanitarian assistance and acknowledges the importance of media assistance in order to prevent further human suffering. The Italian director of the Center for International Conflict Resolution, Columbia University, Andrea Bartoli, (Bartoli, 1995, p. 200) notes, that

> By looking at Rwanda, Liberia, Chechnya and other notable
> areas of conflict in the mid-1990s, it is evident that
> humanitarian aid alone cannot solve the structural cause
> which determine such predicaments. At the same time,
> however, it would be naive to believe that humanitarian aid
> cannot play a role in such crises.

My point is that the humanitarian assistance forms a first step in other modes of international support seeking to remove the causes of conflicts.

In most cases, OCHA leaves a post-conflict situation before the DPKO peacekeeping mission, but the organisation conceptualises and prioritises media and information as a strong and important function. This is evident through its Integrated Regional Information Network, Humanitarian Information Centres and very active and comprehensive internet-based functions. But it is also clear that OCHA, with its immediate crisis focus, would be less suited to bridging crisis to mid- and long-term media and communication strategies. The World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organisation (WHO) and other humanitarian agencies are in a similar position.

The DPA, which is the focal point for preventive action, sees their primary role as setting the policies and advising on country specific solutions, but only possesses limited operational capacity and hardly any public information or media expertise. Michelle Griffitt, the Office of the Under Secretary General of DPA, finds that in the media field, a much better knowledge of the country and its media landscape would help the DPKO and DPI extensively in their work. Better planning, improved hand-over to development agencies and

a more comprehensive strategy to secure sustainability in the field of media would be important steps to take as part of prevention action (Griffitt, interview, 8th December 2004).

Besides performing the humanitarian tasks of OCHA, the DPKO is the core operational department within the UN. As such, the DPKO carries out all peacekeeping missions, but as it has very limited public information capacity, relies heavily on the DPI's expertise in this field. However, Nick Birnback stresses that the DPKO's ambition to work with the media as part of sustainable peace and preventive action is very much alive, as reflected in the UNSG's annual report (Birnback, interview, 8th December 2004). In some countries like Congo, East Timor, Cambodia, or Bosnia, the DPKO has established radios, which still exist and are broadcasting. Depending on the long term strategies and business plans from UN DPKO some broadcasters have proven sustainable, while others have shut down as a consequence of lack of resources.

The DPI, which is a sizeable large department with substantial expertise from public information and media activities, would be an obvious choice for bridging the crisis, short- and mid-term approaches to public information and media strategies. However, only four people are employed within the Peace and Security Section and the resources for rapid and pre-mission deployment would need to be expanded if the DPI is to be responsible for the overall coordinator in this area. The DPI has the problem that its rapid deployment facility only can be used in conflicts, which are covered by a UNSC mandate and not in other conflicts or disasters, in which the facility could be used by OCHA and other humanitarian organisations. This could favour a more independent approach for the facility.

It is also important to consider that the DPI only develops strategies for longer term media development on an ad hoc basis, as part of preventive action. As described by the staff from this section, the period between the immediate and mid-term post conflict is improvised by different parts of the UN sans coordination (Manuel *et al*, interviews, 6th December 2004).

Beyond the UN Secretariat and working without the UNSC mandate, the UNDP and UNESCO are both dealing with media in conflict. The UNDP has reformed its programme to include a conflict prevention and peace-building approach and Michelle Griffitt, a former UNDP employee, points to their long term media programmes (Griffitt, interview, 8th December 2004). Similarly, UNESCO has in its Division for Freedom of Expression, Democracy and Peace, taken media initiatives, often in collaboration with international media NGOs and civil society organisations. UNESCO has established offices in early post-conflict scenarios in Afghanistan and a few other countries.

To attain the goals for preventive action as set by the UNSG, an increased coordination, development of tools and methodology between the UNDP, UNESCO and the UN Secretariat would be needed. However, when looking at the potential coordination within the UN family, it would also be relevant to examine the national and international media NGOs who, collectively, probably manage the largest budgets for support to media in post conflict situations. What is the difference in capacities and potentials between the UN and the NGOs and what are the legitimacy issues, which arise?

7.6   NGOs and other actors

Before analyzing the definitions and roles of NGOs, it should be acknowledged that I have, do and probably also will generate income from working with, analysing or advising on NGOs as actors within international responses to conflict, democracy and development issues. Though the reader might expect a less critical stance to this field of research, I shall do my outmost to be non-partisan in my analysis.

NGOs or civil society organisations, as they often are called, are terms defined by and for Western societies as counterweights to the state (Tvedt, 2003, p. 8). In some definitions, civil society includes private, commercial organisations, while in others it is seen as a third, non-profit sector between the state and market. Both are obviously definitions which can be troublesome when applied to development NGOs working internationally. How would one define civil society in a country with an almost non-existent state and market, or what is the rationale behind strengthening civil society ahead of the state's capacity to engage in democracy or the democratisation process?

The American Director of Studies at the Center for International Cooperation at New York University and international expert on Afghanistan, Dr. Barnett Rubin, is critical to the roles of many NGOs:

> There are always NGOs who have written proposals. With a lot of money everybody wants to come to Afghanistan and make workshops about civil society. There is a limit to the

absorption capacity to civil society activities and that limit
has already exceeded. Some Afghans get a nice couple of
days in a nice hotel, but there is nil impact at all except
that it creates a conflict between people who were invited
and not invited. NGOs are very unpopular in Afghanistan.
People hate them. They have big cars and houses and don't
do much of value.

I distinguish between those organisations who have worked
for years in the country, whose contribution is extremely
important. Then there are other NGOs who have never
been to Afghanistan and are doing it the same way
everywhere they go, but they don't know what they are
doing. The problem of some of the local NGOs is that
organisations that might be construction companies
pretend to be non-profit NGOs to be acceptable to donors,
but earn profits. This is corruption (Rubin, interview, 13th
December 2004).

In principle, civil society organisations cover a range of different
aims and motives: from conservative churches, fundamentalist
Muslim social welfare organisations, progressive human rights or
development organisations to stamp collecting clubs and women's
associations.

If we look at international media NGOs, most of them must certainly
be defined as progressive in the sense of supporting the
development of human rights, freedom of expression and
transparency. To my knowledge, no international media NGOs
advocate for censorship, restrictions of the free flow of information
or against independent media. If we look to national media NGOs

like audience consumer associations, the picture is less clear. In Denmark at least, there have been consumer associations, which have sought to control media content according religious or political lines. This might also be the case in some of the countries of conflict.

The Norwegian Research Director at Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen, PhD Terje Tvedt, finds it difficult from a power relations perspective to master

> the complex relationship between the egalitarian justification and its hierarchical structure, between the NGO-speak of partnership and bottom-up and the reality of donor power and a global hegemonic discourse on development (2003, p.9).

According to Tvedt, as the NGO-system in development aid is more accountable to donor policies than to the needs of the local constituency or beneficiaries in its resource management, it is hardly possible to discuss global civil society meaningfully. Instead, the thousands of NGOs reflect a variety of interests comparable to the diverse policies of nation states.

Nevertheless, not only nation states but also the UN seek enhanced and closer collaboration with the international development NGOs. Why is this happening?

In my view, there are several reasons for this:

- INGOs manage huge sums of international development support which, if connected to the operational goals of the UN, can contribute substantially to achieving these goals.

- INGOs can offer more flexibility and coordination in implementing concrete activities than governmental donors have often anticipated.[22]

- INGOs can, supported by the respective governments, deal with all parties in a country. They can, if considered appropriate by the donors or the UN, deal with representatives of opposition groups in countries with governments who lack legitimacy. This provides greater flexibility for two-sided approaches.[23]

- INGOs are probably slower to follow sudden changes in national foreign policies because of their idea basis, their local partnerships and flexibility in approaching several donors, at least theoretically. This strengthens the continuity in development work and reduces the risk of following the agendas set by the international media.

---

[22] The media support for post-conflict Afghanistan, which had an initial coordination meeting on the UN's initiative, turned out to be much more cooperative than the earlier interventions in the Balkans. The BMC, which was working solely with the state radio, had cooperated with Internews, which was solely working with the establishment of private, local media, and several employees from Good Morning Afghanistan at Radio Afghanistan, which had received training and support from Internews. Reciprocally, the BMC assisted with inputs to media policy analyses.

[23] As described in the previous chapters, this was the case in former Yugoslavia, where alternative and opposition media gained substantial support from INGOs to develop alternative voices to the state media, which were controlled by President Slobodan Milosevic's government. The governments and the UN system entered into parallel diplomatic and later armed ventures with and against the government.

Whether the UN's interest in leveraging on the qualities and characteristics of NGOs would be as fervent if it received the funds directly is, of course difficult to answer.

Terje Tvedt makes the case that it is absolutely crucial to analyse the role of INGOs, their donors, the UN system and other governments,

> since their numbers, the high level of activity, their size of funds and the fact that they are the managers of the international NGO language, influence in fundamental ways the institutional design and organizational map in countries all over the world (2003, p. 9).

The Director of the programme on Virtual Diplomacy at the US Institute of Peace, Dr. Sheryl Brown, backs this but is also concerned about the question of legitimacy versus influence:

> The NGOs as a kind of group now have more power than they have ever had to really make their agenda part of the international agenda, because governments have to listen to it. There are a number of NGO-agendas not worth the paper it is written on because of lack of legitimacy. But they have a megaphone and the governments have to listen to them. This is a very difficult time now because you have to deal with everything on an equal basis (interview, 9th December 2004).

One example of the NGO impact is given by the British human rights activist and researcher Helen Darbishire (2002, p. 340). In late 2000, the Macedonian government, after being pressured by a

number of media INGOs agreed to allow the Council of Europe
analyze a draft public information law on the condition that the
Council of Europe did it as confidential report to its member state
government. Shortly after, the Macedonian government approved
and presented a new law to the parliament The confidentiality did
not pay off in a reasonably open legislation and a coordinated
campaign between international media NGOs, some donor
governments, the EC, and others focused so much on this case that
the Macedonian government withdrew the draft law and promised to
prepare a new draft through a consultative process involving both
Macedonian and international media NGOs.

As mentioned, the NGOs are also important instruments for nation
states in their development policies. The United States is the
country which by far has paid the most attention to media
development across the world and with its significant free market-
oriented policy, set much of the agenda. Through USAID, the
American government has supported the three largest international
media NGOs – Internews, Irex and Search for Common Ground, who
combined with other smaller organisations, appear to have eclipsed
all other media NGOs in terms of resources, money, staff and
impact.

Media NGOs are a heterogeneous group. One category covers the
professional organisations, which guard the interests of their
members and additionally sets standards for their professional
constituency in developing and conflict countries. Amongst the
professional media organisations are the International Federation of
Journalists, World Association of News Papers and the European
Broadcasting Union. Local self-regulatory bodies dealing with

professional checks and balances in reporting also form a core/central part of this group.

Another category is the *monitoring and advocacy organisations*. They most often have human rights and freedom of speech as their central tenets. Consequently, the development or the conflict prevention perspective is second to the overall goal of freedom of speech or media freedom. From a simplified perspective, these organisations prefer the establishment of as many alternative voices as possible, to restrictions on existing media or focused support to dialogue in the media. Among these organisations are Article 19, the International Press Institute, the World Press Freedom Committee and as defenders of journalists threatened in their press freedom, the Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters Sans Frontières. Through their funding, these organisations tend to operate relatively independently of policies of the nation states and also tend not to work with governments in the target countries, but as watchdogs.

The third category is the *media development organisations*. These NGOs are all based on a belief in freedom of expression as a fundamental precondition. Their aims are, however, to promote democracy, conflict prevention or peace-building and media freedom only one possible way to achieve this. The range of activities reaches from capacity and institution building to media policy advice, support to co-productions and dialogue as well as to building of associations. Among these organisations are Irex, Internews, Search for Common Ground, Equal Access, Impacs, Free Voice, Press Now, Open Society Institute, International Media Support, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Panos, Medienhilfe, Hirondelle, and other normally member based organisations. These organisations seek to prioritise and operate from a professional

approach but are also dependent on the nation states as donors. Most of these organisations have been established in the late 1980s or early 1990s. There is often some overlap to the above second category.

The fourth category is *broadcasters, educational institutions or development foundations without memberships*. Among these are Radio Netherlands Training Centre, BBC World Service Trust, the Danish School of Journalism, European School of Journalism, FOJO (Swedish School of Journalism), Radio France International, Deutsche Welle, and others. Like the media development NGOs, these organisations are based on the belief in freedom of expression and primarily provide training and in some instances, support to institution building, media legislation or programme production. This can range from an income-generating motive, to benefit their non-profit mother institution, or in other cases, the promotion of the public service concept and media pluralism. In all cases, they can draw on a large supply of permanent and professional staff and reciprocally, offer their staff more variety in their daily work.

Looking at the options for collaboration between the international media NGOs and the UN system in conflict prevention or peace-building, it is possible to identify general trends as this will always involve some degree of simplification.

UNESCO has a solid and important cooperation on peace building and democracy with the second category of NGOs, but also some organisations within the first and a number of organisations within the third category of organisations focusing on media freedom as a core instrument in conflict prevention. UNESCO was an active partner in its collaboration with a number of NGOs in the Balkans

(Darbishire, 2002, p. 337), and together with OCHA it has entered a partnership with a number of NGOs for media and conflict prevention in West Africa. International Media Support "to facilitate the provision of rapid and collaborative support to the media to pre-empt and mitigate the effects of conflict and their humanitarian consequences" (International Media Support Memorandum of Understanding, 2003) established this on an initiative.

The UNDPI and UNDPKO have primarily focused their cooperation on the more operational organisations within the third and fourth categories. This has been either like Hirondelle, setting up and operating a UN radio in Congo and currently in Darfur, the larger NGOs in Afghanistan coordinating media policy, institution building and production support, or a number of other similar ad hoc cooperation.

There seems, however, to be a need for increased cooperation and coordination between the departments of the UN Secretariat working with and without a SC mandate. This includes the UNDP and UNESCO and international media NGOs of all four categories, listed above.

7.7   Conclusions

The rationale for selecting the UN as the starting point for the analysis of multilateral strategies for integrating support to media as part of conflict prevention and peace-building is twofold:

1. The UN has the maintenance of peace and security as its prime purpose. Under the Security Council, the UN

2. Secretariat has the responsibility of operational conflict management among its departments, in terms of peacemaking, peacekeeping and disarmament.

3. Compared to all international actors, the UN has the ultimate legitimacy in coordinating conflict preventing and peace-building efforts and can consequently play an important role in the development and coordination of strategies for support to media in conflict resolution.

7.7.1 With or Without a Security Council Mandate

As we have seen in this chapter, there is a marked difference between what the UN-DPKO, DPA and DPI and other UN organisations, the World Bank and INGOs, can do in the media field before and after conflicts, whether they work with or without a UNSC mandate. When the UNSC has given a mandate to a mission, it is desirable and possible to make provisions for a comprehensive public information effort, as well as to lay the first building blocks for mid- and long-term media development. In very few situations, as in Kosovo and Bosnia, the UN and its international partner organisations have full executive powers.

In a number of other conflict or post conflict countries, the UN has had to either work in tandem with the government or within the framework of peace agreements negotiated with conflicting parties. Under all circumstances, it is important that the written agreements and UNSC mandates consider all specific needs in the country and that the internal procedures are tightened. This could include

provisions for monitoring indigenous media, controlling and restricting the media from hate speech, incitement to violence or similar acts, which are counterproductive to the UN's peacekeeping and peace-building efforts. The mandates and agreements should further ensure that there will be media platforms for the distribution of public service announcements related to the UN's mission and the humanitarian needs in the country.

As a first step towards a democratic media landscape, the mandates should also ensure existing or new media platforms which, if based on recognised professional journalistic standards, can distribute accountable and impartial news and information or through balanced reporting and formats, contribute to increased dialogue and building of relationships across enemy barriers. Should it be impossible through existing indigenous media, the establishment of the UN's own broadcasters would be needed.

The organisations working without UNSC mandates like OCHA, WFP, WHO, UNICEF, UNDP and UNESCO, work within the much broader general mandates given to them. This means that they are freer to work without direct consensus with the governments or the leaders of the conflicting parties in many situations. It is obvious that there are many more humanitarian crises and protracted conflicts in which these organisations can work without a UNSC mandate than there are in which the UN works covered by such a mandate. These organisations have the option of working directly with civil society organisations, community, private and state media, whether they do it with a humanitarian, human rights or development perspective. This relative freedom can make them important complementary partners to the UNSC-mandated UN missions.

7.7.2 Rapid Deployment

We have seen that there is a need to boost the capacity for rapid deployment. This is particularly the case for the DPKO and DPI, but it is certainly relevant for the humanitarian organisations like OCHA, WFP and others.

One bottleneck lies in the lack of up-to-date knowledge about the indigenous media landscape, the current political, civil society and conflict-building actors, as well as the potential entry points for public information, dialogue or strategy for media development. Through collaboration with the DPA as well as a network of media development NGOs and the UN's Institute for Media, Peace and Security, this knowledge should be systematized and made available at very short notice. Indeed, a well-functioning monitoring of media landscapes in regions of potential conflicts could also serve as an early warning system.

Another bottleneck lies with the unavailability of core staff and the recruitment of qualified external public information experts to take over after the first three months. This bottleneck should be met through increased collaboration and exchange of public information officers within the various UN entities engaged in rapid deployment, as well as through increased access to the staff and resources of the non-governmental media development organisations.

A third bottleneck is the unavailability of technical equipment in the event of on-going wars or destruction of media infrastructure in conflict. As far as I know, most UN equipment available in Brindisi, Italy, is of a short-range nature and would hardly be useful in

national conflicts of larger scale. In practical terms, with the exception of communal conflicts as described earlier the most obvious need is often for medium and short wave radio transmitters and in rare cases, long range TV transmitters. The basic production equipment there is already in place.

A fourth bottleneck is probably the lack of a toolbox of information kits, methodologies and capacity to develop the public information efforts into sustainable journalistic environments. The *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* provides valuable guidance in this field, but should be supplemented with additional tools for public information, methodologies for working with journalists in indigenous media and for principles of media development.

7.7.3 Public Information

On one hand, it is necessary for the UN to provide humanitarian and practical information which gives practical answers to obvious needs, such as who is responsible for them, where to get food and shelter, the situation for refugees, security issues, etc.

On the other hand, as part of the peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, it is necessary to rally popular support behind the UN mission, the presence of peacekeeping forces, preparation for elections, or mine awareness campaigns and other issues of concern to the mission and mandate.

Thirdly, during the peace-making phase, it is recommended to advise or train the spokespersons and political leaders of the

conflicting parties in order to deal with the domestic and international media in a manner which, ideally, would avoid jeopardising the negotiation process through unfamiliarity and unintended errors in the handling of the media.

Fourthly, I would suggest an increase in the impact of conflict settlement and resolution efforts by using media and public information to re-establish relationships, build confidence and pave the way for reconciliation and transformation of the conflict.

When practical information is given, it should be accurate, objective and available to everyone. Public information seeks to influence attitudes among enemies or gain popular support for the UN mission, be it the DPA's diplomacy, DPKO's peacekeeping missions or civil officers stimulating dialogue and conflict mediation. In both cases, it is necessary to acknowledge that the old propaganda methods, which assumed that delivered information and particularly repeated information would be accepted by the receiving persons and change their attitudes accordingly, is definitely not the case. (*Propaganda in Theory and Practise: How does it* Work, Totse.Com August 2005 - www.totse.com/en/conspiracy/mind_control/-165524.html)

The receivers' appropriation of such messages is as we discussed it in Chapter 2 highly dependent on the reality on the ground and on discussions within their personal network and other social institutions. Consequently, public information can only hope and attempt to set the agenda, which will be discussed among the individuals – not necessarily to provide answers, which will automatically be accepted.

When dealing with public attitudes and opinions in countries with relatively strong national media, there are good reasons to deal with these in order to not distance the population from appropriating information from new media, as discussed in Chapter 4. However, in countries with very weak media structures, popular radios like *Radio Okapi* can make a significant impact.

Instead of seeking slots in which the UN can broadcast its own programmes, it would probably have more impact if the UN, in partnership with other actors, were to collaborate with existing media to support the development of professional standards and balanced reporting in the ordinary news and current affairs programmes. When issues of concern to the UN's mission are treated by local journalists through professional news criteria, the messages will gain credibility with the population more easily and important steps towards a sustainable and professional media can be taken.

7.7.4 Media Development

In Chapters 5 and 6, we discussed and analysed the impact and strategies for working with indigenous media as part of medium and long term preventive action, as well as a strengthening of the operational conflict management. It is clear that the main responsibility for long-term media development lies with the UN organisations outside the Secretariat, regional organisations, national donors and international media NGOs.

However, there are all good reasons to ensure that bricks for a sustainable media development are laid already when the UN -

through OCHA, DPKO, DPA or DPI - enters a conflict. In an immediate post-conflict situation, it is very easy to influence the policy and development of the local media. It exerts an immediate impact on the platform for public information. It is cheaper and more efficient to change the direction of existing media the earlier the first steps are taken. Particularly with the increasing emphasis on preventive action, it is important to link short, medium and long term interventions in order to transform the conflict through the removal of the root causes.

This requires clear strategies in the fields we have analysed and developed models for – namely the media landscape, media regulation, content, capacity and institution-building – with a clear adaptation to the concrete circumstances.

It also requires that the strategies are developed with and adapted to the interests of the other actors working with medium and long-term media support to peace-building and conflict prevention. For the UN, this coordination would by nature involve the DPI, OCHA and other humanitarian organisations as catalysts. It would require links to regional associations like the AU, OSCE as well as actors in the medium and long term strategies described above as the UNDP, UNESCO, the international media NGOs, EU and a number of significant national donors.

A scheme for the types, timing and actors in necessary media interventions – whether public information or media support - would look as follows:

Intervention Goals:	Humanitarian Crisis Information	Preventive Action	Peace Making Peace Building	Democracy Transition	Development
Actors involved: **Conflicts:**	OCHA, WFP, WHO, EC, National Donors, NGOs	UN, UNDP, UNESCO, EC, National Donors, NGOs	UN, UNDP, UNESCO, Regional Associations, EC, National donors, NGOs	UNDP, UNESCO, EC, National Donors, NGOs	UNDP, UNESCO, EC, National Donors, NGOs
Rapid	X	X	X		
Short term	X	X	X	X	
Mid term	(X)	X	X	X	X
Long term		X	X	X	X
Disasters:					
Rapid	X				
Short term	X				
Mid term	(X)				X
Long term					X

Table 12: Integrated model for intervention goals, actors, and time horizon for media interventions in conflicts and disasters

7.7.5 Towards an integrated model for media support in the UN's operational conflict management and structural conflict prevention

In developing an integrated model for media support as part of the UN's operational conflict management and structural conflict prevention, several needs must be fulfilled, as presented in the table above.

It is necessary to involve parts of the UN system with UNSC mandates to enable coercive approaches, like we have seen it can be an advantage to involve parts of the UN family, which do not depend on dealing with the governments. While the UN family and other global or regional multilateral organisations have a strong

legitimacy and political weight, there is a need for NGOs and other agencies to implement projects supporting particularly content, capacity and institution-building. Further, the involvement of national donors will contribute to strengthening the UN's operational and structural conflict management.

This chapter has also clarified that in order to engage in public information and media support activities already during peace making and at least as soon as the peacekeeping operations start, there is a need to build the rapid deployment capacity of the UN. It has been illustrated that media development initiatives would benefit from being initiated as early as possible.

Particularly to move the focus from conflict settlement over conflict resolution to peace building and preventive action it is necessary to substantially contribute to a change of the media landscape, the legislation, content and ethics of the media and journalists. To ensure this development there is a need to build media development toolkits and capacity within the UN-organisation allowing it to play a guiding role for rest of the international actors.

In order to meet these needs a new organisational set up is required.

As we have seen, there are several bottlenecks which either individually or combined hinder efficient and rapid deployment. Among these are the availability of up-to-date knowledge of the media landscape in potential conflict countries, the availability of core staff and ability to recruit external staff quickly, the availability of rapidly deployable relevant technical equipment, as well as a

toolbox of methods and knowledge based on continuous experience from deployments.

With the many UN organisations and departments requiring the capacity to deploy their public information and media support rapidly, the creation of a joint rapid deployment facility would maximise resources and capacity. Such a facility should be used by the relevant partners, whether they work with or without a mandate from the UNSC.

It is logic and feasible to combine a rapid deployment facility with responsibility for the development of joint strategies for interventions in countries and regions. Perhaps, but not necessarily, a continuous exchange of experience and development of methods, tools and strategies could be based in the same facility.

The rapid deployment facility should implement and ensure as much coordination as possible within the following functions:

- Rapid intervention in conflict preventing or peace-building tasks including the provision of broadcast equipment, technical, public information and media development staff.
- Rapid intervention in humanitarian crises, including the provision of broadcast equipment, technical and public information staff as well as advice on media development.
- Collection and presentation of up-to-date information about the media landscape and related issues in the countries of concern.

- Country strategies and programme development for medium and long term interventions in peace-building, preventive action, and conflict transformation should be formulated cross cutting with other development programmes.

Organisational set up:

In setting up such a facility, the obvious lead partner would be the UN DPI, which is responsible for public information strategies as part of the DPKO's missions. It is clear however, that the rapid deployment facility must be able to work independently from the DPI in order to also cover the interventions, which take place in conflicts without a UNSC mandate, including those carried out in humanitarian crises caused by natural disasters.

The most appropriate solution would probably be to establish rapid deployment as an independent entity governed by representatives from the DPI, DPKO, DPA, OCHA, UNDP and UNESCO, the UN's logistics base in Brindisi, and larger media development NGOs to ensure access to their networks of experts, knowledge of media landscape and involvement in long term strategies. In addition, representatives for the European Union and larger national donors should be involved.

International actors:

Above we have illustrated the many common modes of intervention in crises which stem from conflicts or disasters. In the following scheme, we shall focus on the international actors, who are relevant in the phases of conflict, which were defined in Chapter 4. Not all interventions are relevant in all phases and not all international actors are relevant in all interventions.

Possible interven-tions/Period	Distant Pre-Conflict	Pre-Conflict	Immediate Pre-Conflict	During Conflict	Immediate Post-Conflict	Post-Conflict Peace-building	Transformation of Conflict Society
Aim	Removal of root causes of the conflict	Mediation between adversaries and solution of conflict issues	High level negotiations, monitoring, protection of identity groups	High level negotiations, humanitarian assistance	Humanitarian assistance, re-establishment of relationship and state structures	Reconciliation, social change, civil networking between adversaries	Involve society in the development of joint values, visions and systems
Media Structure /legisla-tion	UNDP, UNESCO, EU, regional organisations	UNDP, UNESCO, Regional organisations			UN, UNDP, UNESCO, Regional organisations, media development NGOs	UNDP, UNESCO, Regional organisations, media development, monitoring & advocacy NGOs	UNESCO, Regional organisations
Media moni-toring/-ethics		Monitoring and advocacy organisations	UN, Monitoring & advocacy NGOs, Media develop-ment NGOs	UN, Monitoring & advocacy organisations	UN, Monitoring and advocacy organisations, Professional organisations	Professional organisations, Monitoring & advocacy, Media development NGOs	Professional organisations
Capacity building	Educational institutions	Educational institutions and media development NGOs	Educational institutions and media development NGOs		Media development NGOs, broadcasters	Media development NGOs, broad-casters, Educational institutions	Educational institutions
Support to Content	Media development NGOs	Media develop-ment NGOs, Professional organisatons, broaodcasters, EU and national donors	Media Development NGOs, EU and national donors	UN, Regional organisations, Media Develop-ment NGOs, broadcasters, EU and national donors	UN, Regional organisations, Media develop-ment NGOs, EU and national donors, broadcasters	Media Development NGOs, broadcasters, EU and national donors	EU and national donors
Public Informa-tion			UN, EU, regional organisations, International Criminal Court.	UN, EU, regional organisations	UN, EU, regional organisations, humanitarian organisations,	UNDP, UNESCO, EU, national donors	

Table 13: International interventions and actors in phases of conflict

8. Conclusions

8.1 Introduction

I embarked on this dissertation with the ambition to analyse the extent to which multilateral and international media support can prevent conflicts, and in which phase(s) of a conflict, under what specific circumstances and by what means it can contribute to sustainable peace.

To discern the answers, it has been necessary to draw on theories and models, which can be used to comprehend conflicts, the dynamics of conflicts and approaches to peace-building and conflict prevention. I have investigated the social-psychological factors, which influence individuals during conflict and affect the appropriation of media messages. Furthermore, it was also important to draw from communication and media theories in order to develop appropriate strategies.

As research within the field of media, communication and the prevention of conflict is new, with very little existing theory, it has been necessary to analyse and construct a number of sub-areas, with each deserving of its own research. I have summarized below, the findings which have been developed through the dissertation as the backdrop for establishing coherent strategies using media and communication in conflict transformation. Finally, I will discuss additional perspectives from the models and strategies I have developed in the conclusion. Are they applicable to other contexts? Can new and future actors be foreseen? What areas should be explored further, to strengthen international and multilateral efforts to prevent and transform conflicts?

8.2   Findings

My focus is on internal conflicts, which have posed new challenges to both international relations schools and strategies for peace-building since the end of the Cold War. While most conflicts today are rooted in unequal access to resources, structural inadequacies of societies, and are often triggered by leadership ambitions, the popular support behind the conflicting parties is typically rallied along ethnic, cultural and religious identity lines. This imbues the media with a particular responsibility.

From my analysis of the media's role during conflict escalation in Chapter 3, it is clear that media in countries with conflict has contributed to conflict escalation in many ways. First, they turned a *blind eye* to the inadequacies and injustices forming the root causes of conflict and later became increasingly one-sided and *biased* in their reporting during the process leading up to armed conflict. By spreading prejudices and stereotyping of the adversaries, the media actively contributed to building a state of *moral panic*.

My analysis showed how on one hand the political leadership *strengthened editorial control* to obtain the media's support for conflict; the closer a country was to open conflict. On the other hand, editors and journalists themselves often took sides as *patriots* in favour of their own identity groups. Those who tried to stay balanced and neutral were removed from prominent positions.

As the analysis also illustrates, there is no indication that state media contributes more to conflict escalation than private media. State media tends to function as a platform for struggles between different political views, each seeking to influence the editorial line

framing the stories which are reported. Private media, where they exist, are not subjected to the formal political decision processes as the former, but often operate as tools for specific political interests or seek to meet market demands for patriotism and consequently conflict escalating reporting.

Structurally, the *media landscape* -understood as the media's structure, legislative conditions and capacity- is the fundamental basis for the media's role during conflict escalation. However, as described above, the dynamics of conflict with increasing leadership control, patriotism and the bias of editors and journalists influence the level of escalating or de-escalating content.

Both the *structural and dynamic factors* determining whether the media contributes to a discourse of conflict escalation or de-escalation are factors, which international media support can influence. I have identified the possible *areas of media intervention* as *media structure, media legislation, ethical standards, journalists' capacity* and support to *content*.

As there are numerous choices to be made when deciding what direction support to the development of media structure and legislation should take, I have discussed and analysed the different types of media from criteria reflecting, what I believe is their potential for de-escalating content. A key term is *diversity*, which not only reflects variations in content and attitudes, but also implies that, from a normative perspective, the media in structure and content should reflect the diversities within a given society. It should ensure equal access for all minorities, serve as a forum for different interests and opinions and offer relevant choices of content and variety over time. Another important term is *impartiality*.

Impartiality in reporting values balanced reporting, showing a case from all sides, truth, critical stance and neutrality are in place both within the individual programme and in the general journalistic standards.

Based on the *de-escalating values* and the experience from media in conflicts, it is possible to systematize media into three groups, each with its own characteristics, strengths and weaknesses:

- Government, State and Public Service media
- Commercial, Political and Religious media
- Non-profit and Community media

All three groups include Net-media as one mode of communication and distribution of information. Most appropriate to direct support are if looked upon from impact, geographical coverage and potential de-escalating values the state media, which if supported must be supported in a development towards genuine public service media. Also professional media owned by non-profit foundations, public trusts etc. have a great potential for de-escalating values, offer alternative voices to the state media, and deserve efficient support. Commercial, political and religious media might be totally diverse, but only some individual commercial media represent diversity and impartiality. By definition, community media does not adhere to professional journalistic characteristics or de-escalating values as defined above. However, depending on their structure and policy, community media might prove to be valuable instruments for international peace-building and conflict transformation efforts.

The analysis of the media's role during conflict escalation indicated significant differences in *structural, legislative*, and *political*

conditions as well as in *editorial practices* of the media along the timeline of conflict. In most cases, violent conflicts in one country or region are recurring, with varying breaks in between. Optimally, international efforts should aim at preventing the recurrence of conflicts by removing the *structural root causes* through transformation of the society in which the conflicts take place. However, this is a long-term perspective. Moving towards sustainable peace starts from the assurance that upcoming violent outbreaks are prevented, that violence which has already taken place is stopped and that re-building of state structures and re-establishment of relationship between the fighting parties are established post-conflict. In other words, in addition to long term interventions, short and medium term measures must also be used to play into the *dynamics* of individual conflicts.

If we isolate one violent conflict to describe the dynamics for the media, it becomes clear that there are more variations than just the pre-, during and post-conflict phases. In Chapter 4 I have described how a conflict escalates from a *distant pre-conflict phase*, in which root causes could be targeted and in which there is no certainty that an outbreak of violence will take place in the future. In the *immediate pre-conflict phase,* the violent conflict is very obvious, almost unavoidable, and the control and bias of the media and journalists exceed all formal legislation, established practices and codes of conduct. Between the distant pre-conflict and the immediate pre-conflict is the *pre-conflict phase*, where it still is possible for international actors to influence the media in moving from a conflict-escalating to a conflict de-escalating role. In theory, it is still possible to prevent the violent conflict from taking place in this phase.

Similarly, it is possible to identify different post-conflict phases when a peace agreement has been established. There is an *immediate post-conflict phase*, during which much of the scope for media interventions is the establishment of emergency humanitarian information, but also where the first steps towards future media can be taken. Following the immediate post-conflict is a *post-conflict planning phase*, during which local and international actors aim to plan the future media structure, adjust existing media legislation, build the capacity of journalists and other actors, support institution-building and initiate the long process of reconciliation with the population. Following the post-conflict planning phase is what I call the *post-conflict peace-building phase*, during which the planned changes for the media and the process of reconciliation are implemented. Following this is the *Transformation of Society Phase*, during which the root causes finally must be removed and joint visions for the whole society are developed.

The *Distant Pre-Conflict* and *Transformation of Society Phases* are not marked by tense conflicts and in reality harbour the same potential for preventing recurring conflicts through a change of society. In both cases, the media must be encouraged not to turn a blind eye to inadequacies in society and on the contrary, should question and examine further options for change. The importance of targeting conflict prevention even several years after a violent conflict has been surfaced and illustrates the necessity for international actors to think long term, to prevent recurring conflicts.

I adapted a model developed by Maire Dugan for the mediation and transformation of social conflicts into a model for support to content to prevent recurring conflicts. I tested this model through a number

of focus groups interviews. The one TV programme, which was tested fit into the suggested model. This did not prove that all programmes which fit into one element of the model necessarily fit all other elements. However, the parallels with Dugan's model are so convincing that I believe that my model offers a feasible design of content support.

My model suggests goals and programme genres along a post-conflict timeline. In principle, print and Net media could also follow the same pattern as broadcast media. In *immediate post-conflict,* the *goal* is to discuss solutions to the immediate issue triggering the conflict. *Programme genres* could be news and current affairs as well as debate programmes. In the *post-conflict planning* and *peace-building phases,* the *goal* is to re-establish relationships and confidence between adversaries through the reduction of fear, stereotyping and prejudices. *Programme genres* could be magazines, documentaries, fiction, sport and entertainment.

The *peace-building* and *conflict transformation phases* aim at removing the root causes of conflict for those directly involved and point to potential changes at system levels. *Programme genres* could be magazines and factual documentaries. *The conflict transformation phase* further *aims* at a broader transformation of society, removing the root causes of future conflicts, and establishing a joint vision for society. *Programme genres* could be investigative, historic or thematic programmes as well as documentaries, news and debate programmes.

In my analysis of the international actors responsible for conflict prevention and peace-building, I have focused on the UN as the multilateral organisation formally mandated by all states to prevent

and remove threats to peace and strengthen universal peace. During the past years, the departments of the UN Secretariat have increasingly had media monitoring and information activities mentioned in UNSC mandates and peace agreements which the UN has been involved in. With the UN's emphasis on structural conflict prevention, there are good reasons to see media and communication strategies not only as part of peace-making and peace-keeping activities, but also as building blocks for structural conflict prevention and transformation. The sooner that long-term strategies are developed, the better chances are for the post-conflict transformation of the media into structures, which is based on the removal of root causes of conflict. However, the analysis also shows that the UN Secretariat has administrative limitations on its ability to deploy rapidly. The interventions carried out with a UNSC mandate allow the UN to put force behind its demands on the conflicting parties to a large degree, while at the same time hindering the mission's ability to work with other partners, apart from the formal leaders from the conflicting sides, to a large degree. Additional actors from the UN family, like UNDP and UNESCO, are better suited to work directly with civil society organisations, community, private and state media without an explicit consensus from government and leaders. They are capable of carrying out long-term interventions. In the work to transform media landscapes, the multilateral organisations, national and multilateral donors often use international media NGOs to implement their policies.

I have categorised international media NGOs, which represent a significant proportion of the international support given to media in conflict, into four categories:

- *Professional organisations* for journalists, broadcasters and print media which focus on the interests of and standards for their professional constituency.

- *Monitoring and advocacy organisations* focusing on human rights and freedom of speech, which work relatively independent from their donors and act as watchdogs rather than as partners with the governments in the target countries.

- *Media development organisations* aiming to promote democracy, conflict prevention or development through media policy advice, support to co-productions, institution and capacity-building seek to work independently but are often instrumental for the interests of national and international donors.

- *Media, educational institutions and development foundations* are based on values as freedom of expression, while their primary interest often is income generation and professional challenges for its internal staff.

Making use of the strengths of each of the potential actors, I conclude in my analysis on the UN's role that a coherent media and communication strategy should be developed and implemented in collaboration with the possible actors with a view to improve the ability to act rapidly and implement coherent long-term transformative approaches.

Such collaboration should take place at a general political and methodological level and in concrete conflict situations to achieve the optimal preventive and peace-building impact.

8.3   The Design of Media Interventions

Nothing indicates that media interventions alone can prevent conflicts or establish sustainable peace. For that purpose, several other strategies and instruments have been developed over the past decades. However, everything indicates that the mass media, with its increasing influence as an agenda setter, has an important role in contributing to the success of other intervention areas. Therefore, media interventions have to be placed within the framework of other international efforts in operational and systemic conflict management.

When dealing with conflict management from a short-term perspective, I have anchored my belief on the positions made by several scholarly sources that the progress towards peace already starts from the initial steps during the immediate crisis. In other words, while crisis interventions have their own goals to achieve, short-term interventions are also setting the framework for medium- and long-term development.

I also believe that short-term interventions alone do not have much impact. The immediate goal of conflict settlement does not play into the overall perspective of resolving and preventing recurring conflict or achieving sustainable peace. Consequently, it is necessary for international operators involved in conflict management from the crisis intervention, to include strategies for long-term conflict transformation.

In this dissertation, it has been necessary to analyse several factors in order to suggest coherent strategies for using media and communication leading to long-term conflict transformation. The

same process is needed for international actors, be they multilateral organisations, donor governments or international NGOs. In order to design and plan media interventions, the international actors must analyse the conflict situation thoroughly, looking at it from conflict, media & communication, and social psychological perspectives.

The following **Integrated Model for Media Intervention Design** shows how the analysis deals within all three theoretical approaches with structural, individual and dynamic factors. Similarly, the design of a media intervention must contain structural long-term goals and immediate objectives with concrete activities**:**

Integrated Model for Media Intervention Design

    ANALYSIS

    1. Conflict Theory

    a. Root causes
    Economic/Social factors
    Structural factors
    Cultural/Identity factors
    Political factors

    b. Dynamic causes, conflict phase
    Economic crisis,
    Structural changes
    Minority bashing
    Political power struggles
    Phase of Conflict

2. Media & Communication Theory

a. <u>Media landscape</u>

Structure, ownership, Distribution

Legislation

Capacity

b. <u>Editorial policy, Content</u>

Conflict Escalating Content

Editorial Control,

Journalists´ Identification

De-escalating potential – media by media

3. **Social psychological theory**

a. <u>Identity and Social Communication</u>

Ethnic, Social, Religious, Geographic identity groups

Private, public and social communication structures

Levels of Leadership

Civil Society actors

b. <u>Media Perception</u>

Consumption of media, by identity groups

Trust in media, by identity groups

Perceived images of 'others´ and mirrored images

Appropriation processes of media messages

Figure 4: Integrated Model for Media Intervention Design - Analysis

STRATEGY

1. Conflict theory

a. <u>Intervention Phases</u>

Conflict Prevention

Conflict Settlement

Peace Building

Conflict Transformation

b. <u>Conflict Resolution Goals</u>

Resolution of Conflict Issue

Re-establishing relationships

Reconciliation

Visions for future

2. Media & Communication Theory

a. <u>Intervention areas</u>

Timeline

Media Structure

Media Legislation

Capacity Building

Institution Building

b. <u>Support to Content</u>

Choice of Media

Choice of Programme Genre

Content goal

Institutional and Ethical Approach

Social Psychological Theory

a. <u>Identity Groups and Media Structure</u>

Media Diversity

Common Media Platforms

Diversity of Journalists

Capacity Building

Civil Society Actors

b. <u>Content Identification</u>

Conflict Issues and Solutions

Confidence-building

Dialogue and Reconciliation

Societal Problems and Visions

Figure 5: Integrated Model for Media Intervention Design - Design

8.4   Additional Perspectives

I have focused on media and communication strategies in internal conflicts, but it is also worth discussing if the findings and models developed for them are viable in the context of *international conflicts*.

From a conflict theory perspective, the dynamics and phases of conflicts are very much the same in the analysis of conflicts. So are the social psychological and media and communication factors, except that it is necessary to analyse these in two or more countries.

Most internal conflicts have strong regional repercussions. While this is a dimension which would benefit from in-depth analysis when dealing with internal conflicts, the regional and international aspects become even more important when analysing and providing answers to international conflicts. The inclusion of regional and international dimensions is relevant for general conflict management efforts, but are also needed when analysing media and communication strategies. The adversaries in internal conflicts have an interest in cultivating the favour of international media coverage for their side, because it might eventually lead to international political, economic or arms support outcomes. In international conflicts, the understanding of the media in the conflicting countries as well as of the international and global media is complex. The theoretical frameworks and tools developed in this dissertation however, would also be valid for international conflicts.

One interesting and highly relevant consideration is, whether it is relevant to use the approaches to media in internal conflicts in

countering *terrorism*; here understood as violent attacks intended to harm innocent civilians. While this is not a subject which I have researched, there is a variety of terrorist attacks motivated by everything from geographical and political ambitions to broader perceptions of cultures and identities. One example is the present wave of terrorist attacks committed by primarily Islamic suicide bombers. Numerous observers have suggested different explanations on what causes socially well-functioning young Muslims to become terrorists: One explanation is that the injustices related to issues of Western foreign policy, the social and political injustice in Muslim countries, the injustices against Muslim immigrants in the West, or inequalities between different countries, foment hatred among potential terrorists. Another explanation is that the simplified picture and perception of Western culture conveyed through the Internet and other media to the populations of Muslim countries, coupled with the simplified picture and perception of Muslim culture in Western countries feed groups of potential terrorists. On both sides, a discourse of war has developed as if it were a conflict waged on conventional targets.

If these explanations are correct, parts of the suggested media strategies for internal conflicts might also be adequate in fighting terrorism. In Western and Muslim countries, the media should actively discuss and question possible injustices in domestic and foreign policy issues. This debate should involve inputs from both sides, be they Muslim immigrants, Western political leaders or the population and leadership in Muslim countries. As well as media's capability to reach all concerned must be ensured. In employing media strategies, it is also essential to look at the environment fostering terrorists from a conflict dynamic perspective, that is, the role of the media during conflict escalation as stimulating prejudices,

stereotyping and moral panic. This can also be seen in the coverage of terrorism carried out by radical Islamists. The Western media might not scapegoat Islam and the majority of Muslims, but very little is done to convey an image of the normal or modern Islam, as practised by the large majority of immigrants in the West and inhabitants of the Muslim world. Similarly, images of the West, particularly the USA, in Arab media do not reflect the lives and values of ordinary citizens. In my view, there are good reasons to search for de-escalating methods when dealing with media and communication as a tool to reduce conflicts involving terrorism.

Through this dissertation, the red thread has been the focus on conflict and even more, the laying of the foundation for democracy and conflict transformation. Consequently, large parts of the theories and models developed are directly or easily adapted to models for international support to democracy development. Discussions on journalism, ethics in journalism, media structure and legislation are all valid when targeting issues such as *democracy, good governance, human rights or social development*.

The adapted model for post-conflict support to content also offers a relevant approach to articulate other societal changes – ranging from health, HIV/Aids, environment, gender, to social development. As I have explained in my model, there is a need for further tests and possible adjustments. From the conflict theory concepts of dynamic and structural approaches, as well as from prevention, resolution and transformation strategies, the parallels to awareness campaigns and communication strategies are apparent. Further theoretical elaboration and development of these concepts could lead to important inputs for communication for social change strategies.

I have dealt with the broadcast media as being conventionally organised in a flow programme structure. With increasing possibilities for the interactive use of programmes in traditional broadcast media, we can expect to see that the broadcast media's function as creators of national or group identities will be loosened. Such a development can imply serious adjustments of the theories and models I have used and will soon require further research.

One other aspect which is important to research more deeply is the involvement of *civil society organisations* at both global and local levels. Civil society advocacy organisations might lack legitimacy, but nonetheless are setting and imposing important international and national agendas. There is no given agenda – constructive or destructive to peace – and global agendas are seldom neutral to all contexts, but often formulated by one part of the world – geographically, politically or socially – and spread to all others. The risk is that terms such as peace, democracy, human rights or gender equality as absolutes are imposed on all societies regardless of societal conditions, or that other values, which might be seen as inappropriate to most of us, are spread efficiently. The value, however, is that when civil society organisations act globally, they can give a hitherto unseen prominence to important values.

An important tool for civil society organisations is the *Internet,* with all its new communication possibilities. As we have seen, the Internet can be used to foster important and efficient campaigns. However, as with conventional media, there is no guarantee that it will be used for peace-oriented or constructive purposes. There is a need to clarify the potentials and criteria for international support to the involvement of civil society and use of Net media in future strategies for peace and societal transformation.

While community media can give valuable input to conflict resolution and peace-building integrated with other reconciliation efforts, they do in some situations voice alternatives to the opinions of the political leadership and are often used by civil society organisations as their primary communication tool. In conflict situations, standards must be developed for the organisation, management and content in community and alternative media before international support can be given safely.

Equally important is the future development of interactive mainstream media and the impact of increased concentration of media – regionally or globally. This development offers new risks but also new possibilities to increase the impact of international support to peace-building, conflict prevention and transformation.

Most important, however is to ensure that multilateral organisations and donors systematically analyse and integrate media and communication strategies as part of their substantial support to prevent conflict and build peace. The development of coordinated analyses and implementation of such strategies should take place between the UN family, other multilateral organisations, national donors, researchers and international non-governmental organisations to ensure that media and communication have an optimal impact. I hope that this dissertation can be a modest contribution to such a process.

bnb

Appendices

A) Declaration of principles on the conduct of journalists

Adopted by the Second World Congress of the International Federation of Journalists at Bordeaux on 25-28 April 1954 and amended by the 18th IFJ World Congress in Helsingör on 2-6 June 1986.

1. Respect for truth and for the right of the public to truth is the first duty of the journalist.
2. In pursuance of this duty, the journalist shall at all times defend the principles of freedom in the honest collection and publication of news, and of the right of fair comment and criticism.
3. The journalist shall report only in accordance with facts of which he/ she knows the origin. The journalist shall not suppress essential information or falsify documents.
4. The journalist shall use only fair methods to obtain news, photographs and documents.
5. The journalist shall do the utmost to rectify any published information which is found to be harmfully inaccurate.
6. The journalist shall observe professional secrecy regarding the source of information obtained in confidence.
7. The journalist shall be aware of the danger of discrimination being furthered by the media, and shall do the utmost to avoid facilitating such discrimination based on, among other things, race, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinions, and national or social origins.
8. The journalist shall regard as grave professional offences the following:

   - plagiarism
   - malicious misrepresentation
   - calumny, slander, libel, unfounded accusations
   - the acceptance of a bribe in any form in consideration of either publication or suppression.

9. Journalists worthy of that name shall deem in their duty to observe faithfully the principles stated above. Within the general law of each country the journalist shall recognize in professional matters the jurisdiction of colleagues only, to the exclusion of every kind of interference by governments of others.

B) Example of collaboration between the state broadcasters of Southeast Europe

The following conclusions formed the basis for a multi-annual regional peace programme:

"The managing directors and their representatives decided to initiate co-operation in the following areas:

Media Policy
Programme Collaboration
Training

In order to promote peace, democracy and stability in SEE, the co-operation shall seek the following objectives:

- To ensure well-functioning, independent public service broadcasting in SEE
- To further co-operation among public broadcasters in SEE and with the rest of Europe,
- To support co-operation between public broadcasters, regulatory bodies and political decision-makers within SEE,
- To work towards increased alignment between the media legislation standards of SEE and the rest of Europe, e.g. as expressed for public service broadcasters in the Council of Europe's recommendation "The guarantee of the independence of public service broadcasting",
- To enhance already existing programme collaboration between the public broadcasters in SEE,
- To continue strengthening the professional standards of public broadcasters in SEE through training,
- To promote sound, ethical working standards within the public broadcasters in SEE, especially in the area of minority coverage and by promoting conflict prevention programming,
- To work wherever possible for a co-ordination of regional assistance activities implemented through international organisations.

Conclusions from SEE Public Broadcasters Conference, Bornholm, April 2000.
Participating broadcasters came from Greece, Turkey, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, FRY with Serbia and Kosovo, Croatia and Hungary.
(BMC Annual Report 2000)

C) Example of support for peace-building provided through local radio associations in Southeast Europe

The BMC Annual Report 2000 gives a clear example on support to peace-building provided through the local radio associations of South East Europe, which all with one exception were commercial radios. Representatives from the undersigned local radio associations in South East Europe declared the following:

The local radio stations expressed:

Their willingness to promote peace, stability, and mutual understanding in the region through cross-border programme co-operation, training and media policy collaboration among their members.

Their willingness to support each other in the process towards democratic media legislation and administrative rules in accordance with European standards,

Their willingness to promote high professional standards, public access, politically and economically independent journalism and an enhanced professional collaboration among local radio stations throughout South East Europe and internationally,

Stress the need for a long-term, comprehensive effort to achieve the above aims and agree on starting network co-operation along the lines of the attached plan of activity for the regional network.

(Conclusions from the Conference of SEE Associations of Private Media, Opatija, March 2000).

D)   Focus Group interviews

TELESEE's co-production collaboration with the aim of analyzing the programmes' impact on restoring a peaceful relationship between the populations of former Yugoslavia and building a sustainable peace.

Background
TELESEE was established in 2000 as a network of public broadcasters in the aftermath of the Nato-bombings in Kosovo and Serbia during the spring 1999.

The aim of TELESEE was to support peace and mutual understanding in the region through initiation of TV-co-productions between the national and provincial public broadcasters in the region.

Further the goal was to support a democratic development through editorially independent and pluralistic media.

The Context
Through victory of Tito's guerrillas over the Germans the ground was laid for a return to a federal Yugoslavian state comprising not only Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, but also Vojvodina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. With the multitude of ethnic, religious, national and political interests in the nation, only strong national symbols with Tito probably as the main force could keep the country together.

Historically, mass communication has played a crucial role in these processes of imagination of national communities. It has enabled the formation and maintenance of public spheres and been central in the homogenization and creation of national cultures and identities. The role of mass communication ranged from constituting frames of shared interpretation, public debate and collective action, to standardizing cultural resources and publicizing definition of the situation.

The contribution of mass communication to the *construction of imagination* of national communities has also another, negative aspect – that of *destruction* and *oblivion* of alternative frames of interpretation, debate and action and of alternative versions of community.

Yugoslavia was an excellent example of this. It could most appropriately be described as a semi-democracy with a high degree of personal and economic freedom, but with neither provision for criticism of the ruling communist party nor for a plural political party system.

During the first decades of post-World war Yugoslavia, the government attempted to stress similarities and to suppress divisive factors among the South Slav ethnic groups. There was an official sanctioning of the 1954 Novi Sad declaration of Croat, Montenegrin and Serb linguists, regarding the oneness of the Serbo-Croat language, the promotion of official versions of Marxist-Yugoslav history and the support of attempts to establish a Yugoslav 'cultural space', especially in the sphere of high culture.

During the first 20 years of post war Yugoslavia the all dominant print and electronic state media lent all their authority to the symbols and public rituals of the Tito-led state. In spite of some degrees of editorial freedom, the media did not allow a debate of the leadership of the communist party and did in spite of a decentralized structure for most media not question the Yugoslav nation as such.

After 20 years of economic growth the country experienced from the late 60'es an economic decline with unbalanced economic development in the different republics. This lead to a re-emerging "nationalism", which of course also was rooted in the political attempts over the last century to establish nation states before and during the process of creating an all-Yugoslav state. President Tito. As a result Yugoslavia was with a new constitution in 1974 transformed into a confederation with the centre loosened its power.

Divided Identities

Yugoslavia after the 74–constitution was a confederation with a high degree of autonomy to republics and provinces. As the political, economic and cultural powers now resided with the republics and provinces, the media also became primarily republican in terms of control, framework of reference and focus of content.

The 'public sphere' of socialist Yugoslavia was, even before the 1974 constitution, segmented along republic borders. Despite its name, Yugoslav Radio-Television was not a really 'Yugoslav' (federation-wide) institution. It had progressively become an effectively coordinating network of republic broadcasting organizations – each of the republics and autonomous provinces had its own broadcasting system and its own press with at least one daily newspaper as its official or semi-official publication.

The media for years ignored or played down the numerous contradictions within the Yugoslav state. They ignored the opposition to the creation of a federal state, they ignored the opposition from parts of the population to a communist (3rd way) system for the state, and later they ignored the increasing nationalism and ethnic separatism. The media and in this case the state media followed the political line of the government, turning the blind eye to their role as facilitators of a dialogue between contrasting arguments.

By the mid-1980s the school systems were fragmented into 8 republic and provincial curricula. The communication was still more intra-republic than federal inter-republic. In this process, the mass media played a very significant role by actively supporting, publicizing and amplifying nationalist definitions of the situation and by demarcating national and ethnic boundaries in the social imaginaries of the post-Yugoslav order.

No need to say that this was even more significant during the civil wars up through the 1990'es.

With the dissolve of former Yugoslavia independence was provided for Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-i-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro and Macedonia as well as the status of Vojvodina and Kosovo inside Serbia – the latter being a UN-mandate.

In Bosnia-i-Herzegovina, however, the independence came after the worst civil war in Europe since Second World War, where the Serb minority supported by Belgrade had been in war against the Muslim majority and to some degree also the Croatian minority of the former Yugoslav republic. The country has its own parliamentary institutions covering Republic Srpska with Serb majority and Bosnia-i-Herzegovina with Muslim (Bosniak) majority and Croat minority as well as the federal institutions covering both entities. Bosnia-i-Herzegovina has been under international governance since the Dayton agreement, which finished the civil war.

When the project aims at supporting peace and mutual understanding it is to be seen not as an attempt to return to the old national unity of former Yugoslavia, but to pave the way for a peaceful co-existence and collaboration across all the countries and entities of the region as well as between the minorities inside the individual countries.

Peace building models:

There are three models, which are relevant to media projects like this.

One model, developed by John Paul Lederach, divides society into 3 levels, which have each their role and interest in a peace-building process:

- Top leadership is military/political/religious leaders, who are keen to be visible in the media. Top leaders both come from governments and from minorities, rebels or independence movements. Their importance in peace-building is their role in high-level negotiations and creation of a cease-fire.
- Middle-Range leadership are respected leaders – could be ethnic or religious leaders or could be academics, intellectuals, or radio- and TV-directors. They are the ones who have most impact on a peace-building process, because they both can reach the political level top leadership and can reach the level of their own organisation's middle leaders and staff. They bless peace-building initiatives and leave it to others to carry it out.
- Grassroots leadership is leaders of local NGOP's, health officials, refugee camp leaders etc. who normally work with local prejudice reduction or psychosocial work in post war trauma. In this case they are the producers and the international relations' people, who ensure that programs are produced to the broader population.

The other model, developed by Maire Dugan, is called The Nested Paradigm of Conflict Foci. The model focuses on local violent conflicts but can also be used on TV-programmes as a parallel. The belief among peace builders and peace researchers is that violent conflicts appear because of failures or un-justices in the society's systems. Only by changing the system will it be possible to have a lasting and sustainable peace. But Maire Dugan says that it is difficult for the population to realize and understand the need for a systemic change.

Therefore – when the violence or war has stopped – there is a need first to re-establish a positive relationship between the people who were in war with each other. Prejudices and stereotypes and hatred should be reduced through peace mediation. But in order to link these person to person relations with the necessary systemic change she works with a sub-system, which is less general and theoretical and more related to personal interests.

For television this would mean that one level is to produce programmes, which allow people in one SEE country to feel sympathy and identification with people in one of the enemy countries. On the sublevel what could be changed was as an example that in Kosovo the Albanians were discriminated up to 1999 or that the Serbs are discriminated now.

Or it could be in former Yugoslavia that for example the students in Croatia felt that it was more difficult for them to be accepted at an elite university in maybe Belgrade than it was for the Serb students. Or the Serb minority in Croatia felt discriminated when applying for a university place in Zagreb.

These are issues you can make television programmes about, which are understandable, deal with problems of ordinary people and point to things in the system which should be changed through non-violent discussions.

The third model is again a model developed by Lederach. He puts the Nested Paradigm of Conflict Foci on a time scale in 4 phases:

1. Immediately after a conflict (2-6 months) crises intervention seeks to consolidate cease fire and provide humanitarian assistance. For TV it would be humanitarian information to the population about food, shelter and refugee situation. And it would be not to question the top leadership's negotiation about ceasefire.
2. Short range planning (1-2 years) would focus on building a consciousness among the populations who had been fighting during the war, that they should not hate each other. In other words that the mutual relationship at a people-to-people, professional to professional level should be re-established. For TV this would be programmes stressing the common values for people and reflecting the common problems (not between the conflicting parties) but for each of the two sides.
3. Decade thinking (5-10 years) would begin dealing with some of the issues that should be solved between the conflicting partners in order to have a sustainable peace. For example trade relations, free travel, music exchange, and joint education initiatives etc. between the countries in SEE should be developed. Things that are related to personal living conditions and still looking at un-justices and mal-functions in the regional system of SEE should be explored in TV.
4. Generational Vision (20+ years) deals with the long term visions for e.g. the SEE region. It could be for example to set up regional councils, which represent both all the nations and all the minorities and will become the forum for solving all

disputes. Or it could be a common market etc. This might not end up being easy to produce TV-programmes about, and here we will easily come back to the top leadership again.

It is of course interesting to see where in these models the selected programmes fit in. As I do not know which programmes you select, I can't judge.

Moderator's Guide

I suggest that the survey carries out the following elements:

I. A questionnaire-based survey to the TELESEE coordinators (anonymous to their employers of course) focusing on the intentions, the reactions from the institution, the editorial possibilities and external reactions to the TELESEE programmes.

II. A questionnaire based survey to the focus group participants about their media consumption and their judgement of the public broadcasters' reliability and importance.

III. A focus group session on the basis of the show reel.

IV. A focus group session on a selected programme.

I. Questionnaire to TELESEE coordinators:
We want to know if the TELESEE cooperation has changed colleagues and managers at their TV-station in a more favourable direction to collaborate with the other broadcasters in the region. We also want to know where the producers feel that the editorial line at their station puts a limitation to the productions they can join – and broadcast. We want to know what reactions they have received in-house and from outside the broadcaster organisation.

Questions could be:

1. How long have you taken part in the TELESEE cooperation?

2. How is the reaction from your management to the TELESEE cooperation?

3. How is the reaction from your journalist colleagues?

4. Do you feel that the TELESEE programmes in terms of professional quality are better or less good than the

programmes you usually produce and broadcast in your organisation?

5. What are the editorial limits on programmes, where you take part in the production? Are you e.g. allowed to be part of programmes about ordinary people's lives and problems in countries or regions with whom you have been in war? Please give examples.

6. Are you e.g. allowed to be part of programmes which look at common problems in the region – like trafficking, corruption, poverty or crime? Please give examples.

7. Are you e.g. allowed to be part of programmes, which look at barriers for a normalised life and living together in the region? Please give examples.

8. Are you e.g. allowed to be part of programmes, which look back on the wars in former Yugoslavia and try to explain why, who and how it happened? Please give examples.

9. How have the TELESEE programmes according to your understanding been received in your country? Viewer ratings, TV-reviews, reaction from viewers, politicians or others?

10. How would you describe your role as a journalist/producer in this cooperation? Neutral, professional, solution oriented, peace journalist, or other considerations you have done?

11. Other comments you would like to add?

II. Questionnaire to Focus Group Participants:
We want to know the participants' pattern of viewing and we want to know their judgement of credibility with regards to the different media.

1. How many hours every day do you watch television?

2. Which TV-stations do you watch most – please rank fro 1 to 4 with 1 being the one you watch most: one of the 4 TV-stations involved in this analysis – from BiH, RS, Vojvodina and Serbia? (Put in the correct names) – federal, republic, private commercial or community media supported by international organisations?

3. How do you judge the amount of programmes about the other countries in the region on the TV-station you watch most – not enough, sufficient, too many

4. When it comes to news, who do you trust most: the federal, republic or local public TV-station, or the private broadcaster in your area? Please rate from 1 to 3 for the 3 most trustworthy. 1 is highest.

5. Do you feel that the overall impression of the TV-station involved in the TELESEE project is favourable to a peaceful or a hostile relation with your neighbouring countries?

6. How many of the programmes, you received on videotape have your watched earlier on television?

It is of course also important that those you invite for the focus group do represent different social groups, different national and ethnic identities, or different geographical locations.

The focus group interviews will be moderated by the selected local media research organisation which will be bi-lingual English and Serbian speaking.

Introduction to participants and Introductory Activities

Guidelines for the Interview

We do not seek any special opinion, but hope that you all will express your own personal opinions. We want to hear them all, and no opinion is better than others.

We do record this interview on a tape recorder so we can go home and make detailed minutes of all the opinions we hear from you. (?)

III. Interview Plan:
There are 3 topics in the first round – this round is on the basis that everybody has received and watched the show reel with several bits of programmes:

1. One thing we want to know is if the participants feel they have an interest in knowing more about their neighbours inside the country or outside after Yugoslavia dissolved as a country.

- Are they generally interested in programmes dealing with ordinary people, traditions or habits that their neighbours have?
- Or would they rather have programmes that focus on the barriers that still exist to live an ordinary peaceful life across the region.
- Or would they like to watch programmes about the wars in the former Yugoslavia and find out why they started, what went wrong, and how could it have been avoided?

The research team should in the 3 respective types of programmes have in the back of their mind – 1. Identification and restoration of relationship, 2. Change of conditions and transformation of conflict into peace, and finally 3. Understanding of the war in terms of who, how, why and reconciliation.

2. Do the participants remember to have watched any of the programmes on the video tape they received? Did they find them interesting? Why?

3. Do such programmes in their opinion add to the mutual understanding across the region? Did they make them or their neighbours reflect about something, or remember some good events in life from the past?

It is clear that we can not directly ask about these issues in such an overall manner and expect it to be understood. But be aware that when you have to re-formulate the questions you should be cautious about the neutrality.

IV. The second round will be based on 1 programme that you play in part or fully for the group:

Depending on which type of programme you choose you will formulate the questions and themes to be discussed accordingly.

Thank you so much.

E) Monitoring media impact of Telesee TV-Documentaries in Balkan

Research design version 1.2 by Kirstine Vinderskov, April 2004

1. Background and purpose

BMC has contacted audience researcher at DRTV Kirstine Vinderskov in relation to designing and supervising the monitoring of the impact of documentary-programmes coproduced by the TELESEE network of public broadcasters in Balkan. The overall aim of the monitoring is to asses how and in what ways the different TV-documentary-programmes can serve as facilitators of peace and stability in the region.

2. Definition of the assignment

The monitoring will explore the viewers opinions and views on the different types of TV-documentary-programmes in order to clarify what impact the different programmes have on the different groups of people in the region. Apart from learning more about the potential influence TV-documentaries dealing with the issues of peace building and democratization have on the sentiments and opinion-making among people in the region, the results will also enable the TV-producers to take the viewers point of view into consideration in planning future documentary-programmes.

The monitoring will focus on the evaluation of specific documentary-programmes in order to achieve a general picture of the viewers reception of the TELESEE efforts. The focus groups will not only react to the programme quality, but through a specific discussion of specific programmes it is the aim that the research will also reveal more general sentiments about the democratic process.

It is a difficult task to try to understand the impact of TV-documentaries in the peace-building process in an area, in which several violent conflicts have taken place. One or even several TV-programmes do not turn strong hostility from wars into true reconcilliation and peace. However this research project will find indicators to show whether each of the programmes does reach the viewers sentiments about the neighbouring populations in a positive direction, and whether the programme has any influence on the viewers opinion about the "other" in the region.

It is also clear that even if one programme proves to have the desired emotional and opinion-making influence the impact on a peaceful development in the region would still depend on the number of such programmes produced and viewed by the individual viewer, the social context and identity for the individual viewers, the political context among top-leaders and mid-range leaders, as well as current events in the region. But the analysis will show if the programmes produced by TELESEE are small steps in the right direction.

So far there has been almost no knowledge produced about the impact of the tv-documentary-programmes among the people watching them in the region. Thus the research is of an explorative kind. The research will try to define key-areas that can be used in the future to continue an ongoing monitoring of the programmes impact. Thus the aim of the research is also educational.

The results aim to give BMC and T the TELESEE network valuable information about the programmes and thus enable them to produce programmes that have the desired quality and fufill the desired aims.

The research will give no statistic knowledge about the impact of the programmes but will give in depth knowledge about selected viewer-groups which can be used to define the relevant areas for future research projects about this topic in the region.

3. Procedure and method

Since the aim is to achieve an insight into the viewers opinion-making and sentiments towards difficult issues of peace building and democratization a qualitative explorative method has been selected. Combined with the importance of establishing a dialogue about these issues focus groups has been selected as the most appropriate method. The focus groups will use concrete TV-documentary-programmes to facilitate the general discussion of the medias impact on the progression of democracy and peace in the region. A total of four focus groups and one test group will be conducted. The groups will be recruited by the selected local Research Institute to secure a scientifically valid sample. The selected research institute will furthermore organise and moderate the interviews. Preferably only by use of two moderators, one in each region. If the purpose is of a more educational character it could be considered to make representatives form the network moderate the groups. In any case representatives of the TELESEE network will be invited to watch the interviews while they are conducted also organized by the Research Institute.

3.1 recruiting criterias

All participants in the focus groups will have to be willing to watch 2-3 selected TV-documentaries in advance, fill out a questionaire about their tv-comsumption and participate in a two-hour long focus group interview. The groups will be recruited by the Research Institute and the interview guide will be made by Kirstine Vinderskov. The participants in the groups must be recruited according to the following criterias:

Group 1 in Sarajevo:
- 12 persons
- In the agegroup 20-40 years
- 50/50 men and women
- Broad spectre of educational backgrounds and occupation
- Watch television regularily
- Have access to a video-recorder in their home

Group 2 in Banja Luka:
- 12 persons
- In the agegroup 40-60 years
- 50/50 men and women
- Broad spectre of educational backgrounds and occupation
- Watch television regularily
- Have access to a video-recorder in their home

In Sarajevo one testgroup will be conducted under the supervision of Kirstine Vinderskov in order to secure that the interviews are carried out in the desired way and to adjust the interviewguide.

Group 3 in Belgrade:
- 12 persons
- In the agegroup 20-40 years
- 50/50 men and women
- Broad spectre of educational backgrounds and occupation
- Watch television regularily
- Have access to a video-recorder in their home

Group 4 in Novi Sad:
- 12 persons
- In the agegroup 40-60 years
- 50/50 men and women
- Broad spectre of educational backgrounds and occupation
- Watch television regularily
- Have access to a video-recorder in their home

It is crucial to use the local knowledge of the Research Institute to decide whether more nuanced recruiting criterias e.g according to ethnicity, religious beliefs and political views are neccessary to secure the right homogeniety and relevant mix in the groups.

Preferably the groups will be recruited as to both city and more provincial/rural areas are represented, since views tend to differ according to region.

3.2 Selection of TELESEE TV-documentaries

From a methodological point of view it is important that the following criterias are taken into consideration when the programmes are selected. The selected programmes will have to be 1. *typical* of theses types of programmes in content and form in order for them to serve as representatives for the general mass of programmes. It is also important that the programmes are 2. *different* in order to help facilitate the different relevant themes regarding the larger issues of peace building and stability. Then it is important that the programmes are 3. *the same* in the different focus groups in order to be able to compare the results afterwards. The programmes that the participants will recieve by mail in advance and watch prior to the focus group session will be the following:
1. "Feast", "Trafficing" or "Music" (dealing with the issues of identification and relationship building)
2. "Destroying arms" (dealing with the barriers of reconciliation)
3. One reflecting the historical issues not yet selected

The programme that the participants will watch together during the focus group session will be "Relics of socialism" because it is a good example of a type of documentary-programme that deal with the difficult issues in a professional manner.

In addition a questionaire for the programme-producers will be conducted and analyzed by Media progress by Bent Nørby Bonde.

4. Interview themes

Since the purpose of the research is to assess the impact of programmes that have never been subjected to this kind of research combined with the difficult aim of revealing the peace building process the study is explorative in its nature. This calls for questions of an open kind and a semi-structured moderators interviewguide. Because it will minimize the moderators influence on the results and maximize the possibillity of an open discussion among the focus groups.
This kind of interviewguide is structured according to certain themes that the interviewer should get the participants views on, but also that its open for new themes that will come up during the interview. This means that the interviewer should be able to not only follow the guide but also improvise and most of all be able to listen.
It is very important that the BMC and TELESEE define what sort of specific knowledge about the programmes and their impact they are

interested in achieving. It is beyond the task of designing the research also to define what should be the focus of the focus group interviews.

Overall the interviews will be structured in two sections:

1. We want to know if the participants feel they have an interest in knowing more about their neighbours inside the country or outside after Yugoslavia dissolved as a country mediated through TV-programmes. And what focus such programmes should have. (the discussion will be based on the programmes the participants have watched from home).

- Are they generally interested in programmes dealing with ordinary people, traditions or habits that they themselves and their neighbours have? (identification and restoration of relationship between the peoples)
- Or would they rather watch programmes that focus on the barriers that still exist to live an ordinary and peaceful life across the region? (Change of conditions and transformation of conflict into peace)
- Or would they like to watch programmes about the wars in the former Yugoslavia and find out why they started, what went wrong and how could it have been avoided? (understanding the war in terms of who, why and reconciliation)

2. Evaluation of selected programme (Relics of arms). We want to know what the participants fell are the strenghts and weaknesses in the programme.

(An operational interview-guide will be presented to the research institute on the meeting in the end of april)

4.1 Guidelines for the interview and structure

Introduction by moderator
- We do not seek any special opinions - there´s no right or wrong answers. We hope that everyone will express their own personal opinions. It is important that the moderator secures that everyone participates and that no one gets to dominate too much. Take turns or rounds if neccessary.
- We do record the interview because it will help us to differentiate between who´s saying what in order to be able to use the answers afterwards.
- Presentation of the moderator and purpose of the focus group
- Introduction round by participants (name and occupation)
- General discussion about TV-documentaries dealing with the issues of peace building and democratization. Different ways of

dealing with the issues are discussed on the basis of the programmes watched in advance (45 minutes)
- Break (10 minutes)
- Screening of selected TELESEE TV-documentary (30 minutes duration)
- Specific discussion of the selected programme and the impact it has on the viewers. What are their feelings and reactions (45 minutes)
- Round up (15 minutes)

Total time estimate per. group app. 2,5 hours

5. Analysis and reporting

There will be produced a written report presenting the analysis of the focus groups as well as the method and results of the monitoring. This will be performed by the Research Institute under the supervision of Kirstine Vinderskov. The report will be in English.

The analysis will be comparative reflecting the similarities and differences in the groups according to age, gender and region or other relevant parameters that will arise from the analysis. The analysis will focus on the different perspectives of the selected programmes and evaluate the impact the different programmes have in comparison with each other. The report should document and give the reader a feeling of the opinions and views of the participants by use of direct quotes from the focus groups. Thus all four interview will have to be transcribed in full length by the Research institute.

It is important that the analysis and thereby the report can be used afterwards by the programme-producers as well as the BMC in the future work of using media as a way of facilitating peace and stability in the region. Thus the report will also point out key-areas for the future work with TV-documentaries in the region.

6. Time schedule and tasks

End of march: The research design will be finished.

April: Communicate and adjust the research design and outline the interview guide by Kirstine Vinderskov. Meeting betwn. Kirstine Vinderskov, BMC representative and Research institute in Sarajevo end of april

May: Recruit participants and organize the focusgroups and the test-group by the Research Institute. Supervision by Kirstine Vinderskov.

June: Analysis and final report by research Institute supervised by kirstine Vinderskov.

Research institute:
Recruiting participants
Organising focus groups

Moderate interviews
Analyse and present written report with results

Translation of selected tv-programmes and simultaneous translation
of test-interview and translation of interview-guide and written
transscripts of the interviews.

F)   Interview guide: Background

Background info to moderators
Since the purpose of the research is to assess the impact of programmes that have never been subjected to this kind of research combined with the difficult aim of revealing the peace building process, the study is explorative in its nature. This calls for questions of an open kind and a semi-structured moderator's interview guide. It is very important that the moderators do not ask leading questions because it interferes with the aim of "getting inside" the focus group participants minds in order to discover what is important to them and what role media-products like Brain Drain and Relics of socialism can play in the way they think about the possibilities and obstacles to peace and democracy in their countries. It is crucial to minimize the moderators influence on the results and maximize the possibility of an open discussion among the focus groups.

This kind of interview guide is structured according to certain themes that the interviewer should get the participants views on, but also that its open for new themes that will come up during the interview. This means that the interviewer should be able to not only follow the guide but also improvise and most of all be able to listen.

It is very important to remind the participants to speak for them selves. To be personal and e.g not talk on behalf of others, but on behalf of them selves. This is done by posing questions like "But is it important to you?" or "How does that make you feel?" or "why didn't you like that?"
It is very important that the moderator secures that everyone participates and that no one gets to dominate too much. Take turns or rounds if necessary).

Focus: Television-documentaries
Participants have watched "Relics of socialism" prior to the interview and will during the interview be introduced to titles and descriptions of others of the Telesee programmes, such as "Feast", "Trafficking", "Music" and others.

"Brain drain" will be the focus-programme of the focus-group discussions and the groups will watch it together.

Interview guide: Questions & themes

1. Introduction by moderator
Thank you for coming. My name is XXX and I´ve been assigned by the Telesee to find out how the programmes they produce are recieved by the audience - by you. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss your feelings and opinions about the programmes you have watched already and one programme that we will watch together. We´ll eat and have a break along the way. The whole session will take 2,5 hours.
I am not looking for any special answers - there´s no right or wrong answers. I hope that everyone will express their own personal opinions especially if you do not agree.

I have not made the programmes and will not be offended if you are critical or don´t understand something. I urge you to feel free to express your views on the programmes what ever they are!
I do record the interview because it will help me afterwards to differentiate between who is saying what in order to be able to use the answers.

2. Introduction round by participants (e.g name and occupation)
In order for us to get to know each other a little better I ask you to state your name, profession and viewing habits, what do you like to watch on tv. One participant at the time.

3. General discussion about TV-documentaries dealing with the issues of peace building and democratization.
Different ways of dealing with the issues are discussed with a starting point in Relics of socialism and other programmes that the focus group might mention. (30 minutes)

(We want to know if the participants feel they have an interest in knowing more about their neighbours inside the country or outside after Yugoslavia dissolved as a country mediated through TV-programmes. And what focus such programmes should have).

Do you feel that the programme we asked you to watch help to build bridges between people in the region?
- what impression did it leave on you - do you feel differently?

What type of programmes would be the best to serve this aim?
-   what subjects should they be dealing with? (use the subjects in the programme they have watched and the list of programmes and probe for others)

- Are they generally interested in programmes dealing with ordinary people, traditions or habits that they themselves and their neighbours have? (identification and restoration of relationship between the peoples)
- Or would they rather watch programmes that focus on the barriers that still exist to live an ordinary and peaceful life across the region? (Change of conditions and transformation of conflict into peace)

- Or would they like to watch programmes about the wars in the former Yugoslavia and find out why they started, what went wrong and how could it have been avoided? (understanding the war in terms of who, why and reconciliation)

- What genres could in your opinion be dealing with theses issues? (documentaries, fiction, news, others?)

4. Break (10 minutes)

5. Screening of Brain drain

6. Specific discussion about the programme

Overall impression
In your opinion what was the programme about?
- how does it fit into the types of programmes discussed prior to the screening

Would you have watched a programme like this at home?

- why/why not?

How would you describe the programmes impact on you?
- (interesting, boring, relevant, annoying...)

What impression did it leave on you?
- (food for thought, new perspective, understanding...)

Content

Did any of the stories in the programme catch your attention more than others?

- which stories did you notice and why?

- which did you not notice?

What do you feel about programmes like this?

- is brain drain a useful way of dealing with the problems?

Did the programme advocate certain opinions and point of views?

- how do you feel about this?
- do you agree/dis-agree?

Mode of address

Was the programme too long, short or did it have a suitable lenght?

- did you loose interest at any point? (if so, when app.?)

What is your view on the different participants in the programme?

- was it interesting what they told?
- was it the right selection of people?

Did you miss something in the programme?

- do you have unsolved questions that the programme did not answer?
- stories or issues it did not cover but should have in your opinion?

7. Round up

Is television programmes like this a good way of dealing with the issues?

Did this programme deal with the issues in a good/useful/fruitful/relevant way?

Do you feel that there are enough programmes on tv about the problems and life of your neighbours?

To what extent can tv-programmes as the ones you have watched help to "heal the wounds"?

G) Statistical analysis

	Question: Most watched TV?		Question: Most trusted TV?	
Focus group	Public TV (%)	Private TV (%)	Public TV (%)	Private TV (%)
1: Sarajevo	FTV (66.6) RTRS (8.3) BHT1 (8.3)	OBN (8.3) HAYAT (8.3)	FTV (66.6) BHT1 (16.6) None (8.3)	HAYAT (8.3)
2: Banja luka	RTRS (36.3) BHT1 (9.1)	PINK BiH (36.3) BN (9.1) ATV (9.1)	RTRS (36.3) BHT1 (27.3)	PINK (18.2) BN (9.1) ATV (9.1)
3: Belgrade	RTS (25)	BK TV (25) TV PINK (25) TV Politika (8.3) Palma TV (8.3) TV B92 (8.3)	RTS (33.3) None (25)	BK TV (16.6) TV PINK (16.6) TV Politika (8.3)
4: Novi Sad	RTS (20) TV Novi Sad (20) None (10)	TV PINK (20) TV BK (10) TV Kanal9 (20)	RTS (40) TV Novi Sad (30)	TV PINK (20) TV BK (10)

H)   Extract from Gujarat Report

In the fact-finding report of the Editors Guild the authors state, that

> While the media enjoy the right to freedom and
> independence in the discharge of their duties, they are
> essentially trustees for the larger freedom of speech and
> expression. Through judicial pronouncements and
> international covenants to which India is a signatory, this
> includes the citizen's right to inform and be informed. The
> right to know is a precious democratic right and is through
> this means that the citizen is ensured participation,
> transparency and accountability.

> The Indian media is privileged to enjoy a wide measure of
> freedom. By this very token, it must exercise this freedom
> with responsibility in matters relating to public order,
> decency and morality, defamation and incitement to an
> offence. It is incumbent on the media to strive for
> objectivity, fairness and balance, to avoid sensationalism or
> anything that is liable to inflame passions, especially during
> periods of stress and tension. It is also obligated to make
> corrections and afford injured parties the right of reply.

Cited References

AFIGBO, A. E. AND UYA, O. E., 2000. The Evolution of Nigeria, 1849-1960. In: (Ajaegbu et al. ed.). *Nigeria – A People United, A Future Assured*. Abuja: Gabumo Publishing Co.

AHMAR, M., 1994. *The Challenge of Confidence-Building in South Asia.* London: Paramount Books.

AHMAR, M., 1999. *The Media of Conflict. War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence.* London: Zed Books.

ANNAN, K., 2001. *Prevention of armed conflict – Report of the Secretary-General*, 7th June 2001. New York: United Nations, (A/55/985-S/2001/574).

ARTICLE 19, 1992. Striking a Balance – Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination. Article 19 and Human Rights Centre and University of Essex.

ARTICLE 19, 1994. *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.* London: Article 19.

BALTIC MEDIA CENTRE, 2002. *BMC Annual Report 2002*. Place of publication Bornholm, Denmark, 4-12.

BANKS, M. AND MURRAY, M. W., *Ethnicity and Reports of the 1992-95 Bosnian Conflict.*

BELL, C., 1992. *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practise. USA: Oxford University Press.*

BIZUMUREMYI, E., 2001. *Genèse d'un genocide "Racialisation", "ethnisation" et communication au Rwanda. Geneva:* University de Geneve, Dep. De Sociologie, Diplôme d'Etudes Approfondies.

BLINDERMAN, E., 2002. International Law and Information Intervention. In: PRICE, M. and THOMPSON, M. (eds). *Forging Peace – Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space*. Edinburgh University Press, 111-118.

BONDE, B. N., ONASANYA, A. AND MAHMOOD, W., 2002. *Nigerian Media – Overview, Evaluation and Draft Programmes for Change.* Bornholm: Baltic Media Centre.

BONDE, B. N., 2005. *Media and the Nigerian Conflicts* [online]. Available from www.media-progress.net. Copenhagen.

BOUTROS-GHALI, B., 1992. *An Agenda for Peace - Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping.* Report of the United Nations Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31st January 1992, (A/47/277 - S/24111), published 17th June 1992.

BRAHIMI, L., 2000. *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects*. Written by a panel chaired by BRAHIMI, L. to the Secretary General, General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations on 21st of August, 2000. New York: United Nations (A/55/305– S/2000/809).

Brain Drain [video], 2003. Produced by TELESEE.

BROWN, M., 1996. *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pages?.

BROWN, M. E., 1993. *Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

BROWN, S. J. AND STUDEMEISTER, M. S., 2002. Diffusion of Diplomacy. *Virtual Diplomacy Series*, (14). Washington: US Institute of Peace.

CARNEGIE COMMISSION, 1997. *Preventing Deadly Conflicts - Final Report*. New York: The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, ch. 4.

CARRUTHERS, S. L. ET AL, 2000. *The Media at War: Communication and conflict in 20th Century.* London: MacMillan.

Causes of Conflict [online]. Available from http://Cmtoolkit.sais-jhu.edu. (July 2005).

CHRÉTIEN, J. P., 1995. *Rwanda Les médias du génocide avec Reporters sans frontiers.* Paris: Edition Karthala.

CHRISTIAN, H., 1980. *The Sociology of Journalism and the Press.* Keele: Sociological Review Monograph 29, University of Keele.

COLEMAN, J., 1964. *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism.* Berkeley, CA: University of California.

CIA World Factbook, 2005. *Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Available from: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html. [Accessed 17th May 2005].

CIA World Factbook, 2005. *Croatia.* Available from: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/hr.html. [Accessed 17th May 2005].

CIA World Factbook, 2005. *Macedonia.* Available from: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html. [Accessed 17th May 2005].

CIA World Factbook, 2005. *Rwanda*. Available from: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rw.html. [Accessed 17th May 2005].

CIA World Factbook, 2005. *Serbia and Montenegro.* Available from: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/yi.html. [Accessed 17th May 2005].

CIA World Factbook, 2005. *Slovenia.* Available from: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/si.html. [Accessed 17th May 2005].

Conflict Management Toolkit [online]. Available from http://cmtoolkit.sais-jhu.edu/index.php?name=introcm-defining. [Accessed date 2005].

COULDRY, N., 2003. *Media Rituals.* London: Routledge.

DANITZ, T. and STROBEL, W., 2000. *Virtual Diplomacy Series*, No. 3, February 2000, USIP, Networking Dissent – Cyber Activists Use the Internet to Promote Democracy in Burma, p. 1-35.

DARBISHIRE, H., 2002. Media Freedom versus Information Intervention. In: PRICE, M. E. AND THOMPSON, M., eds. *Forging Peace, Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 337-340.

DAYAL, J. et al (eds), 2002. *Gujarat 2002 – Untold and Re-told Stories of the Hindutva Lab*. Delhi: Media House, 12-13.

DOWNING, J. D., 2001. *Radical Media – Rebellious Communication and Social Movements.* London: Sage Publications, 44.

DUGAN, M., 1996. A Nested Theory of Conflict. *Women in Leadership*, 1 (1), 9-20.

DUGAN, M., 2003. *Integrative* Power. Available at www.beyondintractability.org. [Accessed in 2004].

DURCH, W. J., 2004. Strengthening UN Secretariat Capacity for Civilian Post-Conflict Response, C*onference on Strengthening the UN's Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management*, *Copenhagen, Denmark, 8th-9th June 2004.*

DURKHEIM, E., 1893. *The Division of Labour in Society.*

DURKHEIM, E., 1912. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.*

EASTERBROOK, G., 2005 [online]. *Explaining 15 years of diminishing violence. The end of War?* Available from: The New Republic Online website. [Accessed 30th May 2005].

EGWU, S. G., 1998. Agrarian Question and Rural Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria*. In: NNOLI, O., ed. *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa.* Senegal: Codesria.

EGWU, S. G., 2000. *Agrarian Question and Rural Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria.* Abuja: Gabumo Publishing Co.

ELLIOTT, P., 2000. Press Performance as Political Ritual. In: CHRISTIAN, H., ed. *The Sociology of Journalism*. Keele: Keele University Press.

ELLSWORTH, K. H., 1999. *Reimagined Communities – Democratic, Ethnic, and Violent: The Social Reconstruction of Nigerian Identities and Communal Relations.* In: draft presentation at Arizona State University, 3rd September 1999 in Arizona.

ELLSWORTH, K. H., 2000. *Identities' Conflicts: Wedding Nigeria's Subnational and International Identities and the Conflicts they Enable.* In: draft presentation at Arizona State University, 16th March 2000 in Arizona.

ELLSWORTH, K. H., 2002. *The Global Ideational Origins of Nigeria's Communal Conflicts: Democratic Discourse and Sharia*. In: draft presentation at Arizona State University, 27th March 2002 in Arizona, 5.

FACHOT, *EBU Diffusion Online*, www.ebu.ch/union/publications/ diffusion_on_line, 2004)

FARRIOR, S., 2002. Hate Propaganda and International Human Rights Law. In: PRICE, M. and THOMPSON, M. (eds). *Forging Peace – Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space*. Edinburgh University Press, 122. The quote is from United Nations Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1 (2 June 1947).

FERN, E. F., 2001. *Advanced Focus Group Research*. California: Sage Publications, 5.

FLEDELIUS, K. 1999, *Jugoslaviens sygdom og* død, ext. ed. Jens Frese, Copenhagen, Gyldendals Uddannelse, 105.

FLOYD, J., 2002. *New York Times*, 3rd March.

FORGES, A. D., 2002. Silencing the Voices of Hate in Rwanda. In: PRICE, M. E. AND THOMPSON, M., eds. *Forging Peace.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 236-258.

FRESTA Peace and Stability Fund, 2000. *Peace and Stability Through Cross-Boundary Civil Society Collaboration,* Programme Document 2000-2002. Copenhagen, 135-138.

The programme *Peace and Stability Through Cross-Boundary Civil Society Collaboration* was developed and designed for the then Danish Programme for Peace and Stability (FRESTA), in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FRESTA, 2000).

HIEBER, L., 2001. *New Home, New Life.* Geneva: Media Action International, 159-160.

HIEBER, L., 2001. *Lifeline Media, Reaching Populations in Crisis.* Geneva: Media Action International, 158.

HOWARD, R., 2002. *An Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding.* Vancouver, B. C.: IMPACS, 1-21.

HUTCHINS, R. M. et al, 1947. *A Free and Responsible Press – A General Report on Mass Communication: Newspapers, Radio, Motion Pictures, Magazines, and Books*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1999. *Case No. ICTR-99-52-T*. Points 28, 31-32, 89 and 98, 4-23.

International Federation of Journalists, 2001. Available from http://www.ifj.org/default.asp?Issue=ETHICS&Language=EN. [Accessed in 2005].

International Journalists Network, 2005. *Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct*. United States: Radio-Television News Directors Association. Available from www.ijnet.org. [Accessed on 2 June 2005].

INTERNATIONAL MEDIA SUPPORT, 2003. *Memorandum of Understanding – Partnership for Media and Conflict Prevention in West Africa*.

JAJA, S. O., 2000. *Political and Constitutional Development Since Independence*, Volume 1. Abuja: Gabumo Publishing Co., 43-46.

JAMES, I., 2000. *The Road to Independence*, Volume 1. Abuja: Gabumo Publishing Co., 39-42.

JENKINS, B. and SOFOS, S. A., 1996. *Nation & Identity in Contemporary Europe.* London and New York: Routledge,.

JONES, E. E. ET NISBETT, R. E., *The Actor and the Observer : Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Behaviour,* Morristown, N.J. 1971, General Learning Press, 1-16.

KELMAN, H., 1997. Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflicts. In: ZARTMAN, I. W. AND RAMUSSEN, J. L., eds. *International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*. USA: United States Institute of Peace, 200.

KAMENICA, S., 2002. *Media as a tool of conflict resolution.* Thesis (Master's). University of York, UK, 48.

KIMENYI, A., 2002. Trivialization of Geocide: The Case of Rwanda. In: KIMENYI, A. and Scott, O. L. (eds). , *Anatomy of Genocide: State-Sponsored Mass-Killings in the 20th Century.* New York: The Edwin Mellem Press, 3. Also available from website www.kimenyi.com/trivilization-of-genocide-the-case-rwanda [Accessed in 2004].

LAITIN, D and ROTHCHILD, D., 2005. Available from http://Cmtoolkit.sais-jhu.edu. *Causes of Conflict.* [Accessed in 2005].

LANSNER, T. R., 2003. *No Empty Vessel: Media Roles in Human Rights.* Unpublished.

LEDERACH, J. P., 1997. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.* USA: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 38-75.

LEWIS, H., 2003. *Evaluation and Assessment of Interventions*. USA: Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base Project, University of Colorado, 3.

LIJPHART, A., 1990. The Power-Sharing Approach. In: MONTVILLE, J. V., ed. *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies.* Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

LUND, M., 1996, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace.

LYNCH, J., 1997. *The Peace Journalism Option.* UK: Transcend Peace and Development Network, 2-56

MCNULTY, M., 1999. Media Ethnicization and the International response to War and Genocide in Rwanda. In: ALLEN, T. AND SEATON, J., eds. *The Media of Conflict.* London and New York: Zed Books, 276.

MCQUAIL, D., 2003. Public Service Broadcasting: Both Free and Accountable. In: *Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture*. September 2003. Slovenia, 14.

NNOLI, O., 1998. *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa.* Dakar: Council for the Development of Economic and Social Science Research in Africa.

OBASI, N. K., 2000a. *Evolution of the Broadcast Media in Nigeria,* Volume 1. Abuja: Gabumo Publishing Co., 373-377.

OBASI, N. K., 2000b. *Nigeria: The Road to National Unity,* Volume 1. Abuja: Gabumo Publishing Co., 65-67.

PARTSCH, K. J., 1992. Racial Speech and Human rights: article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination. In: ARTICLE 19. *Striking a Balance – Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination*. Place?: Article 19 and Human Rights Centre, University of Essex.

PIETERSE, J. N., year? Sociology of Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia Compared. *International Political Science Review,* 18 (1).

REIMANN, C., 2000. *Assessing the State-of-the-Art in Conflict Transformation. In: Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation.* Available from: www.berghof-handbook.net [Accessed in 2004].

RODRIGUEZ, C., 2005. Communication for Peace: Contrasting Approaches. wccd1, Dgroups,org, World Bank (Personal Communication)

ROLT, F., 2001. Our Neighbours, Ourselves. In: HIEBER, L. (ed), *Lifeline Media: Reaching populations in crisis*. Geneva: Media Action International, 158.

ROPERS, N., 2003. From Resolution to Transformation – Assessing the Role and Impact of Dialogue Projects. In: *The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, April 2003*. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 9.

ROSEN, B. R., 1993. The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. In: BROWN, M. E., ed. *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

RUTENBERG, J., *U.S.:* 2003, *Cable's War Coverage Suggests a New 'Fox Effect' on Television*, New York, N.Y. times April 16, 2003.

SCHRØDER, K. ET AL, 2003. *Researching Audiences*. Arnold, London, Arnold, 48-51.

SHAW, M., 1996. *Civil Society and Media in Global Crises, Representing Distant Violence*. London: Pinter.

SOFOS, A. S., year?. From "Yugoslav" to National Cultures: Ethnic Conflict and the Nationalization of the Public Spheres of Former Yugoslavia. *Res Publica*, XXXIX (2).

SOFOS, A. S., year?. Culture, Media and the Politics of Disintegration and Ethnic Division in Former Yugoslavia, In: ALLEN, T. AND SEATON, J., eds. *The Media of Conflict.* London and New York: Zed Books, 162-167.

SPARRE, K. S., 1998. *Journalists as Peacemakers?*. Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, pages?.

The Columbia Encyclopedia [online]. Available from www.bartleby.com/65/. [Accessed in 2005].

The Information Warfare Site [online]. Available from www.iwar.org.uk. [Accessed in May 2004].

THOMPSON, J. B., 1995. *The Media and Modernity – A Social Theory of the Media,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 42.

THOMPSON, M. AND DE LUCE, D., 2002. Media Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In: PRICE, M. E. AND THOMPSON, M., eds. *Forging Peace – Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 205-238.

Totse.com, 2005. *Propaganda in Theory and Practise: How does it Work*, available at www.totse.com/en/conspiracy/mind_control/165524.html [Accessed in August 2005].

TVEDT, T., 2003. Development NGOs – actors in a global civil society or in a new international social system. *Global Governance and Development Seminar* June 2-4, 2003, University of Roskilde, Denmark, 2nd-4th June 2003, 8-9.

Twagiramutara, 1976, Rapport à l'espace, rapport social : contribution à l'étude de leurs liaisons à partir du cas du Rwanda**,** Université catholique de Louvain. Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales. Nouvelle série ; 130, 112-113.

UYA, O. E., 2000. *The Civil Society and Democracy,* Volume 1. Abuja: Gabumo Publishing Co.

UNDPA's homepage, introduction to Conflict Prevention, 2005, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fst_prev_dip.htm

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, PEACEKEEPING BEST PRACTICES UNIT, 2003a. *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations.* New York: 40-48.

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, PEACEKEEPING BEST PRACTICES UNIT, 2003b. *Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone.* New York.

UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, PEACEKEEPING BEST PRACTICES UNIT, 2004. *Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of United Nations Mission in Liberia*. New York.

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1947. General Assembly
Resolution 110 (II). 3rd November 1947. Cited in: ALLEYNE, M. D.
2000. *Education for peace: The UN and new ideas for the
'information age'*. World Association of Christian Communicators
(WACC). Available from:
http://www.wacc.org.uk/publications/md/md2000-
4/alleyne.html.

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, year?. General Assembly
Resolution 2625 (XXXV), 25 GAOR, Supp. (no. 28), 121.

UNITED NATIONS NEWS SERVICE, 2005. *UN Commission finds
Sudanese Government responsible for crimes in Darfur*. Press
Release, 1st February 2005.

VINDERSKOV, K., 2004. *Monitoring Media Impact of TELESEE TV-
productions in Ex-Yugoslavia*. Copenhagen.

WHITE, R. K., 1965. Images in the Context of International Conflict:
Soviet Perceptions of the US and the USSR. In: KELMAN, H. C,
ed. *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*. New
York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 261-74.

WIMHURST, D. East Timor: The UN and Public Information*.*In:
PRICE, M. E. AND THOMPSON, M., eds. *Forging Peace –
Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media
Space*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 287-309.

World Investment News [online]. Available on www.winne.com.
Country Report on Nigeria. [Accessed 12th June 2000].

Interviews

BONDE, B. N., 2002. Personal interview with Manuel de Silva, spokesman for the Special Representative of the Secretary General to Afghanistan. (Spring 2002).

BONDE, B. N., 2004. Personal interview with Susan Manuel, Chief of the Peace of Security Section in UNDPI and her colleagues Mikhail Seliankin, Frederick Schottler and Masimba Tafirenyika. (6th December 2004).

BONDE, B. N., 2004. Personal interview with Nick Birnback, Public Information officer in UN's Department for Peace Keeping Operations. (8th December 2004).

BONDE, B. N., 2004. Personal interview with Michele Griffitt, Office of the Under Secretary General of DPA, New York. (8th December 2004).

BONDE, B. N., 2004. Personal interview with Dr. Sheryl Brown, Director of Department of Virtual Diplomacy, US Institute of Peace, Washington. (9th December 2004).

BONDE, B. N., 2004. Personal interview with Dr. William J. Durch, Senior Associate, the Stimson Center. (9th December 2004).

BONDE, B. N., 2004. Personal interview with Dr. Barnett Rubin, Center for International Cooepration at New York University. (13th December 2004).

BONDE, B. N., 2005. Personal interview with Kirstine Vinderskov. (10th March, 2005).

Additions for Cited References:

THOMPSON, M, 1999. *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina*, 2.ed., Luton, University of Luton Press.

ARTICLE 19, 1996. *Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda and State-Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990-1994*, London: Article 19.

Addition for Interviews:

BONDE, B.N., 2005. Notes from e-mail communication with Karsten Fledelius. (18th May, 2005)

Index